[en] This report has been prepared to satisfy Section 3156(b) of Public Law 101-189 (Reports in Connection with Permanent Closures of Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities), which requires submittal of a Closure Report to Congress by the Secretary of Energy upon the permanent cessation of production operations at a US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facility (Watkins 1991). This closure report provides: (1) A complete survey of the environmental problems at the facility; (2) Budget quality data indicating the cost of environmental restoration and other remediation and cleanup efforts at the facility; (3) A proposed cleanup schedule

[en] Separate abstracts were prepared for 31 sections of the report. Twenty-five were announced in Nuclear Science Abstracts and all were announced in ERDA Energy Research Abstracts

No abstract available

[en] The US Department of Energy Hanford Site, near Richland, Washington, is the location of eight shut-down plutonium production reactors that are now in safe storage. These reactors each operated between 14 and 24 years, until shutdown of the last reactor in 1971. Comprehensive decommissioning planning has been conducted for the reactors and their support facilities actual decommissioning work has begun on some support facilities. Decommissioning criteria used at Hanford are discussed in this paper, as well as major planning assumptions. Decommissioning alternatives have been identified and assessed. The final decommissioning alternative will be selected through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process. The NEPA process for the Hanford reactor decommissioning has been initiated and will include a complete Environmental Impact Statement

[en] This 100-KR-1 Operable Unit Focused Feasibility Study (FFS) is prepared in support of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) process for the 100 Areas. This 100-KR-1 FFS, evaluates the remedial alternatives for interim action at high-priority waste sites within the 100-KR-1 Operable Unit, and provides the information needed for the timely selection of the most appropriate interim action at each waste site. The FFS process for the 100 Areas is conducted in two stages: an evaluation of remedial alternatives for waste-site groups and an evaluation of the remedial alternatives for individual waste sites. Whenever the characteristics of the individual waste-sites are sufficiently similar to the characteristics of the waste-site groups, the evaluation of alternatives in the Process Document is used. This approach, referred to as the ''plug-in'' approach, is used because there are many waste sites within the 100 Areas that are similar to each other

[en] Radiological surveys in the 105 K-East Fuel Storage Basin show average dose rates of 4 to 50 mrem/hr. A major source of the dose is the radionuclides that have been absorbed into the concrete wall of the basin. This reports documents the design review of the concept for reducing the dose from the walls. Volume 1 comprises the Design Review Report and Volume 2 comprises the Design Review Package

[en] This supporting document provides the hazard categorization for 105-KE Basin Debris Removal Project activities planned in the K east Basin. All activities are categorized as less than Hazard Category 3

No abstract available

[en] The reactor primary shield is constructed of high density concrete and surrounds the reactor core. The inlet, outlet and side primary shields were constructed in-place using 2.54 cm (1 in) thick steel plates as the forms. The plates remained as an integral part of the shields. The elongation of the pressure tubes due to thermal expansion and pressurization is not moving through the inlet nozzle hardware as designed but is accommodated by outward displacement and bowing of the inlet and outlet shields. Excessive distortion of the shields may result in gas seal failures, intolerable helium gas leaks, increased argon-41 emissions, and shield cooling tube failures. The shield surveillance and testing results are presented

[en] This evaluation is intended to provide a comprehensive assessment of the risks from fire and fire related perils for the fire barriers between spent nuclear fuel storage basins and reactor areas, 105KE and 105KW. As a result of this fire barrier evaluation the present walls and the components thereof are not a true listed fire rated assembly. However, due to the construction of these barriers and the components thereof, these barriers will provide an equivalent level of protection provided the recommendations in Section 8.0 of this report are completed. These recommended upgrades are based upon sound engineering practice by a Registered Fire Protection Engineer. The construction of the barrier are substantial enough to provide the required 2-hr fire resistance rating. The primary concern is the numerous penetrations in the barrier. There are many penetrations that are adequate and no additional work is required. These penetrations are the ones that were poured-in-place at the time of construction. The penetrations that are of concern are some of the doors, the HVAC ducts, and the unsealed piping and conduit penetrations. There are several metal doors that should be replaced because the existing doors have either a non-approved window or louver that will not limit the spread of fire to one side of the barrier. All unsealed piping and conduit penetrations should be firestopped with an approved firestopping material. The existing non-active ducts that pass through the barrier should be disconnected at the barrier and the opening sealed with an approved firestopping method