[en] A review is given of the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1965-1968). The features of the Treaty and also inspection and control under NPT are discussed

[en] Short communication

No abstract available

No abstract available

[en] The increased production of nuclear fissile materials and the development of technology related to nuclear power generation also increase the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. This book deals with the present situation in the field and with the measures planned to reduce proliferation risks arising from uranium enrichment and irradiated fuel reprocessing. It also contains an in-depth analysis of the safeguards presently applied, nuclear export policies, the lessons learned from INFCE and the conditions for implementing the Non-proliferation Treaty. (NEA)

[en] Published in summary form only

[en] On 20 August 1990, some hundreds of diplomats, government officials, nuclear energy specialists, arms control experts and representatives of non-governmental organisations and the press will gather in Geneva for the opening of the Fourth Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. NPT review conferences review the Treaty's operation 'with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of this Treaty are being realised' (Article VII.3). Holding NPT review conferences at regular intervals also serves to focus international attention upon non-proliferation issues once every five years. The purpose, scope and nature of the conferences is discussed and the main issues for 1990 assessed. (author)

[en] IAEA Safeguards are always implemented on the basis of agreements which are concluded between one or more Governments and the Agency. They lay down the rights and obligations of the parties; the more modern types of agreements, in particular those in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, do that in quite some details. Several articles, for instance, regulate the working relations between the States and the IAEA inspectorate. Those are based on two basic obligations: that of the State to establish and maintain a ''System of Accountancy for and Control of Nuclear Material'' and that of the Agency to ascertain the absence of diversion of nuclear material by verifying the findings of the States' system, inter alia through independent measurements and observations. Other articles dealing also with the working relations States - IAEA rule that the Agency should take due account of the technical effectiveness of the States' system and mention among the criteria for determining the inspection effort, the extent of functional dependence of the State's accountancy from that of the facility operator. However, quantitative relationships in that respect are left to be worked out in practice. With the help of consultants and expert advisory groups a rational has been developed and possible practical arrangements discussed with several States concerned. The rational for coordinating the work of the States' inspectorate with IAEA's inspectorate was to use a factor by which the significant quantity used for calculating verification sampling plans would be adjusted in order to reduce to a certain extent the Agency's independent verification work in case the States would do extensive verifications themselves in a manner transparent to IAEA. However, in practice it proved that there are quite a number of points in the fuel cycle where such adaptations would have little or no effect on the inspection effort necessary to achieve the safeguards objective. Such a strategic point is, e.g., the input to a reprocessing plant, as it has in any case to be verified continuously by the responsible inspectorate. Ad hoc coordination arrangements had to be invented for several key measurement points and various safeguards techniques. A selection of such solutions are described and discussed

No abstract available

[en] Bhutan's accession to the agreement. (HP)