[en] Safety in the operation of electrostatic accelerators is discussed in terms of analyzing the hazards and devising accident prevention techniques. Some practical guidelines are suggested. The usefulness of making a detailed safety analysis is stressed

[en] The author shows how the methods applied to nuclear safety can be extended to industry in general and particularly to the chemical industry. To this end, precise examples are given: cryogenic storage of liquefied gas, manufacture of fluo-products

[en] Trends in reactor safety evaluation in France following the publication of WASH-1400 (the Rasmussen Report) are presented. What is called 'the meteorite case' is first schematically presented as follows: WASH-1400 shows nuclear risk equivalent to meteorite risk and reasonable corrections cannot make many orders of magnitude, consequently present safety rules are adequate. The very impact of WASH-1400 on safety approach is then discussed as for: assistance to deterministic safety analysis, introduction of probabilistic safety criteria, acceptable level of risk, and the use of results in research and reactor operating experience

[en] The main objectives and activity of the Radiological Safety Commission of the University is described. (author)

[en] There is an increasing appreciation of the need for a consistent approach to nuclear safety between various groups having an interest in safety and between various types of installation. Licensing for construction and ultimate approval to operate any nuclear installation depend in the United Kingdom upon a searching assessment of the design, construction and operation of the proposed plant. Criteria of the kind discussed in this paper have been used by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate in this assessment process. From time to time they are subject to comments from other bodies in the U.K. One aim of the criteria is to set out the broad objectives that should be met regarding the magnitude of radiological consequences of accidents or normal operation. In addition, the criteria give guidance on the design philosophy for nuclear safety and the principles of fault evaluation. Criteria must be conceived so that while maintaining safety standards their application does not frustrate design and development. It is also important that undue formalism is not induced in the assessment process at the expense of inhibiting the judgement of safety assessors. A balance must, therefore, be struck between detailed and generalised guidance. It is also accepted that experience in the use and interpretation of criteria will indicate a need for improvement and additions: the criteria are, therefore, regarded as living rather than fixed statements which are expected to develop in response to any need for change in a safe direction that may arise. In developing them, the Inspectorate has drawn heavily upon the experience accumulated during its 16 years of operation and has also referred to criteria published by other organisations. The paper deals specifically with certain of the most important sections of the criteria and indicates the total range of subjects which need to be included in such criteria

[en] It is pointed out that claims recently made from anti-nuclear sources that the Lewis Committee condemned the Rasmussen report as being unuseable in the evaluation of nuclear safety are untrue. In support of this the report of the Lewis Committee, Rasmussen's rejoinder and personal statements by Lewis are quoted. (JIW)

No abstract available

[en] On the basis of the standard format for drawing up safety analysis reports for stationary fission reactors - this format was published in 1959 by the competent Federal Ministry for Atomic Energy - a report is made on the format and scope of German safety analysis reports. The reasons for drawing up a standard safety analysis report for nuclear power plants with pressurized water reactor or boiling water reactor and a KWU draft are discussed. (orig./RW)

No abstract available

[en] In this paper the Safety Analysis Report is considered as a source of information on the safety, availability and behaviour of similar nuclear plants. The human factor contribution to the safety system is pointed out (author)