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[en] The extent of the nuclear programme in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was revealed in May 1992: reports on the country's facilities were handed to the International Atomic Energy Agency and an Agency group visited Korea on a ''familiarisation visit''. DPRK's nuclear programme had been the subject of speculation for some time. While the country had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and two facilities were already under IAEA safeguards - a research reactor and a critical facility, both at the Institute of Nuclear Physics - there were a number of indicators that DPRK was pursuing a nuclear programme aimed at military use. The new openness was prompted by a number of factors including discussions on closer relations with South Korea. DPRK signed a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement on 30 January 1992. On the familiarisation visit by the IAEA director general in May the DPRK revealed nuclear facilities in operation or under construction at five sites. At Pakchon and Pyongsan: each site housed a uranium mine and uranium-ore concentration plant. At Pyongyang: the two facilities already under safeguards at the Institute of Nuclear Physics; and a sub critical facility at Kim Il Sung university. At Nyongbyon: a fuel fabrication plant; an 5MWe experimental power reactor, in operation; a 50MWe prototype power reactor under construction; and a facility ultimately intended as a reprocessing plant, but described by North Korea, because of its unfinished state, as a laboratory. At Taechon: a 200MWe power reactor under construction. (author)

[en] CTBTO (Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization) is charge of nuclear test monitoring for nuclear non-proliferation. CTBTO has 170 seismic stations in operation in 76 countries in order to detect the artificial earthquake that was caused by an underground nuclear test. Korea use formula that is based on the equations that are used by the IMS (International Monitoring System) of CTBTO for analysis of explosive scale, and reflect the nature of the terrain, such as rock. But the expression for calculating the exact scale explosive is still un-established state. And generally CTBTO doesn't care about artificial explosive that is being received low-yield in accordance with the criteria of nuclear detection. But, at the time that North Korea conduct a nuclear test, it should not be overlooked that the scale of the earthquake detection criteria below. Because DPRK is trying to conceal their nuclear development capability, there are possibility of low-yield nuclear test or possibility of install a buffer to hide actual explosive scale. These radionuclide observations were consistent with a DPRK low-yield nuclear test on May 2010, even though no seismic signals from such a test have been detected. But there were a few times of low-yield (magnitude 1.39-1.93) occurred around DPRK nuclear test site at that time

[en] For the decentralization of the North Korea, the decommissioning of the weapon related facilities should be dismantled and the site be decontaminated and restored to the green field. To achieve this final target, Korea should lead the dismantlement projects of the North Korea facilities, sharing work scopes with the member countries of 6 member talks. Many essential technologies for decommissioning of nuclear facilities was acquired and it was concluded that Korean industries could carry out the decommissioning of the North Korea facilities by the some modification or development of the current existing technologies and sharing some tasks for decommissioning of the NK facilities with member countries of 6 member talk

[en] For Korea, it is essential to participate in the decommissioning of North Korean nuclear facilities for Pu-based weapon program and to lead the project for the protection of the environments from the possible spread of nuclear contamination. Before, the studies for the verification of the North Korea nuclear facilities and for the technical preparation of the decommissioning of north Korea were conducted but the depth of the studies was not reached to the evaluation of the decommissioning project by the documentation of a decommissioning plan to the provision of the technical information to the policy decision makers. It is very helpful for understanding the characteristics of the decommissioning projects to formulate a possible dismantling scenario and to make a decommissioning plan. The cost and the periods estimated on the base of this scenario is more exact and the analysis for the selection of different policies will be possible

[en] The Agency has received a letter to the Director General dated 1 November 2006 from the Resident Representative of Cuba, H.E. Ms. Norma M. Goicochea Estenoz, in her capacity as the Chair of the Vienna Chapter of the Non-Aligned Movement, enclosing a copy of the 'Statement by the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement on the Nuclear Test Conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea'. The letter and, as requested by the Resident Representative, its enclosure, are reproduced herewith for the information of Member States

[en] North Korea has chosen nuclear weapons as the means to protect its sovereignty. Despite international society's endeavors and sanctions to encourage North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambition, North Korea has repeatedly conducted nuclear testing. In this paper, the reason for North Korea's addiction to a nuclear arsenal is addressed within the framework of cognitive psychology. The prospect theory addresses an epistemological approach usually overlooked in rational choice theories. It provides useful implications why North Korea, being under a crisis situation has thrown out a stable choice but taken on a risky one such as nuclear testing. Under the viewpoint of prospect theory, nuclear tests by North Korea can be understood as follows: The first nuclear test in 2006 is seen as a trial to escape from loss areas such as financial sanctions and regime threats; the second test in 2009 was interpreted as a consequence of the strategy to recover losses by making a direct confrontation against the United States; and the third test in 2013 was understood as an attempt to strengthen internal solidarity after Kim Jong-eun inherited the dynasty, as well as to enhance bargaining power against the United States. Thus, it can be summarized that Pyongyang repeated its nuclear tests to escape from a negative domain and to settle into a positive one. In addition, in the future, North Korea may not be willing to readily give up its nuclear capabilities to ensure the survival of its own regime

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