[en] A Cost/Risk/Benefit Analysis on the future decommissioning of the Hanford Z-plant, a plutonium conversion and fabrication facility in the United States, was recently completed. The analysis has been used to identify decommissioning tasks high in cost or occupational radiation exposure. Recommendations for future design considerations have been made. They include ways of easing glove box removal, reducing piping removal requirements, and simplifying decontamination of structural surfaces

[en] Popular description of the nuclear waste management centre. (HP)

[en] Nuclear criticality safety (NCS) program elements and equipment are examined at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensed facilities as an integral part of the NRC fuel cycle facility oversight process. This paper presents an overview of the NRC regulatory oversight of the criticality safety program. Several aspects of the criticality safety oversight program, including inspection activities, licensee reporting of operational events, and inspector training are discussed

[en] Blasting is an important activity during rock excavation to reach required depth for obtaining stability of the civil structure. For the construction of various Plant Buildings of Fast Reactor Fuel Cycle Facility (FRFCF), IGCAR at Kalpakkam, based on the geological survey it is required to reach a depth of 21.4 meters from existing ground level. This paper details about the procedures and precaution adopted during the rock blasting activities at FRFCF site. The volume of rock removed by blasting was 3 lakh cubic meters. The total number of blasting carried out was 304 using 105.73 tons of blasting material. The entire blasting work could be completed within 174 days without any incident. (author)

[en] The report sets out the findings of the team which carried out the recent audit of health and safety at Dounreay. The audit was initiated on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive by the Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations and followed an incident on 7 May of this year which left the 'Fuel Cycle Area' on the site without its normal electricity supplies for 16 years. The audit has shown that much has to be done to improve safety at Dounreay to bring it up to the standards HSE requires for continued operation of a nuclear installation and to enable Dounreay to be safely decommissioned and made safe for future generations. However, HSE considers that the site is under proper control under the nuclear licensing regime and presently safe; operations in the Fuel Cycle Area are shut down and they will need a Consent of HSE before they can restart. HSE believes that, subject to the recommendations in this report about organisation, management and training, the current staff at Dounreay have the knowledge, skills and commitment to enable Dounreay to operate safely and to bring it up to the standards that HSE expects. Consent to restart will only be given when the Chief Inspector is satisfied that an adequate safety case for operation has been made

No abstract available

[en] The transport system is employed in a fuel cycle center for storage, relocation or reprocessing of LWR fuel elements. It consists of a mast movable in the vertical direction, capable of horizontal displacement and carrying a swivel boom at its bottom end. This boom is used to move fuel elements from one pool into the other. The mast is braced against lateral forces in a horizontal rail. (DG)

[en] This is a study of the effects on the costs of decommissioning nuclear reactors and fuel cycle facilities caused by changes in the economic environment, changes in the accuracy of facility use planning, and the use of various options for funding decommissioning. The results of this study are applicable to the decommissioning of any facility. 3 refs

[en] The reprocessing system includes a large number of waterfilled ponds next to each other for the intermediate storage of fuel elements from LWR's. The fuel element transport device is allocated to a middle pond. The individual ponds are separated from each other by walls, and are only accessible from the middle pond via narrow passages. The transport device includes a telescopic running rail for a trolley with a grab device for the fuel element. The running rail is supported in turn by a second trolley, which can be moved by wheels on rails. Part of the drive of the first trolley is arranged on the second one. Using this transport device, adjacent ponds can be served through the passage openings. (DG)

[en] It is presented within the paper the properties risk and safety of the nuclear fuel cycle installations as a complete group of noncoincident probabilistic functional events. It is synthesized the risk axiomatics for that installations