Results 1 - 10 of 816
Results 1 - 10 of 816. Search took: 0.018 seconds
|Sort by: date | relevance|
[en] In France big companies are submitted to the European system of carbon allowances exchanges, but now other companies and households will have to pay a carbon tax whose rate has been fixed at 17 euros per ton of CO2. Some sectors like electricity, agriculture, fishing and road transport expect to be free of duty. Some economists think that the carbon tax will be efficient only if its rate increases quickly and dramatically. If France wants to cut its CO2 emission by a factor 4 by 2030, the carbon tax must reach around 100 euros per ton in 2030 which means an increase rate of 6% a year. (A.C.)
[en] Highlights: • We analyse the relationship between competition and ''green'' innovation. • We examine an oligopoly with pollution where firms compete and invest in ''green'' R&D. • We analyse the optimal emission tax set by a committed regulator. • An inverted-U relationship exists between R&D and the number of firms. - Abstract: We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D has the aim to reduce emissions (''green'' innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in ''green'' R&D. We analyse the case where the emission tax is set endogenously by a committed regulator and uncover an inverted-U relationship between innovation and competition that is mainly driven by the presence of R&D spillovers.
[en] There are 2 tools that will allow theoretically the passage to a low-carbonated energy mix: the tax and the emission allowances. The issue is the fixing of the tax or of the amount of emission allowances. In the case of the tax, the players are incited to take measures for a sober energy consumption or for reducing their carbon emissions as long as the extra costs of these measures are lower than the tax itself. In the case of emission allowances, the impact on the environment is more direct: the objective of the environment policy sets the volume of CO2 emissions and as a consequence the volume of emission allowances for the concerned enterprises. The European Union opted for the emission allowance system in 2005 by setting first a 3-year long probatory phase, then a more operational phase that will end in 2012 and a third phase that will end in 2020, this third phase will open the way for achieving the 2050 objective. In 2013 all the European electricity production sector will be submitted to the emission allowance system with allowances sold by auction. (A.C.)
[en] The authors question the 4 main concerns that have arisen since the implementation of emission trade markets 3 years ago. First, the allowance policy was not accurate enough and has led to a surplus offer of CO2 allowances. Secondly, the impact on electricity prices of carbon emission costs was all the higher as it happened at the moment of the deregulation of electricity markets. Thirdly, the CO2 allowances whose price will near 14 euros a ton for the 2008-2012 period are accused of hindering the competitiveness of the European industrial sector. Fourth, the present allowance system that gives to new comers free CO2 allowances is not very conducive to the adoption by these new comers of technologies that are less CO2 emitting. Some ways of improvement are given. (A.C.)
[en] This paper evaluates energy tax reform in the Netherlands between 1988 and 2002 from a climate change perspective. A tax on fuels and the so-called regulatory energy tax since 1996 are examples of indirect and non-uniform taxation of emissions. The overall tax base and rate structure corroborates recent theoretical findings that heterogeneity in production processes and transaction costs may justify optimal departures from the Pigovian corrective tax rule. Surprisingly, the Dutch revenue-raising tax matches the (modified) Pigovian policy prescription rather well, whereas the regulatory energy tax mainly follows the revenue raising Ramsey logic. Further improvements of the energy tax structure are also discussed, such as targeting the energy tax base and linking the tax rate more precisely to fuel characteristics