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[en] The Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) Program, authorized by Congress in 1991 and administered by the Laboratory Science and Technology Office, is our primary means for pursuing innovative, long-term, high-risk, and potentially high-payoff research that supports the missions of the Laboratory, the Department of Energy, and National Nuclear Security Administration in national security, energy security, environmental management, bioscience and technology to improve human health, and breakthroughs in fundamental science and technology. The accomplishments described in this Annual Report demonstrate the strong alignment of the LDRD portfolio with these missions and contribute to the Laboratory's success in meeting its goals. The LDRD budget of $92 million for FY2006 sponsored 188 projects. These projects were selected through an extensive peer-review process to ensure the highest scientific quality and mission relevance. Each year, the number of deserving proposals far exceeds the funding available, making the selection a tough one indeed. Our ongoing investments in LDRD have reaped long-term rewards for the Laboratory and the nation. Many Laboratory programs trace their roots to research thrusts that began several years ago under LDRD sponsorship. In addition, many LDRD projects contribute to more than one mission area, leveraging the Laboratory's multidisciplinary team approach to science and technology. Safeguarding the nation from terrorist activity and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be an enduring mission of this Laboratory, for which LDRD will continue to play a vital role. The LDRD Program is a success story. Our projects continue to win national recognition for excellence through prestigious awards, papers published in peer-reviewed journals, and patents granted. With its reputation for sponsoring innovative projects, the LDRD Program is also a major vehicle for attracting and retaining the best and the brightest technical staff and for establishing collaborations with universities, industry, and other scientific and research institutions. By keeping the Laboratory at the forefront of science and technology, the LDRD Program enables us to meet our mission challenges, especially those of our ever-evolving national security mission
[en] The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office is responsible for environmental restoration (ER) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This includes remediation at Industrial Sites where past nuclear testing activities and activities that supported nuclear testing may have or are known to have resulted in the release of contaminants into the environment. Industrial Sites at the NNSS have included nuclear facilities that supported the nuclear rocket/missile development programs, gas stations, landfills, spill sites, ordnance sites, and numerous other waste disposal and release sites. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities neared completion at the end of fiscal year 2011 while other activities required under the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) and part of the same NNSS ER Project are forecasted to extend to 2027 or beyond. With the majority of Industrial Sites corrective action units (CAUs) completed (more than 250 CAUs and over 1,800 corrective action sites), it was determined that an activity closeout process should be implemented to ensure that the work completed over the past 15 years is well documented in a comprehensive and concise summary. While the process used to close each individual CAU is described in approved documents, no single document describes in summary fashion the work completed to close the many individual Industrial Sites. The activity closeout process will be used to develop an Industrial Sites closeout document that describes these years of work. This document will summarize the number of Industrial Sites closed under the FFACO and provide general descriptions of projects, contaminants removed, and sites closed in place with corresponding Use Restrictions. Other pertinent information related to Industrial Sites work such as the project history, closure decisions, historical declarations, remediation strategies, and final CAU status will be included in the closeout document, along with a table listing each CAU and corresponding corrective action sites within each CAU. Using this process of conducting the activity closeout and developing a closeout document may prove useful for other ER projects within the DOE complex in describing how a long period of ER can be summarized in a single document. The NNSS Industrial Sites activities were completed over the span of 15 years and involved the investigation, cleanup or Use Restriction, and closure of more than 260 CAUs and over 1,800 sites. These activities will conclude in FY 2012 (with the exception of one CAU). In order to capture the work completed over this length of time and document decisions made during the activities, a closeout effort was initiated. The closeout will review the work conducted during the Industrial Sites activities and produce a single document that summarizes Industrial Sites activities. This closeout is being conducted at an interim stage in the overall NNSA/NSO ER Project since the Soils and UGTA activities will continue for a number of years, but the completion of the Industrial Sites project warrants conducting a closeout now while personnel are available and information is still current. The process followed by NNSA/NSO in conducing project closeout for the Industrial Sites portion of the ER program may prove useful within the DOE complex in demonstrating how a large ER project can be summarized. (authors)
[en] Educating the next cadre of specialists and thought leaders on nuclear issues – including nuclear security, nuclear energy, and nuclear nonproliferation—has become a critical national security imperative in the U.S. These workforce challenges are not unique to the U.S. nuclear sector. Addressing this critical shortage in the nation’s nuclear workforce and responding to emerging nuclear challenges confronting our national security will require considerable investments in nuclear-related education programs across the nation. These workforce challenges are particularly acute in the field of nuclear security. To enhance skills and knowledge of the next cadre of specialists in nuclear security, the Pennsylvania State University jointly with Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Texas A&M University launched a nuclear security education program in 2010, with an initial contract from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) program. The three universities and GTRI collaboratively developed a list of courses for the nuclear security education program.
