[en] Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy has two objectives: 1) to promote the emergence of a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime; and 2) to assure the Canadian people and the international community that Canadian nuclear exports will not be used for any nuclear explosive purpose. By emphasizing the key role of the NPT, by promoting reliance upon and improvements in the IAEA safeguards system, by treating nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states alike regarding Canadian nuclear exports, by working for new approaches covering the sensitive phases (e.g. reprocessing) of the nuclear fuel cycle, Canada's policy promotes attainment of the first objective. The latter objective is served through the network of bilateral nuclear agreements that Canada has put into place with its nuclear partners. Those agreements provide assurance that Canada's nuclear exports are used solely for legitimate, peaceful, nuclear energy production purposes. At the same time, Canada, having formulated its non-proliferation and safeguards policy during the period 1945 to 1980, has recognized that it has gone as far as it can on its own in this field and that from this point on any further changes should be made on the basis of international agreement. The Canadian objective in post-INFCE forums such as the Committee on Assurances of Supply is to exert Canada's best efforts to persuade the international community to devise a more effective and comprehensive international non-proliferation regime into which Canada and other suppliers might subsume their national requirements

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[en] This paper presents non-traditional directions of activity of the Institute specialists to solve complicated scientific and technical tasks within the framework of observance of international obligations on non-proliferation. In the latest time much attention is paid to the reaching of mutual confidence between sides during a control over the observance of agreements regarding disarmament. How can we demonstrate implementation of agreements to each of both sides, not having leakage of confidential or, so called, 'sensitive' information? That means to ensure 'transparency' of activity, not doing a damage to both sides. It is needed to note that the meaning of the above term can be substantially varied, depending on what field of activity it is used in. For instance, the meaning of the transparency measures adopted in joint program of RFNC and SNL for future control of disassembling of nuclear weapon is represented as ''...measures which can be taken for building of the confidence of both sides, assuring that these sides reach mutual understanding, and one side can inspect activity of another side as well as its outcomes which are a part of lifetime cycle of nuclear weapon. We consider this meaning to be acceptable for objectives and principles indicated in joint Russian-Kazakhstani activity on decommisioning of the test site. Hereafter in this paper we will use terminology on the transparency measures which is adopted for future control of the nuclear weapon disassembling. The transparency measures application distates a necessity of development of documentation drawing system of individual procedures and operations, which has 'sensitive' information and to which some transporancy measures, and be in accord with the existent legislation of Russia and Kazakhstan. There is an example of nuclear device (ND) destruction in a tunnel 108 located on the former Semipalatinsk test site, that represents experience gained by specialists of RFNC-RITP in the field of the development and realization of the trasparency measures

[en] To avoid potentially catastrophic changes in the Earth's climate, world energy supply must shift over the next several decades toward carbon-free sources. Nuclear energy has particular promise for rapid and large-scale expansion worldwide, if a corresponding expansion in the risks of nuclear proliferation could be avoided. In recent years, attention has focused on limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing through a combination of export controls, voluntary agreements and incentives, and multinational ownership or international control. Iran and North Korea have demonstrated the limitations of export controls, due both to the diffusion of knowledge and technology and the willingness of individuals to engage in illegal trade for profit. Incentives has focused on the guaranteed supply of fresh fuel, but the the guaranteed take-back of spent fuel would be a far more powerful incentive for forego enrichment and reprocessing. Multinational ownership and international control are more promising long-term solutions, if they can be made binding on all states. A promising technological approach is the development of small, sealed-core reactors with long life-time cores. Such reactors would eliminate the need for any fresh fuel manufacture or spent-fuel handling by recipient states. Because small reactors could be economically competitive only if they were mass produced by a few suppliers, they hold the potential of centralizing enrichment and reprocessing in a few states

[en] This decision of the Ministry of Trade and Industry contains a list of equipment, facilities and materials other than nuclear materials the export of which requires a special permit in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act. The content of the list follows closely the trigger list defined by Memorandum B in the Appendix to IAEA document INFCIRC/209. (NEA)

[en] The document reproduces the text of a letter dated 14 September 1989 received by the IAEA Director General from the Resident Representative of Norway relating to the export of nuclear material, equipment or technology

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