Results 1 - 10 of 1916
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[en] Nuclear Sector in Pakistan: • Current energy sources for electricity generation are: - Thermal (64%), Hydroelectric (30%), Nuclear (6%), Coal (0.3%). • PAEC operates the Nuclear Power Plants, Research Reactors, Nuclear Medical and Industrial Research Centers. • Several Private organizations also utilize radiation sources in medical and industrial applications. • PNRA is an independent regulatory body which regulates the nuclear installations and radiation facilities in the country
[en] The foundation of our Integrated Management System (IMS) is built on a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture. It guides our ''AT SITE'' Values and reflects how we conduct our business in a way that meets the highest possible standards of excellence and safety performance. We structure our organization, establish our roles and responsibilities and allocate our resources in order to perform and support the activities that are required to achieve our Vision and Mission. We operate and maintain our plant, establish our programs, processes and procedures, as well as develop and engage our people in sustaining excellence in all aspects of our business. We do this in accordance with all applicable regulations and international standards, whilst engaging and informing our stakeholders.
[en] HRD Support for Nuclear Power: • Coordinated support provided by Departments of Nuclear Energy, and Safety and Security; • IAEA support is provided in several ways: – Produces NE Energy Series, Safety Standards and Security Guidance (http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/default.asp; – Provides Advisory Services, Peer Reviews, Expert Missions, Building Capacities in MS; – Facilitates Global Networking
[en] Ongoing climate change affects complex and long-lived infrastructures like electricity systems. Particularly for decarbonized electricity systems based on variable renewable energies, there is a variety of impact mechanisms working differently in size and direction. Main impacts for Europe include changes in wind and solar resources, hydro power, cooling water availability for thermoelectric generation and electricity demand. Hence, it is not only important to understand the total effects, i.e., how much welfare may be gained when accounting for climate change impacts in all dimensions, but also to disentangle various effects in terms of their marginal contribution to the potential welfare loss. This paper applies a two-stage modeling framework to assess RCP8.5 climate change impacts on the European electricity system. Thereby, the performance of two electricity system design strategies - one based on no anticipation of climate change and one anticipating impacts of climate change - is studied under a variety of climate change impacts. Impacts on wind and solar resources are found to cause the largest system effects in 2100. Combined climate change impacts increase system costs of a system designed without climate change anticipation due to increased fuel and carbon permit costs. Applying a system design strategy with climate change anticipation increases the cost-optimal share of variable renewable energy based on additional wind offshore capacity in 2100, at a reduction in nuclear, wind onshore and solar PV capacity. Compared to a no anticipation strategy, total system costs are reduced.
[en] A first article comments and discusses the content the of the French PPE (Multi-year energy programming). It notably outlines that the ambition about energy savings has been scaled down. Some measures regarding the building sector are outlined, as well as the fact that co-generation is not addressed in this plan (other measures to phase out fossil fuels are indicated). The ambitious level of renewable heat, alternatives to fossil fuels and gases are also commented, as well as the objectives in terms of production of renewable electric power. The case of nuclear energy is finally addressed. As the French national low-carbon strategy (SNBC) is about to be reviewed, and as an objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 is still specified, the second article notices that the country did not meet its commitments in terms of carbon budget during the 2015-2018 period, and that it seems that it will keep on this way. Thus, it appears that, despite all measures and objectives suggested for the different sectors, basic objectives are threatened
[en] This document reports works by an information commission which addressed several topics: brakes on energy transition related to the lack of vision of what the future energy production and consumption will be, development of renewable energies, mobility, energy savings, the future evolution of large energy and industrial groups, taxing and financing, and the crucial role of territories. After a presentation of numerous recommendations, the report comments the existence and content of planning documents, and gives a brief overview of scenarios proposed by institutions, associations, NGOs and scientists. It outlines that the French energy production mix must be diversified, and better quantified and planned, that barriers to development of renewable energies must be removed (these barriers are identified for each specific sector), and that hydrogen should fully play its role in transition. The evolution of the energy consumption mix in the different sectors (housing and office building, sustainable mobility, industry) is addressed with discussions of obstacles to be removed. The roles of citizen, territorial communities and Parliament in transition are outlined. The numerous hearings are reported.
[en] Under the Paris Agreement, OECD countries agreed to aim for a reduction of their greenhouse gas emissions sufficient to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 deg. C above pre industrial levels. This commitment requires a massive effort to de-carbonise energy and electricity generation, a radical restructuring of the electric power sector and the rapid deployment of large amounts of low-carbon generation technologies, in particular nuclear energy and renewable energies such as wind and solar PV. This study assesses the costs of alternative low-carbon electricity systems capable of achieving strict carbon emission reductions consistent with the aims of the Paris Agreement. It analyses several deep decarbonization scenarios to reach the same stringent carbon emission target but characterised by different shares of variable renewable technologies, hydroelectric power and nuclear energy.
