[en] In recent years in the USA, increased emphasis has been placed on utilizing an 'all-hazards approach' in the development and testing of disaster plans. Disaster plans developed in this way should prepare the community to deal with a wide variety of natural and man-made emergencies, both anticipated and unanticipated in etiology. The basic approach in each disaster remains the same, with adaptation as necessary to deal with specific threats. Such an approach 'enables communities to be prepared to manage any number or type of emergencies. It facilitates prevention, preparation, response, and recovery, based on the broad scope of what could happen within and beyond the community.' (JCAHO) An all-hazards approach appears to have merit as well in the selection of antidotes for mass casualty use. Using cyanide as an example, we examine several criteria which permit a disaster preparedness entity to choose among available cyanide antidotes to permit the broadest application possible in the context of a cyanide-related chemical emergency. These criteria include: source of exposure, efficacy, safety (in the presence and absence of poisoning), safety in adults and children, ease of administration, conditions for storage and maintenance, stock rotation, and cost. The greatest limitation to the all-hazards approach in antidote selection is geographic availability. Because of the high cost of regulatory approval and historical protectionism / preferences by governments, certain regions may have little or no choice in the selection of antidotes. Hydroxocobalamin appears to best meet the requirements of an 'all-hazards' antidote for cyanide.(author)

[en] This article is a preliminary analysis of eight workshops developed with the local committees for disasters prevention on the Aburra Valley. No one of these committees has at this moment a clear and coherent policies for disasters prevention that make possible to establish administration and community procedures according to the national laws. As a result they do not have specific goals to achieve a permanent action. In most of cases is missing an organized structure to articulate all the different agencies and employees involved. The committees do not have a periodical prepared meetings schedule, what they do is just making emergency reunions to answer to calamity situations. Even though all the cities have a responsible officials staff for emergency management, they have others priorities so the prevention disasters work is left on a second level. In the second part of this article are presented some theoretical elements about disasters and are developed some legal aspects that support the policies related to this topic

[en] Due to an oversight, four references were cited incorrectly in the reference list of the original publication as well as in the text of the publication. The first names were used instead of the last names of the authors. In addition some author names were omitted inadvertently. The correct presentation of these references is shown below.

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[en] The Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake, generated a series of large tsunami waves that struck the east coast of Japan. Several nuclear power facilities were affected by the severe ground motions and large multiple tsunami waves: Tokai, Higashi Dori, Onagawa, and TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni facilities. The operational units at these facilities were successfully shutdown by the automatic systems installed as part of the design of the nuclear power plants to detect earthquakes. However, the large tsunami waves affected all these facilities to varying degrees, with the most serious consequences occurring at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi. These tsunami waves overwhelmed the defences of TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi facility, which were only designed to withstand tsunami waves of a maximum of 5.2 meters high. The larger waves that impacted this facility on that day were estimated to be larger than 14 meters high. The tsunami waves reached areas deep within the units causing the loss of all power sources except for one emergency diesel generator, with no other significant power source available on or off the site, and little hope of outside assistance. With no means to control or cool the reactor units, the three reactor units at TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ichi that were operational up to the time of the earthquake quickly heated up due to usual reactor decay heating. The lack of water to cool the reactor cores resulted in the partial melting of fuels rods and the production of hydrogen. In the first week there were a number of hydrogen explosion that resulted in the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere. These events are provisionally determined to be of the highest rating on the International Nuclear Event Scale. This presentation provides an overview and timescale of the events that unfolded in Japan, the current situation, the road map to recovery, the response by the Government of Japan and International Agencies and the future work programmes of the United Nation family of Agencies.

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[en] The paper contains the assessment methodology of a Safety Case fuel decommissioning of research reactors, taking into account the international approach principles. The paper also includes the assessment of a flooding scenario for a decommissioned research reactor (stage 1 of decommissioning). The scenario presents the flooding of reactor basement, radionuclide migration through environment and long term radiological impact for public. (authors)