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[en] The theme of the synopsis is the improvements of preventive measures in transport and preventive measures against drones that can be used as such in order to bypassing and endangering a nuclear security system. Also, the synopsis deals with the possibilities provided by wireless sending of data from remote sites, which improve detection measures for the purpose of tactical action against an illicit transit of nuclear material. All these measures aim to be the way forward for prevention and detection in the nuclear security system.
[en] Formed in April 2008, “Atomexpert” Ltd. provides services related to the NS (PP) of Radioactive Material and facilities, Physical Protection of the critical sites and facilities, counteracting terrorist acts at these sites and facilities. The organization has highly skilled professional members with specialized knowledge and experience in each of the Profile Activities bringing together the NS, the Nuclear Industry and Academia experts.
[en] Egyptian Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF) produces isotopes for medical and industrial purposes. The transport of radioactive material is interim phase from beginning till its destination. The specified procedures of an adequate transport security system incorporates the concept of defence in depth and uses a graded approach to achieve the objective of preventing the material from becoming susceptible to malicious acts. Pre-shipment check is crucial to ensure that all measure described in the security plan are in the place and functioning well and should be strictly followed.
[en] A robust and disciplined approach to maintenance is crucial to the lasting success of equipment, facilities, nuclear security measures, and systems related to nuclear security detection architecture. Properly designed and implemented, a comprehensive maintenance management plan will reduce long-term maintenance costs, improve system availability, and extend the service life of the equipment, instrumentation, and systems. The United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence defines maintenance as “actions taken to preserve, restore, verify, and improve an asset’s functional capability.” A maintenance management plan describes the tasks and the good practices required to effectively maintain the systems.
[en] Radioactive sources were used in Senegal long before independence in 1960. The inventory of these sources throughout the national territory, the search for sources out of regulatory control and the control of their safety and security are among the missions of the national regulatory authority created in the year 2011. The implementation of this mission from scarce resources has necessitated the development of strong and sustained international cooperation. The purpose of this article is to show how certain issues relating to the management of the security of radioactive sources have been undertaken thanks to international cooperation and through the development and progressive implementation of an integrated nuclear security support plan. (author)
[en] The recent revolution of information security in Sudan attributed to adoption of effective measures and strategies that taken by relevant governmental institutions. These institutions handle the burden of information security in Sudan according to the concrete governmental strategy governed by the Ministry of telecommunications and information technology and derived by local bodies such as Sudan- CERT, National Information Center, and the Nile center for technology research. The Recent development in information security has impact on the status of cyber security and in turn yielded reliability and data integrity on governmental level and specifically the nuclear institutions. This paper illustrates the development of information security in Sudan and the efforts that have contributed to this progress. (author)
[en] The purpose of the conference is to foster the exchange of practices and experiences related to the security of radioactive material under regulatory control in use, transport and storage, and to the system and measures for detection of this material out of regulatory control. Consistent with the objectives set out above, the overall themes for the conference will be: •Securing radioactive material from cradle to grave; •Detecting radioactive material involved in criminal/unauthorized acts; •Strengthening domestic interfaces and leveraging existing capabilities for keeping material under control and for detecting such material when out of regulatory control; •Facilitating international cooperation in supporting the efforts of states to fulfil their responsibilities to ensure the security of radioactive material; •Strengthening sustainability and effectiveness of nuclear security regimes related to security of radioactive material and nuclear security detection architecture.
[en] Control of unauthorized and illegal traffic of radioactive and nuclear materials across the border of the Republic of Serbia is carried out at national border crossings. Direct control of unauthorized and illegal traffic of radioactive and nuclear materials is performed by Customs Administration (customs officers) using portable radiation indicators and stationary radiation monitors. Assistance to Custom Administation is provided by other state authorities, Border police, Serbian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency and National inspectorate for radiation protection within the scope of their jurisdiction. (author)
[en] Each year, radioactive materials are lost, stolen or otherwise out of regulatory control. Most incidents are minor, but material is potentially available for criminal acts. The ability to detect illicit transport of radiological or nuclear material is an important component to reduce the threat. Hence, in the framework of the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program phase II Round Robin Test (ITRAP+10 phase II RRT), the IRSN developed platforms for testing nuclear security equipments. In the continuity of ITRAP+10, this project allowed checking the radiological performance of security equipments and their compliance with different standards (ANSI/IEEE and IEC). In addition, it supports national testing laboratories to build up facilities for performing tests and to get hands-on feedback to improve efficiency of testing procedures.
[en] Physical security in nuclear fuel cycle facility means detection, prevention and response to threat, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer involving radioactive and nuclear material. This paper proposes a physical security system designing concepts to reduce the risk associated with variant threats to nuclear fuel cycle facility. So, we will study the unauthorized removal and sabotage in a hypothetical nuclear fuel cycle facility considering deter, delay and response layers. Also, we will perform any required upgrading to the security system by investigating the nuclear fuel cycle facility layout and considering all physical security layers design to enhance the weakness for risk reduction. (author)