[en] China's dominance in the production of rare earth elements symbolizes the competition for once obscure sets of mineral resources in our increasingly digital, low carbon world. For the last two decades China has produced between 80 and 95 percent of the world's rare earths - a group of 17 metals that have become key components of revolutionary technological progress in fields ranging from energy, to ICT, to medical devices, to defense. Despite their name, rare earths are not rare, and can be found across the globe. Environmental concerns, which spiked in the 1970's and 80's notably in the United States and Europe, liberalized global trade, and Chinese policies designed to harness the country's resource wealth are primarily responsible for the concentrated production of these metals. From 2010, the world was made acutely aware of this distorted division of labor. Running counter to its commitments to global trade rules, China put in place stringent export control measures, including licenses, taxes and quotas, that would severely limit the supply of rare earths to industrial consumers abroad. In the same year, China was also widely accused of, though vehemently denied, placing a de-facto, two-month embargo on rare earth shipments to import-dependent Japan as a means of punishment for the detention of a Chinese fisherman in disputed waters in the East China Sea. The facts of these latter events can be disputed, and the gains that China may have achieved from such an embargo were marginal, but the damage was done. A combination of supply concerns and spiking prices - which for some rare earths rose by 500 percent or more in the year that followed - drove an investment boom in rare earth exploration that would include the jungles of Brazil, the depths of the Pacific Ocean and even the surface of the moon. Some production outside of China, notably from the Mount Weld mine in Australia, has so far proven viable, but others, such as California's Mountain Pass mine, have faltered as market conditions have shifted. Following a dispute settlement process at the World Trade Organization, China returned to more or less normal trade practices in 2015 and still accounts for more than 80 percent of global rare earth production today - including nearly all of the world's output for some critical elements, such as dysprosium. On the demand side, industrial consumers overseas went into high gear to find solutions. Many have been able to make efficiency gains, find substitute materials, or change technologies altogether that led to an estimated drop in nearly one third of global rare earth demand through 2016. But for others, for instance in the wind and automotive industries, solutions have proven more complicated and rare earths remain critical materials. Many project that demand for rare earths such as neodymium and dysprosium will rise significantly on the back of these dependent industries, but technological change and efficiency gains may yet hold further surprises. Herein, the risks are twofold. First is the continued dependence on China for rare earths that are still considered critical inputs by many industries of the future. Second is the risk that, in the frenzied search for solutions to supply constraints, industrial users may have to sacrifice competitiveness relative to other, particularly Chinese users which don't face the same material constraints. For China, using its resource advantage as an economic 'weapon' to fight its diplomatic battles is far from the primary goal. Indeed, China's approach to the rare earth industry has been largely driven by more domestic concerns. One is responding to the country's growing environmental crisis. In this effort, Beijing increasingly favors the more energy-efficient and low-carbon technologies such as wind energy and electric vehicles that often rely on rare earths. At the same time, it also looks to better manage the environmental disaster that rare earth production has brought to the country's mining regions. Another core driver is facilitating China's economic strategy to lead the industries of the future and increasingly master respective value chains - ensuring the country's long-term economic transformation and providing further legitimacy to the ruling Party. In this light, China's approach to rare earths has not only been to master resource production and ensure that Chinese industries have the resources they need, but also to increasingly dominate the downstream, value-added industries that depend on these critical metals. As such, China today is not only the world's primary producer of rare earth oxides, it is also their largest consumer and increasingly controls value chains for key dependent products such as rare earth magnets. Still, China's resources are not infinite, and concerns over rising demand and increasingly limited reserves for some rare earths in China are pushing Chinese companies to seek out resource supplies from abroad. As such, a new wave of overseas Chinese investment may mean that the production (and pollution) that was once delocalized to China will increasingly be diverted to other areas of the globe, with China still looking to master the more valuable downstream industries. (author)
[en] The financial system has an important role to play in financing the transition of the economy and the drastic reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and must take into account in its activities the risks that climate change poses to it. The French government has begun to mobilize on the subject, as have the Paris financial centre and the various institutions that supervise the financial system. What is the outcome of these actions: is financial regulation in France equal to the Paris Agreement? In order to answer this question, the Institute for Climate Economics (I4CE) and the Frankfurt School - UNEP Centre reviewed the entire French regulatory framework applicable to the financial system in order to identify its strengths, weaknesses and therefore its necessary changes. This qualitative analysis is summarized by a rating, assigned in the most transparent way possible. This study shows that the French regulatory framework has solid advantages, particularly compared to the European, German and Dutch frameworks analysed elsewhere. This advance is due in particular to the mandatory climate disclosures for investors, obligations that date back to the Energy Transition Law for Green Growth of 2015 and have made France a pioneering country in this field. The more recent awareness of financial supervisors in France and a strong financial market dynamic are also assets. But, on other issues the delay is significant or practices are only beginning to change. This is particularly the case for the supervision of asset managers who do not integrate climate issues or informing consumers about the climate impact of their financial investments. France is also lagging behind in taking climate change into account in national accounting standards or education and training in green and sustainable finance. Finally, on many subjects, France has a rather wait-and-see attitude towards Europe: it prefers to wait for the introduction of new European standards. This is particularly the case for the modification of prudential regulation in order, for example, to better take into account the risks related to climate change in the calculation of the capital required from banks. This wait-and-see attitude is also reflected in the consideration of climate in investors' fiduciary duty, or in the establishment of a taxonomy of 'green' economic activities. This evaluation exercise reveals that, although France is one of the leaders in green finance, there is still a long way to go to achieve a regulatory framework that is fully in line with the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The progress made in some areas should not obscure the collective work that remains to be pursued