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[en] In 2011 CEA reported 100 events to the Authority for Nuclear Safety (ASN). 93 were graded 0 on the INES scale and 7 were graded 1. None of them had a significant impact on the staff health and the environment. 25% of these events concerned delays in the controls of safety equipment. In 2011 CEA had to manage several situations that led to a response of its crisis center: 1) the explosion of an oven belonging to the Socodei-Centraco company situated near the Marcoule Center, 2) the discovery of about 500 grenades from the first world war during digging out works in the Grenoble Center, 3) flooding due to heavy rains in the Cadarache Center, and 4) an intrusion attempt at the Cadarache Center. (A.C.)
[en] The disposal of nuclear waste in deep geological formations provides a safe means of isolating the waste from people until the radioactivity has decayed. However, preventing people from intruding waste isolation systems is a different problem since it is difficult to foresee future human activities. It has therefore appeared that it is necessary to look for some reasonable means to reduce still further the probability of inadvertent human intrusion in the future. This paper presents a general reflection on how this goal could be reached and does not correspond to an official position which may be taken by ANDRA. (authors). 1 fig., 9 refs
[en] The primary objectives of the physical protection are to protect nuclear material from theft and unauthorized removal and to prevent the sabotage of nuclear material and facilities. To accomplish the objectives, a system for the physical protection (PPS) of nuclear material and facilities should be established and implemented under the 'Law for physical protection and measures against radiological emergency' and the recommendations INFCIRC/225 /Rev.4, which are considered as a baseline for the PPS. The current PPS of KAERI including the physical protection elements such as detection, delay and access control was reviewed and analyzed. The options for upgrading the PPS were suggested to meet the domestic and international obligations. An upgrade plan chosen by KAERI is being established
[en] Since 2008, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), similar to regulators of other critical industries, has requested their licensees to implement cyber security programs and conduct self- assessments without the benefit of an industry specific cyber security standard that provides common metrics for coverage and effectiveness of their programs. However, for the nuclear industry, a new CSA standard 290.7 entitled 'Cyber security for nuclear power plants and small reactor facilities', released in December 2014, will have the CNSC looking to facility operators to be compliant to the new standard. This paper will discuss initiatives at Canadian Nuclear Laboratories to develop of a suite of tools, techniques, and best practices that can be used by the regulator and industry for assessing compliance and effectiveness of cyber security technology and implementations. (author)
[en] A flexible metal or ceramic cable is described with composite ceramic ends, or a U-shaped ceramic connecting element attached to a binding element plate or block cast from alumina or zirconium, and connected to the connecting element by shrink fitting. 7 figs
[en] In this book, the author gives the reasons for while ecology and economics constrain our communities to call at the nuclear energy for producing electricity. He gave understand the intolerable feature of catastrophic reactor accident such Chernobylsk. With a sum of examples he permits to better understand the real threats and propose measures for reducing the dangers
[fr]Dans ce livre l'auteur nous explique pourquoi l'ecologie et l'economie nous obligent a recourir a l'energie nucleaire pour produire de l'electricite. Mais il nous fait comprendre aussi le caractere intolerable de l'eventualite d'une catastrophe comme celle de Tchernobyl. A travers une somme considerable d'exemples, il nous permet de mieux comprendre les veritables menaces et propose toute une serie de mesures pour eliminer les dangers les plus criants
[en] In this session participants, in particular those representing national authorities, were asked to highlight regulatory aspects and criteria within their countries that are relevant to human intrusion. Several of these national highlights were supported by written material distributed at the meeting. A brief summary based on the contributions is provided
[en] Hiroyuki Umeki, Chairman of the IGSC, indicated that when updating its programme of work, in 2007, the IGSC raised a number of issues that the group recommended RWMC-RF to consider for further discussion. The conclusions from different IGSC studies were that there is agreement at a conceptual level on the treatment of human intrusion, but a range of approaches are adopted for addressing it in safety assessment, and the degree to which these are specified in regulations also varies considerably among national programmes. The requirements and constraints for considering human intrusion are stylised and, therefore, are largely specified in regulations; in many national programmes, relatively few (or no) aspects are left to the discretion of the implementer. Human intrusion is considered as a sensitive issue for many programmes since it can be an issue of high interest to stakeholders and decisions on approaches are normally undertaken after extensive consultation; those who have already taken decisions are generally satisfied with the outcome and would not welcome work that might undermine or re-open the issue. Thus, a detailed re-examination of safety assessment of human intrusion and of the conclusions that have been reached previously is not a priority. This issue remains of interest to IGSC, however, as it must be addressed in some fashion within all safety cases. The key questions are: - Should regulations require measures to reduce the likelihood or consequences of human intrusion? What 'credit' can be taken for such measures? Is there new thinking or methods in terms of memory and markers? - What types of stylised human intrusion should be considered in a safety case? What are the roles of the regulator and implementer in doing so? - What consequences should be considered? What are the protection criteria against which to assess human intrusion scenarios? - Are the answers to any of these questions site-, culture-, concept- or waste-specific? A concluding question may be: Is there still consensus on the areas of agreement, or has thinking evolved?
[en] This calculation provides a pre-retrieval, screening-level assessment of long-term groundwater pathway human health risk associated with potential leaks during retrieval and potential residual waste remaining after completion of retrieval for the U-200-series tanks (U-101, U-102, U-103, U-104). A screening-level groundwater impacts perspective for the U tank farm as a whole is included. To provide additional perspective, potential risk from inadvertent post-closure human intrusion into the U-200-series tanks is also included
[en] Highlights: • “Estimate and Prevention of the Insider Threats, EPIT” was proposed for the specific estimation of insider behaviors. • EPIT method considers the CCF of protective devices to analyze the insider threat to the effectiveness of PPS. • A reasonable management of nuclear staffs will be found to mitigate insider threats by the EPIT method. - Abstract: Physical Protection Systems (PPS) are used to protect critical facilities and prevent against adversarial intrusion. The insider threats of PPS must be considered when analyzing the effectiveness of PPS. On the basis of the normal approach termed “Estimate of Adversary Sequence Interruption, EASI”, a novel method named “Estimate and Prevention of the Insider Threats, EPIT” was proposed for the specific estimation of insider behaviors. According to failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) method, the EPIT method adequately considers the common failure causes of protective devices to analyze the insider threat to the effectiveness of PPS. By the EPIT method results, a reasonable management and rights allocation of staffs can be figured out to mitigate insider threats.