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[en] This paper reports on the objective of a nuclear freeze which is to slow down or stop the so-far inexorable development and deployment of more and more (read destructive and deadly) nuclear warheads. The essential notion is not new. The proposed treaty for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests that was very nearly negotiated in 1959 was perhaps the first serious effort to obtain a nuclear freeze, albeit a partial one. Growing concern about the nuclear arms race has led to greatly increased interest in much broader and more effective freezes. A comprehensive nuclear freeze, one that would stop all stages in the manufacture, testing, and deployment of nuclear warheads, would clearly be very desirable and have a great impact. It would not, however, deal with the other worrisome aspects of nuclear weapons, which is the very large number of such weapons that already exist
[en] The memoirs of the author traces his life from his first-year graduate studies in physics at the University of Rochester in 1942 to his present position as Director of the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. The part of his life involved in making weapons extends from 1942 to 1961. During this period, he worked with E.O. Lawrence on the Manhattan Project and served as director of Livermore after it became the Atomic Energy Commission's second nuclear weapons laboratory. He also served on many government advisory boards and commissions dealing with nuclear and other weapons. In 1961, the combination of a heart attack and changes in administration in Washington led York too return to the University of California for the talking peace portion of his life. He has since become a public exponent of arms control and disarmament and the futility of seeking increased security through more and better nuclear weapons. York's explanation of his move from making weapons to talking peace leaves the reader with a puzzle
[en] To provide a brief overview of key arms control and nonproliferation arrangements for the layperson that may be relevant to the Commission's comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Primer would be published by the Commission and made publicly available, probably as an appendix to a larger Commission report.
[en] Most arms-control-treaty-monitoring scenarios involve a host party that makes a declaration regarding its nuclear material or items and a monitoring party that verifies that declaration. A verification system developed for such a use needs to be trusted by both parties. The first concern, primarily from the host party's point of view, is that any sensitive information that is collected must be protected without interfering in the efficient operation of the facility being monitored. This concern is addressed in what can be termed a 'certification' process. The second concern, of particular interest to the monitoring party, is that it must be possible to confirm the veracity of both the measurement system and the data produced by this measurement system. The monitoring party addresses these issues during an 'authentication' process. Addressing either one of these concerns independently is relatively straightforward. However, it is more difficult to simultaneously satisfy host party certification concerns and monitoring party authentication concerns. Typically, both parties will want the final access to the measurement system. We will describe an alternative approach that allows both parties to gain confidence simultaneously. This approach starts with (1) joint development of the measurement system followed by (2) host certification of several copies of the system and (3) random selection by the inspecting party of one copy to be use during the monitoring visit and one (or more) copy(s) to be returned to the inspecting party's facilities for (4) further hardware authentication; any remaining copies are stored under joint seal for use as spares. Following this process, the parties will jointly (5) perform functional testing on the selected measurement system and then (6) use this system during the monitoring visit. Steps (1) and (2) assure the host party as to the certification of whichever system is eventually used in the monitoring visit. Steps (1), (3), (4), and (5) increase the monitoring party's confidence in the authentication of the measurement system.
[en] This paper discusses the theory of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in two ways. First, it employs a top-down, deductively oriented approach to explain CBM theory in terms of the arms control goals and objectives to be achieved, the types of measures to be employed, and the problems or limitations likely to be encountered when applying CBMs to conventional or nuclear forces. The chapter as a whole asks how various types of CBMs might function during a political - military escalation from peacetime to a crisis and beyond (i.e. including conflict), as well as how they might operate in a de-escalatory environment. In pursuit of these overarching issues, the second section of the chapter raises a fundamental but complicating question: how might the next all-out war actually come aoubt - by unpremeditated escalation resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation, or by premeditation resulting in a surprise attack? The second section of the paper addresses this question, explores its various implications for CBMs, and suggests the potential contribution of different types of CBMs toward successful resolution of the issues involved
[en] In this context, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to assessing the incentives and disincentives the United States and Russia face in pursuing further arms control agreements as well as the role of arms control in the two countries’ foreign policies and security strategies.On the second day, the workshop participants explored four pathways for a renewal of U.S.-Russian arms control, including:New START extension or a New START follow-on agreement; an agreement which meets Russia at least half way in the strategic space; an agreement addressing challenges to European nuclear stability; and unusual mix-and-match approaches that might be taken. The discussions and their results are summarized here.
[en] It is now technically possible to verify that a country is not conducting nuclear tests. Why, then, the repeated failures of the Geneva Conference in prohibiting or even limiting such test
[fr]Il est aujourd'hui possible de verifier qu'un pays ne conduit pas d'essais nucleaires. Pourquoi donc les echecs repetes de la conference de Geneve sur leur interdiction ou meme leur limitation
[en] This Common Criteria approach has been applied to create a definition of Authentication Assurance Levels that can quantify the level of assurance reached for a system subject to a set of authentication procedures. The arms-control authentication application of the Common Criteria expands on more typical information security evaluations in that it must contend with information barriers and preclude sophisticated intentional subversion attempts.
[en] It is widely believed that an arms control limit on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would be nearly impossible to verify. Among the reasons usually given are: these weapons are small, built in nondistinctive industrial facilities, deployed on a variety of ships and submarines, and difficult to distinguish from their conventionally armed counterparts. In this article, it is argued that the covert production and deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles would not be so straightforward. A specific arms control proposed is described, namely a total ban on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. This proposal is used to illustrate how an effective verification scheme might be constructed. 9 refs., 6 figs