No abstract available

[en] We have adapted the Los Alamos MASS accounting system for use on an IBM PC/AT at the Fuels Manufacturing Facility (FMF) at Argonne National Laboratory-West (ANL-WEST) in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Cost of hardware and proprietary software was less than $10,000 per station. The system consists of three stations between which accounting information is transferred using floppy disks accompanying special nuclear material shipments. The programs were implemented in dBASEIII and were compiled using the proprietary software CLIPPER. Modifications to the inventory can be posted in just a few minutes, and operator/computer interaction is nearly instantaneous. After the records are built by the user, it takes 4 to 5 seconds to post the results to the database files. A version of this system was specially adapted and is currently in use at the FMF facility at Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho Falls. Initial satisfaction is adequate and software and hardware problems are minimal

[en] Through an iterative application of Decision Support Systems (DSS) apparatus and evolution of DSS concepts, we redefined DSS from a systems perspective. By focusing on successful DSS and the definition of success for the newly-defined DSS, we generated a paradigm for understanding, applying, and improving DSS. The significance of the research is that we now: (1) understand the various roles management tools play within the new DSS concept; (2) recognize the need for characterizing the domain of responsibility of a manager to obtain a successful DSS; and (3) have learned special characteristics of government agencies like Nuclear Materials (NM) to identify what features of the new DSS concept can be expected to improve performance

[en] Material control and accounting (MC and A) of special nuclear material (SNM) must supplement physical security to protect SNM from unlawful use such as terrorist activities. This article reviews MC and A safeguards of SNM in the United States. The following topics are covered: a brief perspective and history of MC and A safeguards, current MC and A practices, measurement methods for SNM, historical MC and A performance, a description of near-real-time MC and A systems, and conclusions on the status of MC and A in the United States

[en] The purpose of this study was to provide the NRC with information on the availability and capability of current evaluation techniques to support safeguard regulations that emphasize performance requirements. Nine existing evaluation techniques were considered. Four deal with material control, four with fixed site physical protection and one with transportation safeguards. All but one of the techniques (NBS-DPA) employ computer codes; most are closely tied to a data base associated with the technique. Not all of the techniques considered are fully available to a potential user; some are still in development and the extent of tested application and documentation varies. Those aspects of the techniques bearing on availability (input requirements, current status, extent of tested application, completeness of documentation, and overall limitations on utilization) have been assessed and are summarized

[en] The scope of a safeguards evaluation model can efficiently address one of two issues: (1) global safeguards effectiveness or (2) vulnerability analysis for individual scenarios. The Safeguards Automated Facility Evaluation (SAFE) focuses on the first issue, while the Safeguards Network Analysis Procedure (SNAP) is directed towards the second. A combined SAFE/SNAP approach to the problem of safeguards evaluation is described and illustrated through an example. 4 refs

[en] Education and training efforts are expanding in the field of nuclear materials control and accountability. There are some opportunities and very specific needs relative to MC and A education and training. This paper identifies these opportunities and needs and addresses improving training programs

[en] A typical nuclear material accounting system employing double-entry bookkeeping is described. A logic diagram is used to model the interactions of the accounting system and the adversary when he attempts to thwart it. Boolean equations are derived from the logic diagram; solution of these equations yields the accounts and records through which the adversary may disguise a SSNM theft and the collusion requirements needed to accomplish this feat. Some technical highlights of the logic diagram are also discussed

[en] Nuclear materials are subject to both national and international safeguards control. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) takes care of the international safeguards control. The control activities, which are discussed in this article, are carried out according to the agreements between various countries and the IAEA

[en] The objective of IAEA safeguards implemented in conjunction with the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is to provide ''timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material''and deterrence. To strengthen its safeguards, the IAEA is developing a system of technical criteria to clarify this objective. Agency safeguards center on four basic task elements: setting requirements, selecting procedures, applying safeguards and evaluating results. 3 refs