[en] As the numbers and complexity of nuclear facilities increase, limitations on resources for international safeguards may restrict attainment of safeguards goals. One option for improving the efficiency of limited resources is to expand the current inspection regime to include random allocation of the amount and frequency of inspection effort to material strata or to facilities. This paper identifies the changes in safeguards policy, administrative procedures, and operational procedures that would be necessary to accommodate randomized inspections and identifies those situations where randomization can improve inspection efficiency and those situations where the current nonrandom inspections should be maintained. 9 refs., 1 tab

[en] The use of multinational institutional arrangements to control sensitive nuclear-fuel-cycle activities has interested policymakers since the dawn of the nuclear age. Several such ventures have been tried in the past, largely for economic, commercial, or technical reasons, and they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. More recently, with the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies, multinational arrangements have received increasing attention as a means of reinforcing international safeguards which, together with political commitments on peaceful use, have been the principal components of the nonproliferation regime. The political acceptability and efficacy of multinational arrangements is related to the historic experience with multinational ventures, the changed political circumstances of the 1970s, and the probable requirements for constructive future cooperation. As part of a comprehensive regime covering the development of sensitive nuclear activities, multinational arrangements can reinforce the regime in a manner that is widely acceptable. A political effort to win support for such arrangements is thus worthwhile. 29 references

[en] It is clear that a lot of work needs to be done to increase understanding within the region about Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and the promotion of regional exchanges of information. A graduated and slow approach would be needed to overcome the existing suspicions and wariness about these new concepts. I have mentioned that the 'two tracks', which are complementary, would probably constitute a practical approach. The CSCAP series is particularly useful and important among the track-two discussions. In addition, I have identified some practical areas where the Kathmandu Centre could concentrate its work, such as organizing workshops to increase awareness and knowledge of such ongoing CBMs as the United Nations Arms Register, CSCAP and the ASEAN Regional Forum. In addition, the Centre could perform the roles of depository of seminar papers, of being the electronic hub of a network connecting the regional think-tanks and-even more ambitious-of becoming a centre for studies in preventive diplomacy and regional security. All these efforts will help to slowly transform the regional security perceptions between Asian countries and provide a positive regional security atmosphere, one conducive to regional economic progress and cooperation

[en] The spread of nuclear weapons would make the world a much less stable place, and such a spread may be difficult to stop. Yet proliferation is not as yet inevitable. Several viewpoints are implicitly rejected in this special issue on proliferation of International Organization. One is that nuclear proliferation would actually be desirable for the world. Another is that such weapons spread is inevitable. Other rejected viewpoints are that such spread can be halted only by a crash program, by a brutal exercise of American national power, or by a substantial surrender of such power. The international system may indeed hamper a nonproliferation effort in various ways - for example, in a drastic worsening of Soviet-American relations or a major disruption of world oil production. Yet, the most important counter to pessimism about containing proliferation comes from the world's awareness of how bad actual proliferation would be. States that pretend to be indifferent or resigned to such nuclear-weapons spread will quietly be making contributions to halting it. 6 references

[en] While nonproliferation is no longer in the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Afghanistan crisis, the problem of checking the spread of nuclear weapons was the subject of an intense controversy between the United States and Europe throughout the 1970s. Beginning with the Ford administration policy and continuing with the new Carter nonproliferation policy, a major nuclear controversy opposed the American and European nuclear suppliers. The first area of controversy was the question of technological transfers to the Third World and the conditions for such transfers (embargoes on sensitive technology, International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards). The controversy also spread into the area of the plutonium economy - i.e., breeders and reprocessing. On both of these questions, most of the problems raised in the 1970s are still open despite some rapprochement between European and American positions. Major points of disagreement remain in the aftermath of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation full scope safeguards, the question of breeder reactors, and plutonium economy. The major uncertainty for the future will be whether nuclear energy as a whole will remain in the present state of depression or whether nuclear programs throughout the world will grow again. 24 references

[en] Technical dispositions that safety authorities will accept after shutdown of a nuclear installation and reglementation to use are examined. The different solutions from surveillance and maintenance, after removal of fissile materials and radioactive fluids, to dismantling are discussed especially for reactors. In each case the best solution has to be studied to ensure protection of public health and environment

No abstract available

[en] The application of advanced statistical methods (estimation and testprocedures) in the analysis of sequential material balance data may improve implementation of nuclear materials safeguards in bulk handling facilities. In particular a hypothesis-test has to be developed which allows the detection of a diversion constant in time of small amounts of fissile material over extended periods of time with a high detection probability and a controlled low false alarm probability. It is demonstrated that for the case of independent variables and an infinite time horizon the Power-One-Test yields very satisfactory results. But in the presence of systematic errors of the balance data the requirements with respect to detection - and false alarm - probability can not be met simultaneously. For a finite time horizon the analytical calculation of the false alarm probability proves not to be possible, therefore different methods to estimate the false alarm rate have been studied. Due to the accumulated measurement error the limitations for detection of a protracted diversion can in principle not be influenced, neither by means of intermediate tests nor by application of more complex mathematical evaluation methods or a higher effort for recalibration or multiple measurements. But if it can be assured that within a preceding accountancy interval no material losses will have occured one can adjust for the systematic errors. By that way time periods much longer than that ''clean calibration interval'' can be effectively controlled for any significant material loss. (orig.)

[en] Centralization of radiation dose records into national registers of occupational exposures is an increasingly common practice. As a result, additional uses of the data have become possible, based on the improved accessibility of lifetime personal dose histories. So far greatest attention has been paid to the potential for epidemiological follow-up; but there are other emerging needs for computerized life-history data which are readily retrievable in quantity, as implied for example by the ICRP recommendation to limit the average doses to groups of workers, on the basis of cost-benefit analyses involving estimates of harm commitments accumulated over periods longer than a year. Only if the computerized dose data are collated into one lifetime dose history record for each individual will these purposes be readily served. Major difficulties are forseen, however, if the year-by-year computerized dose data for each individual are fragmented into two or more blocks requiring multiple access to multiple locations. Where the machine-redable lifetime histories also contain adequate personal identifying information, epidemiological follow-up become an inexpensive byproduct of good record keeping. Such design features have not figured prominently in published discussions, but are important for registers of occupational exposures to any agents with delayed harmful effects, such as asbestos, products from petroleum and coal tar and oxides of various heavy metals. Design options are considered in the present account, with a view to providing, for all such registers, reliable retrieval of personal exposure histories, in quantity, at modest cost. (author)

[en] Some of the constraints on the nuclear fuel cycle are ones arising from economic and financial reasons, those caused by uranium resources and their distribution, those arising from technical reasons, issues of public acceptance, and those quite independent of normal industrial considerations, but caused by elements of international politics. The nuclear fuel cycle and the international market, matters of nuclear non-proliferation, and international cooperation are discussed