[en] Since its establishment in 2008, the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has achieved a number of objectives under its five pillars: concepts and approaches, policy development and outreach, international nuclear safeguards engagement, technology development, and human capital development (HCD). As a result of these efforts, safeguards has become much more visible as a critical U.S. national security interest across the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex. However, limited budgets have since created challenges in a number of areas. Arguably, one of the more serious challenges involves NGSI's ability to integrate entry-level staff into safeguards projects. Laissez fair management of this issue across the complex can lead to wasteful project implementation and endanger NGSI's long-term sustainability. The authors provide a quantitative analysis of this problem, focusing on the demographics of the current safeguards workforce and compounding pressures to operate cost-effectively, transfer knowledge to the next generation of safeguards professionals, and sustain NGSI safeguards investments.
[en] National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), has established a work management program and corresponding electronic Facilities and Operations Management Information System (e-FOM) to implement Integrated Safety Management (ISM). The management of work scopes, the identification of hazards, and the establishment of implementing controls are reviewed and approved through electronic signatures. Through the execution of the program and the implementation of the electronic system, NSTec staff work within controls and utilize feedback and improvement process. The Integrated Work Control Manual further implements the five functions of ISM at the Activity level. By adding the Risk and Work Configuration Management program, NSTec establishes risk acceptance (business and physical) for liabilities within the performance direction and work management processes. Requirements, roles, and responsibilities are specifically identified in the program while e-FOM provides the interface and establishes the flowdown from the Safety Chain to work and facilities management processes to company work-related directives, and finally to Subject Matter Expert concurrence. The Program establishes, within the defined management structure, management levels for risk identification, risk mitigation (controls), and risk acceptance (business and physical) within the Safety Chain of Responsibility. The Program also implements Integrated Safeguards and Security Management within the NSTec Safety Chain of Responsibility. Once all information has been entered into e-FOM, approved, and captured as data, the information becomes searchable and sortable by hazard, location, organization, mitigating controls, etc
[en] The purpose of this report is to describe and present the latest CAI analyses for the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RM/SM) CAU and review their role in the broader, historical context of CAI activities at RM/SM. As described in Sections 1.4 and 1.5, the current work was initiated after specific concerns arose during a previous CAI phase, which eventually prompted a revision of the FFACO process and the adoption of an alternative modeling strategy (AMS) for CAI work at RM/SM. The remainder of this report will describe the CAI modeling activities conducted through 2017 under the revised FFACO process and AMS discussed above.
