No abstract available

[en] In this paper we discuss Canada's response to the March 2011 events at Fukushima, from a nuclear regulatory point of view, including emergency management. We will also describe the actions taken by the Government of Canada and the challenges with obtaining timely and complete information. Finally, three specific actions taken by the CNSC, namely the establishment of a Fukushima Task Force, the creation of an External Advisory Committee and the results of an IA EA review of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) response to the events at Fukushima are summarized.

[en] Over-exposures in radiotherapy or radiology can happen, about 10 cases a year in France. A scale with 7 levels has been defined to rank the seriousness of the event. Over-exposures are not considered as medical emergencies because the evolution of the lesions is generally slow. Each case leads to an investigation first to know the radiation dose received by the patient in order to provide the adequate care and secondly to know the real cause of the over-exposure in order to prevent it to happen again. Cell therapy with the use of stem cells has been proved successful for the treatment of some lesions. (A.C.)

[en] The chaotic situation on a site that has suffered a severe nuclear accident gives the feeling of an enduring and endless accident. The resilience of a system is its capacity to adapt its operations in order to keep on assuring very specific functions whatever the situation is or becomes. For instance for a nuclear power plant, one of the specific functions is the cooling of the reactor core. Emergency engineering is defined as a whole of measures that would enable the plant to be resilient. Emergency engineering would imply the use of innovative technology means to face unexpected situations (for instance an ice wall to stop radionuclide ground migration) or temporary organisational changes to get timely decisions and adequate ressources. Emergency engineering may become a new concept of nuclear safety. (A.C.)

[en] This paper reports the incident involving the bulk carrier Richelieu, Canada Steamship Lines, and the clean-up work (July 2010) on the banks of the Saint Lawrence seaway, at Cote Sainte-Catherine near Montreal, and discusses the principal management phases of the incident, which was ranked as major in severity according to Environment Canada criteria. First, the locks and the hydroelectric dam were closed to contain the fuel upstream and avoid the contamination of water intakes in surrounding regions. Then, in order to mitigate the environmental impacts of the spill on the ecosystem, the municipal, provincial, federal and privates stakeholders worked together to quickly confine the affected area, recover the product effectively and identify the best cleaning technique, based on field evaluation of the shoreline. This situation was monitored for over a month and a follow-up of the problematic segments was planned for one year later. For improvement in any future intervention, a post-incident analysis was held with the emergency team.

[en] The Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) Complex, operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC, at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) conducted an evaluated drill on October 6, 2015, to allow the ATR Complex emergency response organization (ERO) to demonstrate the ability to respond to and mitigate an emergency by implementing the requirements of DOE O 151.1C, ''Comprehensive Emergency Management System.''

[en] Response activities are important parts of both safety and security activities as a layer of defence, if prevention activities fail and deviation from compliance has been detected. Three levels of response can be differentiated based on the expected occurrence frequency of the event, its actual or potential consequences, and the scope of the involvement of various organizations. The operative level response to most frequently occurring, the least serious events requires efforts mainly from the operator by strictly following the routine procedures developed in advance; however, their repetition may attract the attention of the regulator and initiate enforcement actions. Examples for such events are the anticipated operational occurrences, expected failures of equipment, false and nuisance alarms, certain less serious unintentional or intentional human errors. Joint response with the involvement of more internal organizational units and competent authorities is needed to manage more serious events, which still have no unacceptable radiological consequences. Such events are accidents within and beyond the design basis, security events within the design basis threat. The response actions to those events are developed in advance and described in detail in the emergency operating procedures, severe accident management guidelines and the security contingency plans. The third and most severe level of response is needed, if unacceptable radiological consequences may or do appear on-site and off-site the facility, when the emergency response plans and if appropriate the contingency plans shall be implemented. (author)

[en] the aim of this paper is to minimize the risks of new product development and shorten time-to-market, particularly for high-tech enterprise where the complexity of the product generate vast amount of failure mode. Design/methodology/approach: first, the concept of Critical Consideration Factor (CCF) is introduced based on product-specific technical characteristics, expected lifetime, and yield requirement to identify and prioritize the critical failure mode in the subsequent Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), followed by process characterization on the high risk failure mode and Critical Parameter Management (CPM) practice to realize a robust mass production system of the developed technology. The application on the development of advanced flexible substrate and surface finishes fabrication technique is presented. Findings: through the proposed methodology, the risk level of each potential failure mode can be accurately quantified to identify the critical variables. With process characterization, reliability of the product is ensured. Consequently, significant reduction in development resources and time-to-market can be achieved. Practical implications: the development strategy allows high tech enterprises to achieve a balanced ecosystem in which value created through adaption of new technology/product can be thoroughly captured through commercialization in a timely manner with no field failure. Originality/value: the proposed development strategy utilizes a unique approach with thorough considerations that enables high tech enterprise to deliver new product with rapid time-to-market without sacrificing product lifetime reliability, which is key to achieve competitive advantage in the highly dynamic market.

[en] An efficient accident prevention and response system operating in the Russian nuclear industry is considered. Its core component is the emergency-response and rescue service (ERRS) of the Rosatom Corporation. Especially rigid requirements are made to all subsystem of ERRS on transport and to the rescue formations entering into its structure. The main requirements are: a high level of daily readiness, possibility of urgent delivery of forces and means to the site of accident; autonomy of emergency formations, possibility of functioning in the absence of the developed infrastructure; presence of a reliable mobile communication and information transfer systems; availability of the unique specialized equipment, technologies and high-class well-trained specialists

[en] The MARN (Mission of support for the management of the nuclear risk) was founded in 1995 to assure the interface between the actors of the nuclear world (nuclear power plant operators, ASN and IRSN) and official bodies at the national scale (ministry of interior) or local scale (prefecture). The MARN takes part in the definition of the crisis exercises and is in charge of organizing the simulation of the media pressure during the exercise. The MARN can also intervene in a real nuclear crisis and its work consists in putting into perspective the technical appreciations and recommendations of nuclear experts and to translate them into operational options for the Prefect. (A.C.)