[en] In developed countries, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) represent the majority of all businesses, e.g. 99.9% in the UK. Given this significant proportion, any disruption to the operation of SMEs will have a negative impact on a nation’s economy. In the context of flooding, this paper reports on the use of agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS) to assess SMEs immediate response and short-term recovery. In particular, it focuses on the interactions between manufacturing SMEs and mutual aid partners, and retail SMEs and companies specializing in refurbishing premises. Results show that a manufacturing SME with a mutual aid partner can reduce loss in production by approximately 6% over a 7 working day period. In relation to retail SMEs, those with employees able to be allocated to refurbish its premises recovered faster than SMEs employing a refurbishment company, potentially one day earlier.

No abstract available

[en] Current international context is subjected to increased exposure and manifestation of extreme natural phenomena, which underlines, on every occasion, the unpredictability and intensity of the nature force. Hazards have no border, they manifest separate of territorial division and affect altogether poor and rich, independent of gender, color, statute or any other criteria. The setting of increased hazard risk emerges the need to create strong joint strategies and build resilience to hazards. Still, it is a real challenge, for any country, to be prepared for hazards manifestations in order to reduce to minimum all types of loses. The present paper addresses the need for a sustained trans-boundary approach on natural hazard risk. The purpose of the analysis is to provide solutions and joint approaches in facing the challenge of disaster and management of disparities between countries. Basically, in the end, the main objective is to reduce the risks of disasters and improve joint emergency situation management systems.

[en] In this paper we discuss Canada's response to the March 2011 events at Fukushima, from a nuclear regulatory point of view, including emergency management. We will also describe the actions taken by the Government of Canada and the challenges with obtaining timely and complete information. Finally, three specific actions taken by the CNSC, namely the establishment of a Fukushima Task Force, the creation of an External Advisory Committee and the results of an IA EA review of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) response to the events at Fukushima are summarized.

[en] Over-exposures in radiotherapy or radiology can happen, about 10 cases a year in France. A scale with 7 levels has been defined to rank the seriousness of the event. Over-exposures are not considered as medical emergencies because the evolution of the lesions is generally slow. Each case leads to an investigation first to know the radiation dose received by the patient in order to provide the adequate care and secondly to know the real cause of the over-exposure in order to prevent it to happen again. Cell therapy with the use of stem cells has been proved successful for the treatment of some lesions. (A.C.)

[en] The chaotic situation on a site that has suffered a severe nuclear accident gives the feeling of an enduring and endless accident. The resilience of a system is its capacity to adapt its operations in order to keep on assuring very specific functions whatever the situation is or becomes. For instance for a nuclear power plant, one of the specific functions is the cooling of the reactor core. Emergency engineering is defined as a whole of measures that would enable the plant to be resilient. Emergency engineering would imply the use of innovative technology means to face unexpected situations (for instance an ice wall to stop radionuclide ground migration) or temporary organisational changes to get timely decisions and adequate ressources. Emergency engineering may become a new concept of nuclear safety. (A.C.)

[en] This paper reports the incident involving the bulk carrier Richelieu, Canada Steamship Lines, and the clean-up work (July 2010) on the banks of the Saint Lawrence seaway, at Cote Sainte-Catherine near Montreal, and discusses the principal management phases of the incident, which was ranked as major in severity according to Environment Canada criteria. First, the locks and the hydroelectric dam were closed to contain the fuel upstream and avoid the contamination of water intakes in surrounding regions. Then, in order to mitigate the environmental impacts of the spill on the ecosystem, the municipal, provincial, federal and privates stakeholders worked together to quickly confine the affected area, recover the product effectively and identify the best cleaning technique, based on field evaluation of the shoreline. This situation was monitored for over a month and a follow-up of the problematic segments was planned for one year later. For improvement in any future intervention, a post-incident analysis was held with the emergency team.

[en] Reconstruction after the Great East Japan Earthquake in March 2011 has been delayed. To suitably respond to similar large-scale disasters in the future, the implementation of a disaster management system at the local municipal level, aimed at rapid reconstruction that includes management of processes from pre-disaster to the reconstruction phase, is required. In this study, we develop a prototype of such a system, which is referred to as the Local Government Disaster Management System (LGDMS). For our study, we collaborate with a municipality in Kochi, Japan. In the LGDMS prototype, we use a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) format, wherein the contents of each activity and roles of different organizations in those activities are defined based on a study of organizational problems and law and regulation issues among the central government, prefectural governments, and municipal governments. The Construction Management Committee of the Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE) established a subcommittee for this research. This subcommittee is composed of university faculty members, local consulting engineers, and administrative officials in Tohoku and Kochi. The subcommittee is striving to implement LGDMS in several municipalities in Kochi. (paper)

[en] Response activities are important parts of both safety and security activities as a layer of defence, if prevention activities fail and deviation from compliance has been detected. Three levels of response can be differentiated based on the expected occurrence frequency of the event, its actual or potential consequences, and the scope of the involvement of various organizations. The operative level response to most frequently occurring, the least serious events requires efforts mainly from the operator by strictly following the routine procedures developed in advance; however, their repetition may attract the attention of the regulator and initiate enforcement actions. Examples for such events are the anticipated operational occurrences, expected failures of equipment, false and nuisance alarms, certain less serious unintentional or intentional human errors. Joint response with the involvement of more internal organizational units and competent authorities is needed to manage more serious events, which still have no unacceptable radiological consequences. Such events are accidents within and beyond the design basis, security events within the design basis threat. The response actions to those events are developed in advance and described in detail in the emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines and the security contingency plans. The third and most severe level of response is needed, if unacceptable radiological consequences may or do appear on-site and off-site the facility, when the emergency response plans and if appropriate the contingency plans shall be implemented. (author)

[en] The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex, operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) conducted an evaluated drill on October 6, 2015, to allow the ATR Complex emergency response organization (ERO) to demonstrate the ability to respond to and mitigate an emergency by implementing the requirements of DOE O 151.1C, ''Comprehensive Emergency Management System.''