[en] Glance at the articles in this report, and you will sense the transformation that is reshaping the landscape of materials science and chemistry. This transformation is bridging the gaps among chemistry, materials science, and biology--ushering in a wealth of innovative technologies with broad scientific impact. The emergence of this intersection is reinvigorating our strategic investment into areas that build on our strength of interdisciplinary science. It is at the intersection that we position our strategic vision into a future where we will provide radical materials innovations and solutions to our national-security programs and other sponsors. Our 2004 Annual Report describes how our successes and breakthroughs follow a path set forward by our strategic plan and four organizing research themes, each with key scientific accomplishments by our staff and collaborators. We have organized this report into two major sections: research themes and our dynamic teams. The research-theme sections focus on achievements arising from earlier investments while addressing future challenges. The dynamic teams section illustrates the directorate's organizational structure of divisions, centers, and institutes that support a team environment across disciplinary and institutional boundaries. The research presented in this annual report gives substantive examples of how we are proceeding in each of these four theme areas and how they are aligned with our national-security mission. By maintaining an organizational structure that offers an environment of collaborative problem-solving opportunities, we are able to nurture the discoveries and breakthroughs required for future successes
[en] This document establishes requirements and standard methods for the development and maintenance of the Emergency Management Hazards Assessment (EMHA) process used by the lead and all event contractors at the Y-12 Complex for emergency planning and preparedness. The EMHA process provides the technical basis for the Y-12 emergency management program. The instructions provided in this document include methods and requirements for performing the following emergency management activities at Y-12: (1) hazards identification; (2) hazards survey, and (3) hazards assessment
[en] This paper identifies business models and six management principles that can be applied by a nonproliferation organization to maximize the value and effectiveness of its products. The organizations responsible for reducing the nuclear proliferation threat have experienced a substantial growth in responsibility and visibility since the September 11 attacks. Since then, the international community has witnessed revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities, nuclear black markets, periodic nuclear tests, and a resurgence of interest by countries worldwide in developing nuclear capabilities. The security environment will likely continue to evolve in unexpected ways since most of the proliferation threats with which the world will be forced to contend remain unforeseen. To better prepare for and respond to this evolving security environment, many nonproliferation organizations are interested in finding new or better ways to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. Of course, all organizations, whether they are market driven or non-profit, must operate effectively and efficiently if they are to succeed. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, many of the management principles that this study recommends can help all organizations succeed. However, this study pays particular attention to nonproliferation organizations because of the mission they are responsible for fulfilling. Nonproliferation organizations, including nonproliferation programs that operate within a larger national security organization, are responsible for reducing the threat of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These organizations have an enduring mandate from the public and the international community not to fail in the completion of their mission for failure could have detrimental impacts on international security, public health and the environment. Moreover, the public expects nonproliferation organizations and programs to fulfill their mission, even when resources are limited. They are expected to anticipate and react quickly to prevent a potential threat while staying accountable to their public stakeholders, many of whom remain unaware of the very threats the organization is trying to address. When budgets are flush, it is easy to believe that money will solve all problems; but during times of economic hardship, managers must rely on creative and cost-effective management approaches to implement their missions. Fortunately, managers of nonproliferation organizations can draw on a wealth of research on organizational design and culture to help them identify the management strategies most appropriate for them. Such research can help nonproliferation managers think about their own organizational structures and cultures and adapt accepted management principles to their unique organizational mission. This analytical process is not straight forward, as some managers may find themselves taking risks that others might not take, such as making ostensibly risky investments for the common good, or supporting creative thinking to help mission accomplishment. Some management principles that are relatively straightforward for other organizations may be difficult to envision and implement in a nonproliferation organization. Therefore, the goal of this study is to help nonproliferation managers identify management principles that can be implemented in a nonproliferation organization and, in the process, help maximize the value of the organization's products and effectiveness of its mission.
[en] Document available in abstract form only. Full text of publication follows: A multi-level (facility and programmatic) risk assessment was conducted for the facilities in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) Program and results were included in a new Risk Management Plan (RMP), which was incorporated into the fiscal year (FY) 2010 Integrated Plans. Risks, risk events, probability, consequence(s), and mitigation strategies were identified and captured, for most scope areas (i.e., risk categories) during the facilitated risk workshops. Risk mitigations (i.e., efforts in addition to existing controls) were identified during the facilitated risk workshops when the risk event was identified. Risk mitigation strategies fell into two broad categories: threats or opportunities. Improvement projects were identified and linked to specific risks they mitigate, making the connection of risk reduction through investments for the annual Site Execution Plan. Due to the amount of that was collected, analysis to be performed, and reports to be generated, a Risk Assessment/ Management Tool (RAMtool) database was developed to analyze the risks in real-time, at multiple levels, which reinforced the site-level risk management process and procedures. The RAMtool database was developed and designed to assist in the capturing and analysis of the key elements of risk: probability, consequence, and impact