[en] This session was originally titled 'Safety: Who cares?' in a fairly provocative way. A clear conclusion of this session and discussions that were held at the workshop is that there is a wide concern for safety among the people in charge of control room operations. This was shown as well by the quality of the seven talks presented in this session on subjects ranging from safety standards to a practical case of a safety incident. (author)

[en] The book is written with the awareness of safe work culture where success does not lie to compliance with the law only. Instead it is more of an excellent management based on the principle of self organization. Self arrangements in the management of occupational safety and health do not rest on the shoulders of the employer or the safety management and safety communities, but are committed together with the leadership of the employer. Self arrangements will be more meaningful and successful if those involved have knowledge about the philosophy and principles of why and how this management is done, and so the method can be practiced and eventually cultivated as a working system. (author)

[en] The main working spheres and results gained during 40 years of activity of the Great Britain Nuclear Installation Inspectorate (NII) are considered. The new approach to safety analysis developed with NII participation is described in details. The important role of the safety analysis realization, utilization of modern methods for risk estimation and safety culture principles introduction at NPPs is shown

[en] The main objective was to advise the EC on future challenges and opportunities in terms of enhanced co-operation in the area of nuclear safety and harmonization of safety requirements and practices in an enlarged European Union. The activities were divided into 3 sub-tasks as follows: part A, to prepare an analysis, synthesis and assessment of the main achievements from Community activities related to the Resolutions on the technological problems of nuclear safety of 1975 and 1992, with due consideration for related research activities; part B, to prepare an overview of safety philosophies and practices in EU Member States, taking account of their specific national practices in terms of legal framework, type and age of operating nuclear reactors; part C, to provide elements of a strategy for future activities in the frame of the Council Resolutions, with particular attention to the context of enlargement of the EU. (author)

No abstract available

[en] Considering the current trend in applying the revised source term proposed by NUREG-1465 to the nuclear power plants in the U.S., it is expected that the revised source term will be applied to the Korean operating nuclear power plants in the near future, even though the exact time can not be estimated. To meet the future technical demands, it is necessary to prepare the technical system including the related regulatory requirements in advance. In this research, therefore, it is intended to develop the methodology to apply the revised source term to operating nuclear power plants in Korea. Several principles were established to develop the application methodologies. First, it is not necessary to modify the existing regulations about source term (i.e., any back-fitting to operating nuclear plants is not necessary). Second, if the pertinent margin of safety is guaranteed, the revised source term suggested by NUREG-1465 may be useful to full application. Finally, a part of revised source term could be selected to application based on the technical feasibility. As the results of this research, several methodologies to apply the revised source term to the Korean operating nuclear power plants have been developed, which include: 1) the selective (or limited) application to use only some of all the characteristics of the revised source term, such as release timing of fission products and chemical form of radio-iodine and 2) the full application to use all the characteristics of the revised source term. The developed methodologies are actually applied to Ulchin 9 and 4 units and their application feasibilities are reviewed. The results of this research are used as either a manual in establishing the plan and the procedure for applying the revised source term to the domestic nuclear plant from the utility's viewpoint; or a technical basis of revising the related regulations from the regulatory body's viewpoint. The application of revised source term to operating nuclear power plants might increase the safety margin. (authors)

[en] Full text: The existing global safety regime has arisen from the exercise of sovereign authority, with an overlay of voluntary international cooperation from a network of international and regional organizations and intergovernmental agreements. This system has, in the main, served us well. For several reasons, the time is ripe to consider the desired shape of a future global safety regime and to take steps to achieve it. First, every nation's reliance on nuclear power is hostage to some extent to safety performance elsewhere in the world because of the effects on public attitudes and hence there is an interest in ensuring achievement of common standards. Second, the world is increasingly interdependent and the vendors of nuclear power plants seek to market their products throughout the globe. Efficiency would arise from the avoidance of needless differences in approach that require custom modifications from country to country. Finally, we have much to learn from each other and a common effort would strengthen us all. Such an effort might also serve to enhance public confidence. Some possible characteristics of such a regime can be identified. The regime should reflect a global consensus on the level of safety that should be achieved. There should be sufficient standardization of approach so that expertise and equipment can be used everywhere without significant modification. There should be efforts to ensure a fundamental commitment to safety and the encouragement of a safety culture. And there should be efforts to adopt more widely the best regulatory practices, recognizing that some modifications in approach may be necessary to reflect each nation's legal and social culture. At the same type, the regime should have the characteristics of flexibility, transparency, stability, practicality, and encouragement of competence. (author)

