[en] Risk is a poorly defined term and is commonly used in at least two quite different ways. I shall use risk in a qualitative way to mean the combination of the likelihood and consequences of possible events and I shall express likelihood as the probability or the probability per year of an event occurring and I shall define the consequences of the event as necessary. Risk assessment is then the process of assessing the numerical values of the probabilities and the consequences. It contains no element of social or economic judgment. However, the use of risk assessments must also take account of the way in which people react to real or imagined risks. It is unrealistic to expect that governments and regulatory bodies will take actions wholly on the quantitative assessment of risks they will also have to take account of people's reactions to and perceptions of risk

[en] Prior to the development of nuclear power, uranium ores were used to a very limited extent as a ceramic colouring agent, as a source of radium and in some places as a source of vanadium. Perhaps before that, because of the bright orange and yellow colours of its secondary ores, it was probably used as ceremonial paint by primitive man. After the discovery of nuclear fission a whole new industry emerged, complete with its problems of demand, resources and supply. Spurred by special incentives in the early years of this new nuclear industry, prospectors discovered over 20 000 occurrences of uranium in North America alone, and by 1959 total world production reached a peak of 34 000 tonnes uranium from mines in South Africa, Canada and United States. This rapid growth also led to new problems. As purchases for military purposes ended, government procurement contracts were not renewed, and the large reserves developed as a result of government purchase incentives, in combination with lack of substantial commercial market, resulted in an over-supply of uranium. Typically, an over-supply of uranium together with national stockpiling at low prices resulted in depression of prices to less than $5 per pound by 1971. Although forecasts made in the early 1970's increased confidence in the future of nuclear power, and consequently the demand for uranium, prices remained low until the end of 1973 when OPEC announced a very large increase in oil prices and quite naturally, prices for coal also rose substantially. The economics of nuclear fuel immediately improved and prices for uranium began to climb in 1974. But the world-wide impact of the OPEC decision also produced negative effects on the uranium industry. Uranium production costs rose dramatically, as did capital costs, and money for investment in new uranium ventures became more scarce and more expensive. However, the uranium supply picture today offers hope of satisfactory development in spite of the many problems to be solved. (author)

[en] Since the energy crisis, a number of energy plans have been proposed, and almost all of these envisage some kind of energy demand adaptations or conservation measures, hoping thus to escape the anticipated problems of energy supply. However, there seems to be no clear explanation of the basis on which our foreseeable future energy problems could be eased. And in fact, a first attempt at a more exact definition of energy demand and its interaction with other objectives, such as economic ones, shows that it is a highly complex concept which we still hardly understand. The article explains in some detail why it is so difficult to understand energy demand

[en] The volume G objective is to present a study that defines an organization, a staff policy and recruiting system and professional training in harmony with mine, plant and other services needs by considering available human resources and bearing in mind the Rick possible achievement of nigeriens staff, employee and personal advanced qualification and training.While the volume H describes the divers transportation methods for important equipments and reactive tonnage, during construction and project functioning phase of Imouraren sit. The possible divers way toward the sit are described. And transport methods and retained possible ways as base for the cost estimation are mentioned. In both volumes relative costs are estimated

[en] This letter deals with the discussion about the building of ‘Zwentendorf’, which should have become Austria's first nuclear power plant. The president of Austria is replying to Prof. Broda's letter about ‘Zwentendorf’ and appreciates Broda's neutral description of the energy-problem in Austria, but does not agree with him, due to possible energy distresses in the future. (kancsar)

[en] This report was published during the debate about the construction of nuclear-power-plants in Austria and before the national referendum, which prevented the implementing of “Zwentendorf”, Austria´s first nuclear-power-plant. The report gives a view over the events in the discussion about Austria´s nuclear-future. (kancsar)

[en] Twenty five years ago we began planning the first United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which took place in 1955. It had a tremendous effect. For the first time, for example, scientists from the West met scientists from the socialist countries; they found that they had a common language and they could appreciate one another's work. That changed the whole outlook of the period. In fact, Dag Hammerskjold said it was the greatest political event of the decade. Now we face a different problem, but I feel we should try to convene a similar meeting. A few things have happened since 1955. We have made enormous advances in the application of atomic energy; for example, the Soviet Union, which at the time had a reactor hooked up with a capacity of 5 kilowatts, now has nuclear power plants with a total capacity which is probably at least a thousand times greater. On the other hand, we are now not quite as optimistic that less developed countries can use atomic energy efficiently at the present time, but atomic energy - even if retarded in one way or another - is here. Whatever the changes since 1955, I believe that if the nations of the world took counsel together at a conference similar to the United Nations Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, it would become easier for the rulers of those nations to conduct themselves with assurance and confidence against the opposition of people who, for their own reasons, want to impede scientific and technical progress. I would like to see a revival of the spirit of initiative and daring so that we can again attack our problems rationally, knowing the risks but taking them, f would like people all over the world to realize that we are a global community and that an injury to one part of that community, whether physical, psychological or cultural, is an injury to the whole. So what I am calling for is a conference which will revive the flagging morale of science and technology, so that we can once again rely on the ability of the human spirit courageously and boldly to find rational ways of solving our problems. Our problems are much more serious now than they were in 1955. I have mentioned the oil problem, but there are two others that we must take into account. The first is the tremendous increase in world population, and it is compounded by the second: the rising expectations of the growing population. How can one meet the desire of more and more people for what they think of as the good things of life? The stable survival of our culture depends on our solving these problems, which are global and just as serious for the Third World as for the developed countries, including the socialist countries

[en] Although the anti-nuclear campaign is partially political, in the sense that it involves some of its leaders in representations and collective choices affecting the general orientation of society, it has not succeeded in becoming a lasting feature of the political spectrum. This is due to partly to the grassroots concept of the anti-nuclear movement which believed that it was possible to stand up against nuclear plant at local level and ignore the real centres of power. It is also due to the fact that the main political and union organisations have not taken responsibility for total opposition to nuclear power in that this calls in question the values of progress and growth to which these organisations are profoundly attached. Lastly, it is due to the political situation; since 1975 and the development of the economic crisis, the nuclear problem is bound to be pushed into the background by the problems of employment, unemployment and the standard of living. (author)

[en] The oil crises in the seventies had a large impact on the economic development in the industrialized countries. The question is how large the impact of an oil crisis would be nowadays, after many years of energy saving. An overview is given of the expectations for the most important energy markets and how these expectations in combination with energy levies will effect the economy in the Netherlands

[en] Before the United States of America can arrive at a coherent national energy policy, several ongoing debates must be resolved - on environmental hazards, health impacts, and the direct economic consequences of alternative future energy options. No one strategy is obviously correct - or uniquely ethical. Each strategy has its drawbacks, each can be blocked by one or another coalition of interest groups. The public is poorly informed by the media. A single large coal-mine accident is far more extensively reported than a long series of isolated accidents at grade crossings for coal trains, and yet the latter causes more deaths each year. Similarly, the public debate on nuclear issues is focused on low-probability, high-consequence events. It is as though national policy were being framed by a gambler whose motto is 'it's only the stakes and not the odds that matter'. The two authors of this paper come from different disciplines, yet they both believe that the odds do matter. It is essential that the public be well informed about the health risks and the economic consequences of a moratorium on the civilian uses of nuclear energy in the USA. We think that such a moratorium would adversely affect health and the economy. These impacts although small in relation, say, to the overall death rate or to the overall gross national product are not small in an absolute sense The adverse consequences of a moratorium are much more certain, and surely outweigh the impacts of any plausible accident associated with the operation of power reactors