[en] Third party liability insurance for nuclear damage likely to be caused during international transport of nuclear substances should be approved, in accordance with the 1960 Paris Convention, by the countries over whose territories these substances are carried even when the insurer is in a foreign country. However this policy is not yet applied in all the member countries of the Convention. A solution might be to follow the international motor insurance scheme, commonly called the green card system, which guarantees the insurance taken out by the driver. In addition, the financial security certificate provided by the Paris Convention should be changed to adapt with international transport conditions. (N.E.A.)

[en] Now that the worldwide evaluation of the nuclear fuel cycle decided upon in October 1977 for further international support of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy which, at the same time, is to minimize the proliferation risk of nuclear weapons, is fifty percent complete, an analysis of the work performed so far in INFCE (International Fuel Cycle Evaluation) and of its trends and perspectives may be attempted. It turns out that all of the sixty countries now participating seem to be interested in obtaining results; however, these findings will not be binding under international law. No country has so far questioned the importance of nuclear energy as a source of opwer. The strong initial interest in 'exotic' fuel cycles has given way to a more sober assessment. All industrialized countries, the United States included, want to keep open the option for the fast breeder reactor. The developing countries have not sought confrontation with the industrialized countries, but constructively participate in the quest for problem solutions. (orig.)

[en] The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State. There is no single international instrument that addresses nuclear security in a comprehensive manner. The legal foundation for nuclear security comprises international instruments and recognized principles that are implemented by national authorities. Security systems at the national level will contribute to a strengthened and more universal system of nuclear security at the international level. The binding security treaties are; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the 2005 amendment thereto, Safeguards Agreements between the Agency and states required in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Model Protocol additional to agreement(s) between State(s) and the Agency for the application of Safeguards Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

[en] The responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each individual state. However,states need to work together to enhance collective nuclear security. There are international legal instruments that provide a strategic framework and a common platform for such cooperation. Among such legally binding security related instruments are: Convention on the physical protection of Nuclear materials, Convention on the early notification of nuclear accident and the International convention for the Suppression of acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

[en] International liability agreements, their development and problems are outlined in brief, their stage of ratification is discussed and proposals are made for their revision. (HP/LN)

[en] The document is the second revision of the Rules of Procedures and Financial Rules that apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (INFCIRC/573), convened in accordance with the Chapter 3 of the Convention

[en] The presentation is on the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, U N Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism

[en] These Rules of Procedure apply mutatis mutandis to any meetings of the Contracting Parties to the Convention convened in accordance with Chapter 3 of the Convention

[en] A systematization of nuclear energy law is presented. Attention is paid in particular, to the Brazil-Germany agreement

[en] Over the last decade, a number of very significant developments have taken place in modernising the existing international nuclear liability regimes. The first major advancement was the adoption, in September 1997, of the Protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (VC Protocol) and of a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). This was followed, in February 2004, by the adoption of Protocols to amend both the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (PC Protocol) and the 1963 Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention (BSC Protocol). The principle goal of all these new instruments is to provide a greater amount of compensation to a larger number of victims in respect of a broader scope of nuclear damage suffered as a result of a nuclear accident. The second, but still very important objective is the maintenance of compatibility between the revised Paris and Vienna Conventions to ensure the smooth functioning of the 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention (VC) and the Paris Convention (PC). In addition, the PC States wish to ensure that their newly revised Convention will not prevent a Contracting Party from joining the more global regime established by the CSC. However, it remains to be seen to what extent these new instruments will attract a sufficient number of adherents to make them truly effective. While the VC Protocol is already in force, it has not drawn wide support from the 1963 VC States or from countries with important nuclear generating capacity which have not yet joined that latter any Convention. In addition, notwithstanding its adoption almost 10 years ago, the CSC has not yet entered into force and it remains questionable whether it will ever attract the necessary number of adherents for that purpose, especially in light of its strict requirements in this regard. As for the PC and BSC Protocols to amend the Paris and Brussels Supplementary Compensation Conventions, it is too early to make predictions regarding their entry into force, but one can say, based upon the latest available information that their Contracting Parties are progressing rapidly towards ratification, acceptance or approval of those instruments and their implementation into national law. Nevertheless, there is little encouraging information with respect to the adherence to those Protocols of the many important nuclear power generating countries which have not yet joined the Paris/Brussels any international nuclear liability regime. The need for international co-operation to attract a larger number of adherents to these various instruments, to facilitate their ratification, acceptance or approval and to assist in the adoption of appropriate implementing legislation therefore remains a high priority amongst the international nuclear community. (author)