[en] In the IFMIF/EVEDA Project, a prototype accelerator producing a deuteron (D⁺) beam with a beam current of 125 mA accelerated up to 9 MeV at the CW mode is planned. The Personnel Protection System (PPS), is a part of the control system of the accelerator and it has 2 functions which are radiation safety management and accelerator operation management in order to protect the personnel against unnecessary exposure, electrical shock hazard and other dangerous phenomena. Since the radiation safety management during and after beam operation is a critical issue for the IFMIF/EVEDA accelerator, a PPS with high reliability is required. To realize the high reliability, we decided to use and customize proven systems and hardware, and applying dual PLC system. The dual PLC system is adopted for higher reliability because the PPS only permit some actions when both PLC systems make the same judgment. The radiation controlled area consists of the accelerator vault and radiation hot area where equipment like heat exchangers for cooling water are installed. The PPS manages the entering/leaving of the radiation controlled area according 3 access modes: no access, controlled access and authorized access. A system of personal keys is used for unlocking the access door of the controlled area. For instance: every worker has to take a personal key to enter the controlled area. Unless all keys are returned to the key box, the beam operation is not permitted. 4 emergency stop buttons are installed in the accelerator vault. When an abnormal or an emergency phenomenon happens, it is possible to stop beam operation by pushing the nearest button. Monitoring cameras are installed in the accelerator building

No abstract available

[en] The author introduces an example of the application of Intel microprocessor in VME system- a prototype of VME master module based on Intel 486DX2 CPU. The access and control from VL-BUS to VMEbus are realized by the prototype, in which a dedicated VMEbus interface chip-Cypress VIC068A is used. The principle of the system software, which worked in protected mode, is discussed, and VMEbus resources management in protected mode is also researched

[en] Published in summary form only

[en] This paper describes the physical protection enhancements provided as part of the Material Protection Control and Accounting Program (MPC and A) at each of the sites

[en] The LHC Access Safety System has introduced a number of new concepts into the domain of personnel protection at CERN. These can be grouped into several categories: organisational, architectural and concerning the end-user experience. By anchoring the project on the solid foundations of the IEC 61508/61511 methodology, the CERN team and its contractors managed to design, develop, test and commission on time a SIL3 safety system. The system uses a successful combination of the latest Siemens redundant safety programmable logic controllers with a traditional relay logic hard wired loop. The external envelope barriers used in the LHC include personnel and material access devices, which are interlocked door-booths introducing increased automation of individual access control, thus removing the strain from the operators. These devices ensure the inviolability of the controlled zones by users not holding the required credentials. To this end they are equipped with personnel presence detectors and the access control includes a state of the art bio-metry check. Building on the LHC experience, new projects targeting the refurbishment of the existing access safety infrastructure in the injector chain have started. This paper summarises the new concepts introduced in the LHC access control and safety systems, discusses the return of experience and outlines the main guiding principles for the renewal stage of the personnel protection systems in the LHC injector chain in a homogeneous manner. (authors)

[en] This paper reviews the main features of the new PS Personnel Protection System (PSPSS) as well as the main milestones for its deployment during the Long Shutdown of 2013-2014. Access conditions in the PS, SPS and LHC complexes during this period shall be described as well as the upgrades and improvements that are under preparation. (authors)

[en] Effective implementation of capacity building program in Kenya will result in maximum protection against terrorist activity/counter terrorism worldwide due to countries meeting the requirements of the program via safety and security measures at land borders, seaports, and airports. It will also result in enforcement of illegal trade pertaining to terrorist financing, money laundering, trade fraud, strategic cases including weapons of mass destruction, child pornography, intellectual property rights, document fraud, alien smuggling, drug smuggling, and general smuggling. It will also facilitate legitimate commerce.

[en] ADaMS is CERN's Access Distribution and Management System. It evaluates access authorisations to more than 400 zones and for more than 35000 persons. Although accesses are granted based on a combination of training courses, administrative authorisations and the radio-protection situation of an individual, the policies and technicalities are constantly evolving along with the laboratory's activities; the current version of ADaMS is based on a 7 year old design, and is starting to show its limits. A version 3 of ADaMS will allow improved synchronization with CERN's scheduling and planning tools (used heavily during technical shutdowns, for instance), will allow CERN's training catalogue to change without impacting access management and will simplify and reduce the administrative workload of granting access. The new version will provide enhanced self-services to end users by focusing on access points (the physical barriers) instead of safety zones. ADaMS 3 will be able to cope better with changing and new requirements, as well as the multiplication of access points. The project requires the cooperation of a dozen services at CERN, and should take 18 months to develop. (author)

[en] BetrVG section 87, sub-sec. (1), No. 1 and 7, first sentence; Atomic Energy Act section 7, sub-sec. (2), No. 5; section 17, sub-sec. (1), sentence 2. On the basis of a right of codetermination, the works council may only claim an arrangement that could be decided upon by the employer alone outside the Works Constitution Act. In case the employer is obliged by an administrative act binding upon him, to take certain measures, the works council may not claim an arrangement deviating from this directive by referring to the right of codetermination. Federal Labour Court, decision of May 26, 1988 - 1 ABR 9/87 - concerning the execution of security controls on the personnel entering the WAK. (orig./HP)