No abstract available

[en] A physical inventory verification (PIV) was simulated at a mixed-oxide fuel fabrication facility. Safeguards inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted the PIV exercise to test inspection procedures under ''realistic but relaxed'' conditions. Nondestructive assay instrumentation was used to verify the plutonium content of samples covering the range of material types from input powders to final fuel assemblies. This paper describes the activities included in the exercise and discusses the results obtained. 5 refs., 1 fig., 6 tabs

[en] The report treats the feasibility of safeguarding a wide-scale domestic mixed oxide industry. It presents the results of an effort originally undertaken as part of the GESMO environmental impact statement and is being published as a technical report in order to provide information which would otherwise be unavailable due to the termination of the GESMO activity. The characteristics of a projected wide-scale MOX industry, the perceived threat to that industry, and the possible consequences of sabotage or theft of nuclear material are discussed. Safeguards strategies, technical approaches, and currently existing safeguards requirements and their applicability to safeguarding a MOX industry are discussed and their economic costs and societal impacts assessed

No abstract available

[en] Topics discussed are: safeguards considerations for the MOX fuel industry; approaches to safeguards; reference safeguards system;alternative safeguards options; and societal impacts

[en] Physical inventories are taken periodically to meet Company, State and IAEA requirements. Those physical inventories may be verified by IAEA and/or State inspectors. This presentation describes in an introductory but detailed manner the approaches and procedures used in planning, preparing, conducting, reconciling and reporting physical inventories for the Model Plant. Physical inventories are taken for plant accounting purposes to provide an accurate basis for starting and closing the plant material balance. Physical inventories are also taken for safeguards purposes to provide positive assurance that the nuclear materials of concern are indeed present and accounted for

No abstract available

[en] The structural integrity and possible failure modes of mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants (MOFFP) subjected to different ground-motion intensities ranging from 0.1- to 1.0-g peak accelerations was studied. To perform this study, calculation models of safety-related systems to be used in the analysis were developed. Both elastic and inelastic dynamic response analyses for both horizontal and vertical ground motion were performed. Conclusions drawn regarding the structural integrity for the model MOFFP are as follows: (1) no structural damage at ground motions <0.4 g; (2) severe structural damage at 0.4 to 0.5 g; (3) complete building collapse at >0.5 g; and (4) building collapse before equipment failure. (U.S.)

[en] The main industrial facilities involved in closing the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle in France are La Hague reprocessing plants in which fission products are vitrified and recycle materials are recovered and purified, and MELOX plant where the recovered plutonium is used to fabricate MOX fuel. These facilities are operated by AREVA/COGEMA. Since the opening of the first plutonium box at the MELOX plant in February 1995, a huge return of experience has been accumulated in the operation of the first large-scale industrial and highly automated MOX manufacturing plant in the world. The results which will be presented in this paper are the consequences of the permanent quality improvement policy implemented since start-up as a necessary condition to satisfy safety requirements as well as commercial, economical and social constraints. In the first part of the paper, a detailed history of production since February 1995 up to 2003 will be presented, with special emphasis on 1997 (first year of 100 tHM production), March 1998 (a one-month demonstration period concluding with 19 t production), and since 1999 (beginning of multi-design productions within the limits of the decree). The second part of the paper will be devoted to the results and performances of the plant since start-up. Finally, the paper will present the prospects for the future, and especially in the development of the level of production up to 145 tHM within the limits of the new decree. (author)

[en] The automated fabrication process is executed and supervised by an operational control unit. The operational control unit is programmed to dose the different powder components and to perform the single fabrication steps to obtain the powder composition desired. According to the powder specifications the amounts of the components are variable. They have to be programmed and have to comply with the requirements of criticality safety. Criticality safety is based on fixed values as content of fissile material, moderation and powder densities to assess the safety of equipment and to determine safe or subcritical masses. To maintain criticality safety independent from the variable values programmed within the operational control unit, an active safety system has been introduced which controls and limits the criticality parameters at fixed values. The general design criteria for criticality safety are given. The different fabrication steps are explained and the safety measures as applied are demonstrated. (Author)