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[en] Conclusions: • IAEA has mandate to establish nuclear security guidance and to support States, on request, in its application; • Framework is in place: → High level guidance published; → Structures and processes established. • Priority is to complete comprehensive suite of guidance: → For use by States; • As basis for Agency’s other activities.
[en] Workshop Outcomes: • Representatives of all six SSCs gained a much fuller understanding of the ISAM, its purposes, and its application. • Overall, all six SSC representatives expressed strong support for ISAM and endorsed its value and practicality: – Clear consensus to begin using it on a trial basis; – At least two development teams are already doing so. • The only significant concern expressed by the SSCs related to resource requirements and expertise needed to apply the ISAM. • Draft ISAM document includes comments and perspectives discussed at the workshop.
[en] RSWG - Purpose: • Primary objective – promote consistent approach on risk, safety, and regulatory issues between Generation IV systems. • Elements of Work Scope: – Propose safety principles, objectives, and attributes based on Gen IV safety goals to guide R&D plans – Propose a technology-neutral framework of safety criteria and assessment methodologies; – Test and demonstrate the applicability of the framework and assessment methodologies; – Provide consultative support to System Steering Committees and other Gen IV entities; – Undertake appropriate interactions with regulators, IAEA, and other stakeholders.
[en] Overview in INPRO draft manual on nuclear reactor safety: • Proposed simplification of structure of methodology: – Reduction of number of basic principles from four to one; – Reduction of number of user requirements from 14 to 10 (by combining); – Elimination of overlapping criteria in different user requirements; and – Elimination of overlap with area of environmental impact of stressors (assessment of public exposure at normal operation conditions and AOO). • By request, inclusion of safety culture into the safety manual (removed from the manual on infrastructure).
[en] Conclusion: • Vendors provided a valuable demonstration of application of INPRO Methodology. • Vendors have important roles to (i) validate INPRO methodology, (ii) provide design information, (iii) help reduce assessor’s efforts in INPRO assessment of design specific areas. • For full scope NESA, assessors should work in close cooperation with vendors or with consultants with detailed design knowledge.
[en] Update of Gen IV Technology Roadmap: • What remains unchanged: – GIF goals: Sustainability, Safety & Reliability, Economics, and Proliferation resistance & Physical protection; – Six Reactor Systems; – Phase definitions: Viability – Performance – Demonstration – Industrialization.
[en] Objectives of PR&PP Working Group: • Facilitate introduction of PR&PP features into the design process at the earliest possible stage of concept development → PR&PP by design. • Assure that PR&PP results are an aid to informing decisions by policy makers in areas involving safety, economics, sustainability, and related institutional and legal issues.
[en] Current RSWG Activities: • Work during the past year has turned to focus primarily on development of an integrated framework for assessing risk and safety issues in Generation IV systems; • Methodology is called the Generation IV Integrated Safety Assessment Method (ISAM).
[en] Conclusion: • Since there are various technical choices, safety design standard for Gen-IV reactors should include commonly applicable, technology-neutral criteria. • Appropriate combination of deterministic and risk-informed approach should be pursued aiming at rational safety design. • Since SFR and LFR have common aspects as LMFR, consistency as LMFR safety design criteria is important in SFR SDC and LFR SDC. • On the other hand, clarification of SFR and LFR specific safety design criteria is also important.
[en] The close cooperation of INPRO with the three GIF methodology working groups (proliferation resistance and physical protection, risk and safety, and economic modeling) has been very productive and should continue. In the future, GIF will continue to focus its efforts on facilitating advanced reactor R&D cooperation among our members. As part of the GIF vision, I am open to hearing from IAEA about any suggestions on how INPRO and GIF can strengthen our relationship to support mutual objectives.