[en] Software Safety Analysis is one of the essential tasks must be performed in the design work of digital computer software used in safety system of Nuclear Power Station. While there is more experience in Software Verification and Validation and Configuration Management in software industry, Software Safety Analysis (SSA) is a new task. What is the scope of SSA? What should be done in SSA? Various SSA related code and Standards were reviewed and from the evolvement of code and standards, it was concluded that Abnormal Condition and Events should be treated as part of SSA activities and SSA activities could be one of the activities in Software V and V SSA case study on NUMAC as Pervious Developed System was presented and a new method on SSA - 'Hazard Analysis and Defense in Depth for Software Safety Analysis' to enhance the confidence in SSA activities in Lungmen project was introduced

[en] Full text: The safety culture in HANARO was self-assessed in accordance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety of Research Reactor drafted by IAEA. From 2002, IAEA has worked on the development of the Code of Conduct to achieve and maintain high level of nuclear safety in research reactors worldwide through the enhancement of national measures and international co-operation including, where appropriate, safety related technical cooperation. It defines the role of the state, the role of the regulatory body, the role of the operating organization and the role of the IAEA. As for the role of operating organization, the code specifies general requirements in assessment and verification of safety, financial and human resources, quality assurance, human factors, radiation protection and emergency preparedness. It also defines the role of operating organization for safety of research reactor in siting, design, operation, maintenance, modification and utilization as well. All of these items are the subjects for safety culture implementation, which means the Code could be a guideline for an operating organization to assess its safety culture. The self-assessment of safety culture in HANARO was made by using the sections of the Code describing the role of the operating organization for safety of research reactor. The major assessment items and the practices in HANARO for each items are as follow: The SAR of HANARO was reviewed by the regulatory body before the construction and the fuel loading of HANARO. Major design modifications and new installation of utilization facility needs the approval from regulatory body and safety assessment is a requirement for the approval. The Tech. Spec. for HANARO Operation specifies the analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection for HANARO operation. The reactor operation is mainly supported by the government and partly by nuclear R and D fund. The education and training of operation staff are one of major tasks of operating organization. The quality assurance and radiation protection for reactor operation and utilization are conducted by substructures of KAERI which are independent of operation and utilization organization. The emergency drill is performed every year in accordance with regulatory requirement. The effect of reactor operation on the environment is periodically monitored and evaluated. The items in the Code for siting, design, operation, maintenance, modification and utilization are fulfilled in HANARO. Thus, it is thought that the safety culture in HANARO satisfies the guideline of the Code on the role of operating organization. (author)

[en] This Safety Guide supplements the IAEA Safety Fundamentals publication The Safety of Nuclear Installations [1] and the Safety Requirements publication Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation [2]. It supersedes the Safety Guide issued as Safety Series No. 50-SG-O12, Periodic Safety Review of Operational Nuclear Power Plants, in 1994. Routine reviews of nuclear power plant operation (including modifications to hardware and procedures, significant events, operating experience, plant management and personnel competence) and special reviews following major events of safety significance are the primary means of safety verification. In addition, some States have initiated systematic safety reassessment, termed periodic safety review (PSR), to assess the cumulative effects of plant ageing and plant modifications, operating experience, technical developments and siting aspects. The reviews include an assessment of plant design and operation against current safety standards and practices, and they have the objective of ensuring a high level of safety throughout the plant's operating lifetime. They are complementary to the routine and special safety reviews and do not replace them. The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide recommendations and guidance on the conduct of a PSR for an existing nuclear power plant. The Safety Guide is directed at plant operating organizations and regulatory bodies. This Safety Guide deals with the PSR of an existing nuclear power plant. A PSR is a comprehensive safety review of all important aspects of safety, carried out at regular intervals, typically of ten years. The review process described in this Safety Guide is valid for nuclear power plants of any age, but may have a wider applicability, for example, to research reactors and radioactive waste management facilities. A PSR is not intended to deal with the decommissioning phase; however, documentation resulting from a PSR would be an important input for planning decommissioning