No abstract available

[en] The execution of attacks with radiological weapons are well within the capabilities of both local terrorist groups and transnational terrorist networks. In a research project, plausible attack scenarios have been developed, based on medical and industrial radioactive sources widely used in Germany. Special emphasis was put on how such sources could be obtained applying criminal tactics. To this end, working procedures in hospitals and companies have been analyzed. Furthermore, by means of simulations, the consequences of a terrorist attack using such sources were estimated. None of the scenarios we investigated led to doses at the site of the explosion which might cause acute radiation effects. However, in some scenarios, an attack would result in the necessity of a potentially very costly clean-up of large urban areas. Therefore, improvements in sources security are recommended. (orig.)

No abstract available

[en] This work focuses on the main specific risks for those working with laboratory animals in a Research Center such as CIEMAT. First we present the general biological risks, their laws and rules. Next, we development the specific risks associated with the laboratory animals, zoonotic diseases and allergies. then we deal with the risks that can be consequence of working with laboratory animals, ionizing radiations, chemical products, genetically modified organisms, liquid nitrogen management, bio containment and human samples management. As they are subjects of interest, we also include the workers health assesment for those exposed to biological agents, including recommendations about hygiene and disinfections. (Author)

[en] Short communication

[en] Protection of heads of state/government from CBRN threats requires flexibility and advanced planning. The best approach to CBRN countermeasures in a close protection context combine traditional close protection techniques, sound security practices, and a good understanding of the technical nature of the threat. Poor general security practices make for poor CBRN protection. This paper addresses a methodology for assessing the viability of threats to protected persons/VIPs and provides an overview of close protection in the CBRN environment. It is important to define the scope of CBRN response in the close protection context. Some threat agents are more applicable to a military environment than to the type of attack consistent with assassination. By focussing the scope of CBRN close protection more specifically on the more technically viable threats, appropriate concepts of operation can be developed. Concepts of operation, developed with an understanding of the threat, determine the requirement for advanced preparation and the training and equipping of protective details. Most of the responses required in CBRN incidents are well served by tactically sound close protection procedures. The fundamental principles are: rapid identification of hazard, speed, use of protective technology, and medical interventions, including rapid decontamination and basic and advanced life support measures. This paper does not contain confidential or classified information and represents only the opinion of its author. It does not represent any official policy or opinion of the authors present or previous employers.(author)

[en] Containment of a tritium accident within a large fusion device building will be difficult and costly. Complete containment is impossible, and with this fact in mind, the global dispersion and health effects of tritium are reviewed. Atmospheric tritium emissions lead to an estimated population dose to the Northern Hemisphere of 5.6 x 10^-₃ man-rem/Ci, which may also be interpreted as 1 cancer fatality per MCi. Updating the NRC $1000 per man-rem criterion to 1982 costs gives 9.5 $/y per Ci/y as the unit annual health benefit rate from averting tritium release at a continuous rate. Present worth considerations lead to an estimate of $100 per Ci/y for the maximum capital investment justified per expected curie per year of tritium release averted. A simplified enclosure model is used to explore the trade-off between processing capacity and recycle time with the health cost of residual tritium release included in the analysis

No abstract available

No abstract available

[en] The development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has caused continued effort toward public safety through radiation health protection measures and nuclear management practices. However, concern has not been focused on the development specifically in the operation of chemical pestrochemical industries as well as other industrial processes brought about by technological advancements. This article presents the comparison of the risk of radiation and chemicals. The methods used for comparing the risks of late effects of radiation and chemicals are considered at three levels. (a) as a frame of reference to give an impression of resolving power of biological tests; (b) as methods to quantify risks; (c) as instruments for an epidemiological survey of human populations. There are marked dissimilarities between chemicals and radiation and efforts to interpret chemical activity may not be achieved. Applicability of the concept of rad equivalence has many restrictions and as pointed out this approach is not an established one. (RTD)