[en] There is a growing unease and resentment among many non-nuclear weapon states at the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon states to begin any multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Many non-nuclear weapon states believe that, having succeeded in obtaining the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995, the nuclear weapon states have lost their interest in nuclear disarmament. In the current world situation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty review Conferences are about the only occasions at which the non-nuclear weapon states have any influence or leverage over the policies of the nuclear weapon states. This is because most non-nuclear weapon states appear to believe that the nuclear weapon states are concerned only about nuclear non-proliferation and not about nuclear disarmament

[en] Short communication

[en] On the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco an overview of the experiences towards consolidation of the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world shows that it has been a point of reference and inspiration for other geographical zones of the world, as soon as the nuclear-weapon-free zones become valid, conflicting areas will be reduced. Some States proposed the Treaty itself may eventually be extended if other protocols added. Another proposal would be to add a protocol on sea pollution

No abstract available

[en] With the continual increase of remote connectivity to industrial control systems (ICS), the threat of malware and malicious activity reaching and successfully being installed on a nuclear related ICS has increased considerably. The ability for an adversary to control and manipulate nuclear ICS’s could lead to catastrophic consequences for not only the directed organization but potentially large regional populations. In the past, ICS isolation produced the proper controls necessary to provide reliable power generation, fuel re-processing, and safeguards monitoring of individual countries honoring their commitments under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other agreements. However, the benefits of remote networking of ICS’s became obvious; increased productivity, near real time process information, remote maintenance, and the sharing of data with external systems. Increasing ICS access pathways allows more opportunities for the adversary to gain a presence on these systems. Today’s sophisticated malicious hackers are accessing systems with not only the intent to deny service or deceive, but rather to maintain a persistent presence for long term exploitation. This paper will discuss several aspects of the current and emerging cyber threats to nuclear ICS’s and how they apply towards the risk management of nuclear facilities. (author)

[en] The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America by means of the Tlatelolco Treaty is one of the finest contributions made by the countries of the region to the political ideal of peace and to international law as applied to disarmament. The history of this Treaty and its main provisions are given in the article introduced

[en] The increased production of nuclear fissile materials and the development of technology related to nuclear power generation also increase the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. This book deals with the present situation in the field and with the measures planned to reduce proliferation risks arising from uranium enrichment and irradiated fuel reprocessing. It also contains an in-depth analysis of the safeguards presently applied, nuclear export policies, the lessons learned from INFCE and the conditions for implementing the Non-proliferation Treaty. (NEA)

[en] The historical and political aspects of relations between civil nuclear technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons are analyzed. Many countries will soon be able to come close to making a bomb without violating their nonproliferation agreement. While peaceful nuclear power production should continue, there is a need for basic changes in its development and export. The driving forces behind proliferation are examined and the initial steps set out which need to be taken

[en] The reason for analyzing alternative fuel cycles is to identify those characteristics which provide weak links and to develop a balanced fuel cycle in which neither the front end, the reactor, nor the back end would provide an obvious pathway to a nuclear weapons capability. This balance can be achieved with identifiable technical, institutional, and political barriers. The economics, safety, environmental, and commercial feasibility of the barriers must also be evaluated to assess national and international acceptability. The choice between systems should be based on these factors in addition to the problem of proliferation

[en] This article sets out the principle and essentials of the process for reviewing the operation of the non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The NPT was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970. In 1995 the NPT was extended. The 2000 review conference is of considerable importance for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly in the light of the fact that after the indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty, the non-nuclear-weapon states urged the nuclear-weapon states to take new steps towards nuclear disarmament. This article presents a review of the 30 year period of the application of NPT