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[en] Benefits: Overall site-wide safety goals, appropriately decomposed and apportioned, will provide an effective basis for grading the safety analysis effort, as permitted and encouraged by the CRL site licence.
[en] Five areas were recommended by the TM where IAEA should consider producing guidance (the formal TM report): 1. Develop a hierarchical approach for Safety Goals. 2. Clarify interfaces between the Fundamental Safety Objectives, Safety Principles, Safety Requirements and the proposed framework for Safety Goals. 3. Develop a methodology to derive lower-tier goals in a consistent and coherent manner. 4. Develop guidance on methods and approaches to assess the degree of compliance with the full spectrum of Safety Goals and a comprehensive review methodology. 5. Develop an approach to using Safety Goals.
[en] The management system safety and control area (SCA) covers the framework that establishes the processes and programmes required to ensure an organization achieves its safety objectives, continuously monitors its performance against these objectives, and fosters a healthy safety culture. Performance objectives: There is an effective management system that integrates provisions to address all regulatory and other requirements to enable the licensee to achieve its safety objectives, continuously monitor its performance against those objectives, and maintain a healthy safety culture.
[en] This publication provides information and guidance on the establishment of a process for periodic safety review for research reactors, including preparation, conduct of the review and reporting of results. In addition, it covers the regulatory assessment of these results. The publication also provides information on the experience of Member States in establishing and implementing periodic safety reviews of research reactors, including implementation of reasonable and practical improvements based on these reviews.
[en] Summary: • The knowledge about ensuing fire occurrence in the second phase of HEAF has been accumulated, and it is becoming clear that if arcing time can be shortened, it is possible to prevent fire and to mitigate the consequences of explosions. • In the amended regulatory requirements, prevention of ensuing fire and mitigation of explosion are required. • Research on the scale of the HEAF impact and other factors at the first phase is to be continued, and when new knowledge is obtained, the results will be reflected in the regulatory requirements further, as necessary. – The role of TSO is to make use of research results to actual nuclear safety regulations. – S/NRA/R's HEAF research is a good example of research results that was useful for actual nuclear safety regulations.
[en] Safety Codes & Guides: • AERB has developed safety standards, codes of practice and related guides & manuals, covering all stages of a project. • Codes set the minimum requirements that are to be fulfilled mandatorily by the facilities. • Codes formulated on the basis of internationally accepted safety criteria. • Guides contain detailed guidelines to implement specific parts of a safety code.
[en] The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is being built by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to replace aging uranium processes at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 NSC) in Oak Ridge. This paper will summarize some of the more important lessons learned for the NCS (Nuclear Criticality Safety) practitioner working in a design environment rather than in a production or experimental environment. As the Chief NCS Engineer for the UPF Project I have been responsible for ensuring the technical evaluations produced on the project are high quality, technically accurate, and conform to the Y-12 NCS Program expectations. Ensuring nuclear criticality safety for processes that do not yet exist in reality is a challenge very different than that of ensuring subcriticality for processes in an operating facility. The biggest difference being that in design space - everything is imaginary whereas in the operating facility you have the benefit of being able to go out and look at the equipment and interview the operators. Ensuring that Nuclear Criticality Safety is integrated into design is a process that requires constant communication between the NCS staff and the broader engineering design team. Until the facility is constructed - nothing is physically stable and so rigorous documentation of decisions - to include any assumptions - is necessary to minimize errors. Non-NCS engineers will not understand the hazard or the physics of nuclear criticality. It is up to the NCS staff to provide training and communication to the team. The NCS staff must be patient and prepared to explain themselves many times and be as flexible as possible.
[en] Conclusions: • Existing laws and regulations provide a good coverage of the four layers of Safety Goals. • Adequate coverage of different facilities and entire life span. • Limited use of probabilistic safety goals; most detailed defined by industry. • The proposed framework and hierarchy of Safety Goals can be easily applied to the Swedish context. → This presentation is incomplete: Limited time available, not sufficient to provide a full picture. • The triangle fully captures the conceptual aspects of the framework and hierarchy, and the matrix provides specific examples: – Important not to see the matrix as a complete checklist!; – Good as a completeness check; – indicates areas that are lacking or unclear defined.
[en] In Great Britain, the drop in reactivity that occurs when nuclear fuel is irradiated in a nuclear power reactor has typically not been claimed. Instead, criticality safety assessments have normally assumed that the fuel is unirradiated with no reduction in the fissile material present. Although this 'fresh fuel' approach is conservative, it leads to an overestimation of the calculated neutron multiplication factor (keff) and may lead to additional operational burdens being placed upon duty-holders. In future, it is possible that GB duty-holders may take credit for the reduction in reactivity, known as 'burn-up credit', that occurs when fissile material is consumed in a nuclear reactor. In order to provide authoritative and independent information on the key aspects of burn-up credit, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) commissioned a research project. This paper provides an overview of the key findings of this research and potential implications for the regulation and management of criticality safety in GB. A 'Regulator Question' set for use when assessing criticality safety cases is given that is intended to aid both regulator and duty holder in their assessments, which enables regulatory attention to be targeted proportionately on those areas of most importance
[en] Our customers and the public rely on the nuclear industry to protect their safety and the environment. Assuring safe work outcomes is achieved through an excellence-aspiring culture; human behavior (HU) tools help workers and organizations achieve this objective, and foster learning while encouraging good behaviors. Nuclear Knowledge and Field Workers at SNC-Lavalin recognize and play an active role to reduce the likelihood of errors and events. Building a Culture of ExcellenceTM program was developed by SNC-Lavalin Nuclear, utilizing well-established Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) principles. This INPO-based framework is helping us to foster a leaning environment that affects our systems, personnel proficiency and accelerate industry best practices. This paper will discuss some of our improvement areas in that encourage and reinforce high standards promoting of health, safety, security, environmental protection, and quality. (author)