No abstract available

No abstract available

[en] This paper presents a structure of the safeguards problem that brings into context various aspects of the objective and scope of a national safeguards system. The ''societal risk'' approach is used to develop a comprehensive rationale for safeguards design and evaluation, the continuing systematic assessment of the safeguards system, and the allocation of safeguards resources. Within the objective of achieving or maintaining an acceptable level of risk, a nation can utilize this structure to design and implement a comprehensive and cost-effectve safeguards system. The combination of protective mechanisms which provides the desired degree of protection at minimum cost will depend on the total set of mechanisms legally, culturally, and technically available to a particular nation and on that nation's definition of the threat and consequences associated with the wilful misuse of nuclear material. While the basic elements of the problem and the broad internal concerns remain much the same from nation to nation, it should not be expected that the cost-effective solution matching appropriate protective mechanisms to all feasible adversary actions will be the same. Information on the effectiveness of the protective mechanisms with respect to each sub-objective and each part of the necessary action sequence will enable a balanced application of resources appropriate to the national circumstances. (author)

[en] The paper first defines the term career and assesses its application in the IAEA safeguards inspectorate. It then identifies prerequisites for employment in the inspectorate and describes the selection process. The second part outlines the requirements for approval by the Board of Governors and designation to specific countries, together with designation difficulties and delays the Department of Safeguards encounters in its attempts to utilize its staff resources as efficiently as possible. The paper examines working conditions of the inspectorate, and considers the political-technical nature of inspection work, headquarters and field responsibilities, productivity standards, promotion possibilities, the rotation system, and career potential. The paper concludes that an opportunity for a career in the inspectorate is necessary to ensure the staff loyalty, independence, and competence required for the IAEA to maintain credibility in the international community. It stresses the need to recognize the political-technical nature of the work, the lack of glamour, and the need for steps to provide career development. (author)

No abstract available

[en] The Hungarian SSAC has introduced a comprehensive domestic safeguards verification system consisting of regular comprehensive SSAC verifications in the whole lifetime of the facilities. The main goals of the comprehensive verification system are: (i) to assess the facility's safeguards system compliance with the relevant national legislation and recommendations, (ii) to assess the activities of the facility aimed at maintaining and further developing its safeguards system, and, (iii) to revise validity of data and information previously provided by the facility subject to safeguards licencing procedures. The maintenance level of the system as well as the available knowledge on the possible needs for change reflect the top management's awareness of this issue and is a good indicator of the present and future effectiveness of the facility level safeguards system and the level of safeguards culture. The structure, preparation, conduction, documentation and initial experiences of the comprehensive safeguards verification system is introduced in the paper. Additionally, HAEA has just introduced a safeguards indexing method for evaluation the safeguards culture at Hungarian nuclear facilities. The main goal of indexing method and the evaluated parameters are also shown in the paper. (author)

[en] For a number of years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been developing a methodology for evaluating the effectiveness of international safeguards systems. In late 1981, an IAEA Advisory Group endorsed the basic principles of this safeguards effectiveness assessment methodology (SEAM), as well as its trial application to LWRs using actual inspection data and its continued development to bulk handling facilities. During this development process a number of case study applications of the methodology were also undertaken as part of the U.S. support programme to IAEA. Specifically, these case studies dealt with (a) a mixed oxide fabrication facility, (b) a reprocessing facility, and (c) a number of special cases of LWR safeguards. This paper describes experience with the application of the methodology in these studies, preliminary experience in the trial application to LWRs, and plans for possible future utilization of the methodology. A number of general lessons have been drawn from the process of applying the assessment methodology to the various types of facilities that were considered: (1) Safeguards problems differ within a facility type, so that an assessment must be made using a fairly specific set of assumptions. (2) The question of what follow-up activities would be necessary to resolve the initial anomalies discovered by the safeguards system is an important one, whose answer may determine the acceptability of the system to the Agency or the operator. (3) The number of diversion paths analysed grows rapidly with the number of combinations of concealment methods considered, and a simplified means of presentation and manipulation is important

[en] The needs and views of developing countries with regard to nuclear energy are reviewed. The main issue in international nuclear relations is the need to restore a climate of mutual confidence, in particular the proliferation risks of nuclear power. These risks have been examined by INFCE. Safeguards and the provision of supplies from abroad are discussed. (U.K.)

[en] The basic design elements (which have remained constant) and report on current and near term enhancements that have resulted from the evaluation process are presented. 2 figs, 1 tab

[en] The article considers new challenges and possibilities for improvement of safeguards implementation, presents recent results obtained, and concludes with a forward look at future challenges