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[en] The 1990 review conference of the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is previewed. The issues that will be discussed are analysed and put into their political context. The key issues are identified as compliance with articles I, II and III of the Treaty, evaluation of the general state of the process of nuclear disarmament and the significance attached to agreeing to a comprehensive Test ban treaty and additional security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states. (UK)
[en] The Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970. It balanced the non-proliferation interests of several countries and created a mechanism for monitoring whether the Treaty was being honoured. Review Conferences at which parties to the Treaty could examine its implementation every five years were also established. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and subsequent Reviews of 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990 are discussed. In 1995 there will be a conference to decide the future of the Treaty. Possible extension proposals are examined. (UK)
[en] The role of Canada in the development of the current non-proliferation regime is considered. Canada has set a unique example in non-proliferation as, although it has a large nuclear power capability, it has always chosen, and will continue to choose, not to develop nuclear weapons. Its current attitudes and policy towards non-proliferation are discussed. (U.K.)
[en] This chapter argues the need to distinguish between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the issues of both non-proliferation and nuclear proliferation. It does not see the NPT as being able to maintain credibility and urges further study. In particular nuclear proliferation in the Indian subcontinent is examined. Both India and Pakistan have strong incentives neither to adopt a nuclear weapons stance nor to adopt a non-nuclear posture. (U.K.)
[en] This paper presents an integrated multicriteria analysis method for the quantitative evaluation of a state's nuclear nonproliferation credibility level. Underscoring the implications of policy on the sources of political demand for nuclear weapons rather than focusing on efforts to restrict the supply of specific weapons technology from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', the proposed methodology considers the political, social, and cultural dimensions of nuclear proliferation. This methodology comprises three steps: (1) identifying the factors that influence credibility formation and employing them to construct a criteria tree that will illustrate the relationships among these factors; (2) defining the weight coefficients of each criterion through pairwise comparisons of the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP); and (3) assigning numerical scores to a state under each criterion and combining them with the weight coefficients in order to provide an overall assessment of the state. The functionality of this methodology is examined by assessing the current level of nuclear nonproliferation credibility of four countries: Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Switzerland.
[en] The history of Non-Proliferation from 1945 when President Truman set out four fundamental assumption underlying the United States policy on nuclear weapons proliferation, until 1970, is set out. The events explained are the US Atomic Energy Act 1946, the Baruch Plan for International Control of Nuclear Energy, Non-Proliferation through National Agreement, Atoms for Peace, International Control, United States legislation 1946-1948, the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), General and complete Disarmament and the Irish Resolution and the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (UK)
[en] The success of the Third NPT Review Conference held in September 1985 is illustrated by the fact that the conference was able to reach concensus on the final report that strongly reaffirmed support of the NPT, contained useful recommendations and included three difficult issues - nuclear arms control, the 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi Tammuz reactor and a proposal that a non-proliferation commitment should be a condition of supply of nuclear plants and materials. The factors which enabled the consensus to be achieved are discussed. The uncertainty of the future of NPT is mentioned. (U.K.)
[en] International safeguards and export controls are central to ensuring international confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear materials and technologies and to achieving adequate oversight on the transfer and use of nuclear materials, technology, and equipment required for the development of proliferation-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Although the independent strengths of international safeguards and export controls rely largely on universal adherence, there may be opportunities to exploit the shared strengths of these systems. This article provides background information on the separate evolution of export controls and international safeguards, considers how these two elements of the nonproliferation regime interact, and identifies some possible avenues that could, over time, lead to wholly integrated activities.
[en] The nuclear non-proliferation regime comprises a wide variety of unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral agreements. All these agreements contain undertakings by the contracting states not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons and make provisions for means of verifying that the parties abide by these undertakings. The system of verification, the safeguards system, is fundamental to any effective nuclear non-proliferation policy. The purpose of this study is to show that IAEA safeguards, originally products of the political climate of the late 1960s and serving its ends, must be adapted to the political realities of the 1990s. The new aim of IAEA safeguards must be to deal with increased dangers of proliferation around the Asian crescent, and to derive full benefit from the end of the Cold War and from the dramatic progress that has been made since 1988 in devising and securing agreement on intrusive forms of verification that would have been unthinkable until very recently. Although much progress has been made since 1991, additional changes to reinforce the IAEA safeguards system are still required. The proposals contained in this study constitute a contribution to the debate over such changes and the necessary evolution of that system. (author)
[en] An overview is given of the national and international efforts to minimize the risk of a nuclear war by regulating, restricting, and containing the development and possession of nuclear weapons. this has become known as the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Any nuclear non-proliferation regime must have two essential goals: (a) to achieve nuclear disarmament of the nuclear-weapons states, and (b) the renunciation by the nonnuclear-weapons states of efforts to build or to acquire nuclear weapons. To make a regime effective it must be based on international agreements, a system of safeguards coupled with inspection and verification procedures, and above all on the good faith of all nations involved. (Author)