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[en] Although nuclear security is primarily a national responsibility, the legal framework emerged and has been evolving because governments and international institutions recognize that threats to nuclear security have a global dimension. This imperative to work together gave rise to an international effort to build a nuclear-security framework to meet nuclear related threats. Its goal: a coordinated, consistent, sustainable fight against these threats. For the purpose of this paper, the legal framework for nuclear security constitutes a set of legally binding (“hard law”) and nonbinding (“soft law”) instruments which – in combination with other institutions and programs – strengthens nuclear security while helping the international community combat nuclear terrorism. International efforts to deter and prevent nuclear terrorism would be largely ineffective without criminalization of these crimes. States acting under these provisions define actions that threaten nuclear security as criminal offences in national law, and levy criminal or civil penalties commensurate with such serious offences. In this sense, nuclear forensics is key to successfully investigating and prosecuting such offences. The international legal framework for nuclear security provides a comprehensive umbrella under which to pursue such vitally important goals. (author)
[en] The accidents of nuclear smuggling and illicit trafficking of nuclear material has promoted the development of nuclear forensics science. The key issue is how to identify the origin of the material in order to improve the physical protection measures and prevent future thefts or diversions. The key challenge is the specialty of the studied object and complexity of application and the particular requirements for handling with such material. For interpretation of the results, nuclear forensics science relies to a large extent on the expertise and experience of research scientists. This paper outlines the common analytic techniques and briefly introduces the new development of nuclear forensics in international cooperation and reference database. (authors)
[en] Nuclear forensics is a relatively new and certainly a fascinating discipline in science gaining its attractiveness from the exploration of the unknown. As stated in the Communique of the Nuclear Security Summit held 2012 in Seoul “nuclear forensics can be an effective tool in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses.” It also resolved that “States are encouraged to work with one another, as well as with the IAEA, to develop and enhance nuclear forensics capabilities.” In order to respond effectively in case of a nuclear security event States should possess nuclear forensics capabilities as integral part of their national response plan. Nuclear forensic capabilities are not limited to analytical means; they include the legal and regulatory framework, technical infrastructure and human capital. Based on a sound understanding of the opportunities offered by nuclear forensic investigations and its limitations, policy makers can establish the basis for implementing nuclear forensic capabilities at national level. Decision makers of different authorities and organizations need to cooperate in order to ensure the integration of available resources in an efficient response mechanism with appropriate technical nuclear forensics required by measurement experts and law enforcement.
[en] Currently, there are 17 member states in Africa of the Illicit Trafficking Database. These member states have together reported 54 incidences. There were 23 more incidents reported in open sources and are awaiting confirmation by the states involved.
[en] Despite substantial progress in improving nuclear security in recent years, there is more to be done. The threats of nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real. This paper recommends learning from the much stronger national and international efforts in nuclear safety, and in particular taking steps to build international understanding of the threat; establish effective performance objectives; assure performance; train and certify needed personnel; build security culture and exchange best practices; reduce the number of sites that need to be protected; and strengthen the international framework and continue the dialogue once leaders are no longer meeting regularly at the summit level. (author)
[en] Current international nuclear security dialogue has increasing focus on the physical protection of nuclear material with respect to the insider threat. Recent, widely-published cases of smuggling and sabotage of systems have prompted increased concerns that an adversary with access into and within the facility may be more likely to perform a malevolent act than a group of outsiders performing an overt attack. Additionally, by virtue of access to the facility, the insider has the ability to use authority to obtain sufficient knowledge about the facility and processes to identify unique scenarios to successfully complete a malicious act. When implementing standard analysis methods it is common practice to identify and analyze obvious insider groups – material handlers, security, etc. Because the insider is not always who you would expect, there is increasing interest in the “unexpected insider” - one who is not directly associated with material and is not easily grouped. By thoroughly analyzing the expected and the unexpected insider a facility is able to more effectively prioritize protection strategies. Identifying potential methods to identify, analyse, and mitigate against insiders, including the “unexpected insider” has become critical to design and implementation of a comprehensive approach to protection against the insider. This paper focuses on the consideration of the “unexpected insider” when designing and evaluating implementation of the preventive and protective measures to counter the insider. The paper explores the methodologies on prioritizing an insider’s access, authority, and knowledge that are required to do his or her duties within a facility. The paper will provide insight on factors for the unexpected insider such as someone who does not have authorized access to an area but has knowledge of the procedures and processes. The paper will also discuss how current methodologies focus on personnel aspects, administrative aspects, and technical aspects of a protection system which can be implemented to address the “unexpected insider.” The paper will provide a review of recently published incidents of protracted theft and sabotage of systems by an insider, identify and summarize factors that make the incident unique, and propose techniques for protection. (author)
[en] This paper presents the joint experience of the Group of Six in the field of physical protection against the theft or unauthorized removal of nuclear material and against the sabotage of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, which emerged from the joint discussion. Several fundamental principles stem from this experience. Of course the particular terms and conditions of the implementation of these principles are specific to each country. (authors)
[en] Developing new approaches for integrating proliferation resistance into the design of nuclear facilities could lead to improved safeguards applications at both the facility and state levels. This paper provides a practical approach to integrating into the design of nuclear facilities intrinsic and extrinsic proliferation-resistance features that will provide an effective and efficient method to help prevent the diversion, production, theft, and misuse of nuclear material and sensitive technologies for use in development of nuclear or radiological weapons (i.e., 'proliferation'). To facilitate this approach at the facility level, an integrated proliferation risk analysis (IPRA) process is proposed to systematically analyze a facility's processes, systems, equipment, structures, and management controls to ensure that all relevant proliferation scenarios that could result in unacceptable consequences have been identified, evaluated, and mitigated. This approach, which can be institutionalized into the country's regulatory structure, is similar to how facilities are licensed to operate safely and to how they are monitored through audits and incident reporting to ensure continued safe operation. (author)
[en] A State should have a plan ready for response to the detection or suspicion of illicit trafficking in or loss of control of radioactive sources. The response to a radiological emergency may involve many organizations. Therefore, in order to be effective, the response to a radiological emergency must be well co-ordinated, and arrangements must be appropriately integrated with those for a conventional emergency. The regulatory body should require that the emergency arrangements be tested in an exercise before the commencement of operations. (author)
[en] The violent insider threat poses a special challenge to facilities protecting special nuclear material from theft or diversion. These insiders could potentially behave as nonviolent insiders to deceitfully defeat certain safeguards elements and use violence to forcefully defeat hardware or personnel. While several vulnerability assessment tools are available to deal with the nonviolent insider, very limited effort has been directed to developing analysis tools for the violent threat. In this paper, we present an approach using the results of a vulnerability assessment for nonviolent insiders to evaluate certain violent insider scenarios. Since existing tools do not explicitly consider violent insiders, the approach is intended for experienced safeguards analysts and relies on the analyst to brainstorm possible violent actions, to assign detection probabilities, and to ensure consistency. We then discuss our efforts in developing an automated tool for assessing the vulnerability against those violent insiders who are willing to use force against barriers, but who are unwilling to kill or be killed. Specifically, we discuss our efforts in developing databases for violent insiders penetrating barriers, algorithms for considering the entry of contraband, and modelling issues in considering the use of violence