[en] A systematization of nuclear energy law is presented. Attention is paid in particular, to the Brazil-Germany agreement

[en] Over the last decade, a number of very significant developments have taken place in modernising the existing international nuclear liability regimes. The first major advancement was the adoption, in September 1997, of the Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (VC Protocol) and of a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). This was followed, in February 2004, by the adoption of Protocols to amend both the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (PC Protocol) and the 1963 Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention (BSC Protocol). The principle goal of all these new instruments is to provide a greater amount of compensation to a larger number of victims in respect of a broader scope of nuclear damage suffered as a result of a nuclear accident. The second, but still very important objective is the maintenance of compatibility between the revised Paris and Vienna Conventions to ensure the smooth functioning of the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (VC) and the Paris Convention (PC). In addition, the PC States wish to ensure that their newly revised Convention will not prevent a Contracting Party from joining the more global regime established by the CSC. However, it remains to be seen to what extent these new instruments will attract a sufficient number of adherents to make them truly effective. While the VC Protocol is already in force, it has not drawn wide support from the 1963 VC States or from countries with important nuclear generating capacity which have not yet joined that latter any Convention. In addition, notwithstanding its adoption almost 10 years ago, the CSC has not yet entered into force and it remains questionable whether it will ever attract the necessary number of adherents for that purpose, especially in light of its strict requirements in this regard. As for the PC and BSC Protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Compensation Conventions, it is too early to make predictions regarding their entry into force, but one can say, based upon the latest available information that their Contracting Parties are progressing rapidly towards ratification, acceptance or approval of those instruments and their implementation into national law. Nevertheless, there is little encouraging information with respect to the adherence to those Protocols of the many important nuclear power generating countries which have not yet joined the Paris/Brussels any international nuclear liability regime. The need for international co-operation to attract a larger number of adherents to these various instruments, to facilitate their ratification, acceptance or approval and to assist in the adoption of appropriate implementing legislation therefore remains a high priority amongst the international nuclear community. (author)

[en] These Rules of Procedure apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention convened in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Convention

[en] These Rules of Procedure apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention convened in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Convention

[en] The texts of the relationship agreements which the Agency has concluded with the specialized agencies listed below, together with the respective protocols authenticating them, are reproduced in this document in the order which the agreements entered into force, for the information of all Members of the Agency

[en] At its fifth series of meetings, Working Group 3 received a background paper prepared by the IAEA which had a threefold purpose: firstly, to provide an overview on institutional arrangements under consideration by the INFCE Working Groups; secondly, to explore potential relationships between the various institutional arrangements under consideration; and thirdly, to identify areas where further analysis might be desirable

[en] No country is immune to nuclear terrorism. Recent experiences with terrorist bombings at the New York World Trade Center and the Oklahoma City Federal Building have indicated the fact that some terrorists are intent on killing as many people as possible and would not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction to do so. Japan's Aum Shinri-kyo sect tried to buy a nuclear weapon, experimented with the biological weapon anthrax, and used the chemical weapon nerve gas against passengers on the Tokyo subway. Weapons usable nuclear material is now for sale by smugglers. The NPT regime and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are inadequate to deal with the threat that terrorists might buy or steal such material to make a bomb. The Convention only applies to nuclear material 'for peaceful purposes in international transport' and fails to provide for any inspections. The IAEA and its Member States should review physical protection standards in the Convention and in INFCIRC/225/Rev.3. Peer reviews - a substitute for inspections - should be more widespread. States unwilling to accept peer reviews should be asked to respond to an IAEA questionnaire on their physical protection practices. Some method should be found to conduct inspections of physical protection practices in States with significant weapons usable material, particularly Russia and the United States of America. After a period of expert review and experimentation, the Convention should be amended to remove its exceptions from coverage, to strengthen its standards and to require inspections. (author)

[en] The following methods are described: 1) reproducibility of a measurement, both for a qualitative and a quantitative result, 2) comparison of a new diagnostic test, 3) comparison of two diagnostic tests, 4) sample size computation. (authors)

[en] Third party liability insurance for nuclear damage likely to be caused during international transport of nuclear substances should be approved, in accordance with the 1960 Paris Convention, by the countries over whose territories these substances are carried even when the insurer is in a foreign country. However this policy is not yet applied in all the member countries of the Convention. A solution might be to follow the international motor insurance scheme, commonly called the green card system, which guarantees the insurance taken out by the driver. In addition, the financial security certificate provided by the Paris Convention should be changed to adapt with international transport conditions. (N.E.A.)

[en] Now that the worldwide evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle decided upon in October 1977 for further international support of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which, at the same time, is to minimize the proliferation risk of nuclear weapons, is fifty percent complete, an analysis of the work performed so far in INFCE (International Fuel Cycle Evaluation) and of its trends and perspectives may be attempted. It turns out that all of the sixty countries now participating seem to be interested in obtaining results; however, these findings will not be binding under international law. No country has so far questioned the importance of nuclear energy as a source of opwer. The strong initial interest in 'exotic' fuel cycles has given way to a more sober assessment. All industrialized countries, the United States included, want to keep open the option for the fast breeder reactor. The developing countries have not sought confrontation with the industrialized countries, but constructively participate in the quest for problem solutions. (orig.)