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[en] This publication provides information and guidance on the establishment of a process for periodic safety review for research reactors, including preparation, conduct of the review and reporting of results. In addition, it covers the regulatory assessment of these results. The publication also provides information on the experience of Member States in establishing and implementing periodic safety reviews of research reactors, including implementation of reasonable and practical improvements based on these reviews.
[en] This publication provides an overview of the latest experiences of Member States in implementing safety improvements at existing nuclear power plants. It describes in detail many of the modifications and, more generally, Member States' strategies for identifying and implementing safety improvements at their facilities. The publication aims to support practitioners in the continuous evaluation of nuclear safety at nuclear power plants. Within this publication the reader can explore a variety of technical approaches taken in retrospective assessment of safety at existing nuclear power plants and implementing safety improvements through various processes.
[en] This annex describes the regulatory approaches and practical implementation of reasonably practical safety improvements at the only NPP in the Netherlands: NPP Borssele (Siemens KWU, 2-loop PWR, 1975). The plant has undergone a long range of safety improvements since its start-up through back fits, increasingly more structured (periodic) safety reviews, complementary safety assessment (stress test) and lessons learned from internal and external events. The cumulative effect of all improvements on the Total Core Damage Frequency (per year) is shown. In general a lot of information about the regulatory framework, the regulatory authority, the application of PSA and the implemented nuclear safety improvements in the history of the power plant can be found in the National Report on the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
[en] This publication gives practical information and examples on safety analysis principles and methods as well as the contents of licensing documentation needed to support application of IAEA safety standards to nuclear fuel cycle facilities. A systematic methodology is presented, covering the establishment of acceptance criteria, hazard evaluation, identification of postulated initiating events, analysis of accident sequences and consequences. Information is also provided on application of the results of the safety analysis in the design and operational phases, and on appropriate management system processes. The publication applies to all lifetime stages of relevant facilities and for modifications and upgrades. The information presented may be used for periodic safety reviews and consideration of extended lifetime of facilities. With respect to licensing documentation, the publication provides indicative contents and format of the safety analysis report as a higher level document that incorporates the information required at various steps in the licensing and re-licensing process.
[en] Conclusion: IVR is one of important severe accident management strategies of CAP1400. The purpose of IVR-ERVC experiments is to obtain CHF at RPV lower head and research its relevant mechanism. IVR-ERVC experiment facility was designed and built with a series of improvements. Insights achieved in IVR-ERVC experiments contribute to IVR evaluation, design improvement and safety review of CAP1400.
[en] This Safety Guide provides recommendations on the establishment of a framework for safety in accordance with the IAEA safety standards for States deciding on and preparing to embark on a nuclear power programme. In this regard, it proposes 197 safety related actions to be taken in the first three phases of the development of the nuclear power programme, to achieve the foundation for a high level of safety throughout the entire lifetime of the nuclear power plant (NPP). This includes safety in the construction, commissioning, and operation of the NPP and the associated management of radioactive waste and spent fuel, and safety in decommissioning. Thus, it contributes to the building of leadership and management for safety and of an effective safety culture and serves as guidance for self-assessment by all organizations involved in the development of a safety infrastructure.
[en] Policy/Vision statements: 1. Mission Statement ENSI: “We strengthen safety” ENSI operates in an environment that sets the highest requirements for supervision. ENSI is well aware that successful supervisory work depends not only on the technical qualifications of each and every employee, but also on their values and their ability to work constructively together. To achieve these objectives, ENSI has drawn up a Mission Statement. The motto for the Mission Statement is: We strengthen safety, and it answers the following questions: Who are we? How do we carry out supervision? How do we act? How do we manage?
[en] This publication is the outcome of an IAEA meeting that provided a forum for senior regulators to share their experience and disseminate knowledge on how safety performance can be improved through effective leadership, management for safety and safety culture. The publication provides practical guidance to regulatory bodies on promoting and assessing safety culture within their own organizations and providing regulatory oversight of licensees' safety culture activities. Practices from Member States are summarized and common challenges faced by regulatory bodies in implementing these practices are described.
[en] This summary provides a view on safety and operational aspects, as addressed in the summaries of coolant characteristics (see Section 3 of this TECDOC), coolant confining structures (see Section 4 of this TECDOC) and interfaces (see Section 5 of this TECDOC), because they are key cornerstones for licensing of a nuclear facility. Growing international nuclear safety requirements for operation and additional considerations for anticipated events demand more sophisticated approaches for nuclear safety demonstration. This section is divided into two blocks: – Inventory control, accountancy and qualification procedures; – Enveloping safety analysis.
[en] In France the Regulatory Body is the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN), an independent administrative authority created by the Law on Transparency and Nuclear Security (2006). This paper presents the safety culture approach within ASN. According to the structure proposed by the IAEA, it addresses the safety culture policy, the safety culture program, continuous improvement, selfassessment and regulatory oversight.