[en] Design, manufacture, cold trials, and active operation of the sea transport systems are described

[en] This article describes the ship used for transport of spent uranium oxides flasks before reprocessing according to IAEA regulations

[en] The Transnucleaire company is more and more involved in the maritime transport of radioactive materials. Nuclear shipments are classified into 3 categories: i) the products issuing from the fuel cycle but before irradiation ( uranium ores, natural or enriched UF₆, fresh fuel...), ii) the products issuing from materials testing reactors (spent MTR fuel, irradiated samples...), and iii) all the products coming from the nuclear fuel cycle back-end (spent fuel assemblies from nuclear power plants, high-level wastes...). The products from the first category can be shipped by regular trading vessels, whereas the products from the 2 other categories require particular fittings or specialized ships according to the regulations that are applied: INF2 or INF3 or Japanese KAISA rules. The challenges that face this company will be: i) to develop first category shipment by using chartered ships in order to maintain reasonable prices, ii) to turn INF2 ships into INF3 or KAISA ships, and iii) to improve transport conditions by using modern techniques such as the satellite follow up. (A.C.)

[en] On 16 November 1968, 560 metal drums labelled 'Plumbat' were loaded on to a small ship, the Scheersberg A, in Antwerp. The drums contained uranium ore which was being shipped by a small German chemical company to an obscure Italian paint company for processing. At least, that was what the documents said, and the grounds upon which Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Commission) had licensed the sale and shipment of the ore. The Scheersberg A next appeared in a Turkish port, without her cargo. Potentially, the uranium in the drums could be formed into the raw material for a dozen nuclear bombs. As far as Euratom and the security forces of Germany and Itay were concerned, it had disappeared off the face of the earth. In fact, nothing more might ever have been heard about it were it not for a chance sentence uttered to the Norwegian police who were interrogating a suspect about the murder of an Arab waiter. Under questioning, the suspect revealed that he was one of Israel's secret 'hit teams', sent out to kill suspected Arab terrorists. He talked almost eagerly to the police, and divulged that he had once owned a ship called the Scheersberg A. Israel was a logical destination for the uranium, since it was one of the few countries which possessed a reactor capable of transmuting the uranium ore into plutonium, which could be used for bombs. Security officials and journalists followed up that chance remark and started to unravel the extraordinary history of the Scheersberg A, and its part in another mysterious affair, the hijacking by Israel of five gunboats from the port of Cherbourg late in 1969. The Plumbat Affair is a fascinating detective story; the alliances that were formed and the deals that were made at the highest levels of international politics and in the depths of the underworld make this a thriller beyond the imaginings of most novelists. (author)

No abstract available

[en] This document describes the results of the Workshop on Port Selection Criteria for Shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel. The workshop was held at the United States Merchant Marine Academy in Kings Point, New York on November 15 and 16, 1993. The workshop panel of maritime experts developed criteria for the US Department of Energy for the evaluation and selection of ports of entry for spent-fuel shipments. While recommending criteria for selecting ports, the workshop panel agreed that any port capable of handling an ocean-going vessel is capable of safely receiving spent nuclear fuel

[en] Despite the developments in the transport industry, seaborne trade is currently the main way of freight. More than 80% of international trade is transported by the world's oceans. Since 1970, marine traffic has increased at an average rate of 2.1% per year, surpassing 10 billion tons of cargo in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2017). In parallel, cruise tourism has experienced significant growth in recent years both in the size of its ships and in the number of transported passengers. The number of vessels in the world fleet has also experienced substantial growth with at least five new cruise vessels built every year in the last decade. In 2015, the total population of cruise ship passengers worldwide was estimated at 23 million, with growth expectations for 2020 to 28 million passengers (Vicente-Cera et al., 2019).

[en] This is an unofficial English translation of a decision, which was made in accordance with Section 12 of Decree No. 357 of 16th May 1980 on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods in Ships. It adopts by reference the IMO/IMDG Code with the packaging Annex and Amendments 1 - 21. Where the National Board of Navigation has not provided otherwise, the Code shall be applied to vessels carrying dangerous goods, to the classification, packing, marketing and handling of dangerous goods and the stowage of such goods on board, and to documents related to carriage of dangerous goods. The decision applies to vessels engaged in traffic in Finnish territorial waters and to all Finnish vessels, even when operating outside Finnish territorial waters. The decision designates the Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety as the competent authority where approval certificates for transport, packages or containers of radioactive materials are required. (NEA)

[en] In this paper we are going to discuss a variation on the problem of finding the shortest path between two points in optimal ship routing problems consisting of obstacles that are not allowed to be crossed by the path. Our main goal are going to be the construction of an appropriate algorithm, based in an earlier work by computing the shortest path between two points in the plane that avoids a set of polygonal obstacles.

[en] Shortage claims discussed in this article include those due to a definite disaster such as a fire, those due to cargo contamination and storage, and those identified in documentation as occurring between loading and unloading. The principal types of cover are examined, and the distinction between gross and net quantities, claim documentation, the petroleum measurement tables, and guaranteed out turn cover are described in detail. (UK)