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[en] Current DOE policy permits release from DOE control of real property with residual levels of surficial radioactive contamination if the contamination is below approved guidelines. If the material contains contamination that is evenly distributed throughout its volume (referred to as volumetric contamination), then Departmental approval for release must be obtained in advance. Several DOE sites presently recycle surface contaminated metal, although the quantities are small relative to the quantities of metal processed by typical mini-mills, hence the potential radiation exposures to mill workers from processing DOE metals and the public from the processed metal are at present also a very small fraction of their potential value. The exposures calculated in this analysis are based on 100% of the scrap metal being processed at the maximum contamination levels and are therefore assumed to be maximum values and not likely to occur in actual practice. This paper examines the relationship between the surface contamination limits established under DOE Order 5400.5, open-quotes Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment,close quotes and radiation exposures to workers involved in the scrap metal recycling process. The analysis is limited to surficial contamination at or below the guideline levels established in DOE Order 5400.5 at the time of release. Workers involved in the melting and subsequent fabrication of products are not considered radiation workers (no requirements for monitoring) and must be considered members of the public. The majority of the exposures calculated in this analysis range from tenths of a millirem per year (mrem/yr) to less than 5 mrem/yr. The incremental risk of cancer associated with these exposures ranges from 10-8 cancers per year to 10-6 cancers per year
[en] Accidents involving orphan sources and other radioactive material in the metal recycling and production industries have resulted in serious radiological accidents as well as in harmful environmental, social and economic impacts. This Safety Guide provides recommendations, the implementation of which should prevent such accidents and provide confidence that scrap metal and recycled products are safe. Contents: 1. Introduction; 2. Protection of people and the environment; 3. Responsibilities; 4. Monitoring for radioactive material; 5. Response to the discovery of radioactive material; 6. Remediation of contaminated areas; 7. Management of recovered radioactive material; Annex I: Review of events involving radioactive material in the metal recycling and production industries; Annex II: Categorization of radioactive sources; Annex III: Some examples of national and international initiatives.
[en] The IAEA has developed a Sealed Radioactive Sources Toolkit to provide information to key groups about the safety and security of sealed radioactive sources. The key groups addressed are officials in government agencies, medical users, industrial users and the scrap metal industry. The general public may also benefit from an understanding of the fundamentals of radiation safety
[en] In order to solve and fill some requirements about radioactive detection in the small and medium scrap metal smelting enterprises. One kind of economic, sensitive and highly efficient monitoring system of radioactive was studied and designed. The article describes its design briefly about main functions, hardware components, back-end software management platform and so on. (authors)
[en] First lessons - ASN: • MAFELEC had no knowledge of radioactivity issues / nuclear field; • ⇒ ASN had to assist MAFELEC for the management of this situation (unusual position); – Storage of the contaminated buttons; – Procedure in case of new detection of radioactivity; – Transport of contaminated buttons found abroad; – Contact with foreign authorities / customs. • This situation involved many ASN people (regional divisions, department of international relations, dpt of waste, dpt of transport and industrial activities) and needeed coordinated and quick actions. Conclusion: • Complex incident: many different stakeholders (at national and international levels); • Next step: a comprehensive feedback has to be done; • Question: how to prevent such an event?
[en] The inspection and certification of scrap material from nuclear facilities is a regulatory requirement to ensure that radioactive material will not reach public domain. Around the world, cases involving radioactive contamination of metallic components have occurred due to radioactive sources/contaminated metal scrap reaching the public domain. Radiological monitoring of inactive scrap material is essential as it may get into various usages in public domain where controls cannot be implemented. The method of detection is measurement of gamma dose rates due to any loose/fixed radioactive contamination in the scrap or presence of any radioactive material/source. In addition prevention of any inadvertent/malicious act leading to radioactive material reaching the public domain through scrap being essential, this monitoring gains further importance. This paper describes the methodology and experience in detection of presence of radioactivity at inactive Scrap monitoring facility. Even though radioactive sources of high strength with potential for serious environmental hazard have not been detected, few cases of contaminated material (MS plate/equipments etc with extremely low level of 137Cs and Uranium contamination) have been detected and identified using portable gamma spectrometer. If proper monitoring is not carried out the dispersal of radioactivity to the environment can be a matter of concern due to metal scrap reaching recycling industry resulting in huge cost of decontamination and waste disposal. These events may also have negative impact on the export from the country resulting in economic losses. The impact of such events can be ruled out by effective scrap monitoring techniques which ensure that even small quantity of radioactivity escaping into public domain can be prevented. The methodology followed for monitoring of inactive scrap is found to be effective even for detection of presence of very low level of radioactivity
[en] The OECD NEA Co-operative Programme on Decommissioning of Nuclear Installations set up, in 1992, a Task Group entrusted with the task to study the problems and possible criteria associated with the recycle and reuse of metallic materials resulting from decommissioning. The Task Group carried out a thorough analysis of this issue and proposed an approach to the release of those materials from regulatory control which is briefly discussed in this report. Two companion documents, not for publication, describe the assumptions and calculations which are at the basis of the proposed clearance levels. The approach proposed by the Task Group is broader than and differs in some respects from guidance which was recently prepared by Expert Groups of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Commission. This report expresses the point of view of the members of the Task Group and is offered as a contribution to the international debate in this area. It is published on the responsibility of the OECD Secretary General and does not commit the Organisation nor its Member countries
[en] Recycling of scrap metal can effectively improve resource utilization and protect the environment. However, due to the existence of some management problems, a few radioactive sources used in the field of nuclear technology application, or some radioactive contaminated metals also enter the scrap metal recycling sector, through recycled metal products into the community, threatening public health and environmental safety. The special inspection work of radiation safety in scrap metal recycling in Guangxi in 2016 is introduced. The present situation and existing problems in this regard is analyzed, and the countermeasures and suggestions are then put forward. (authors)
[en] It is increasingly frequent for States to have to deal with illicit movements of metallic substances contaminated by radioactivity. Steps taken in the areas of safety and health protection necessarily have financial implications . Except in cases of special urgency, a financial evaluation is vital before such decisions are taken. Specific actions must be initiated. Aside from action by the industries directly involved in self-regulation procedures, checks must be imposed in cases of fraudulent trafficking which has no connection with fair commercial activity. Customs administrations may take specific steps to restore order to legitimate markets. International organizations have a special role to play in disseminating information and promoting international cooperation. The paper outlines the financial impact of fraudulent trafficking, and methods of ensuring that those responsible for such activities bear the financial costs incurred. It underlines the roles that can be played by those involved in the traffic in contaminated products. (author)