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[en] The increased production of nuclear fissile materials and the development of technology related to nuclear power generation also increase the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. This book deals with the present situation in the field and with the measures planned to reduce proliferation risks arising from uranium enrichment and irradiated fuel reprocessing. It also contains an in-depth analysis of the safeguards presently applied, nuclear export policies, the lessons learned from INFCE and the conditions for implementing the Non-proliferation Treaty. (NEA)

[en] Since the last NPT Review Conference in 1980 and especially in the past two to three years, an increasing number of studies, publications, and books have appeared on nuclear non-proliferation. In this paper 14 books are reviewed

[en] This paper presents non-traditional directions of activity of the Institute specialists to solve complicated scientific and technical tasks within the framework of observance of international obligations on non-proliferation. In the latest time much attention is paid to the reaching of mutual confidence between sides during a control over the observance of agreements regarding disarmament. How can we demonstrate implementation of agreements to each of both sides, not having leakage of confidential or, so called, 'sensitive' information? That means to ensure 'transparency' of activity, not doing a damage to both sides. It is needed to note that the meaning of the above term can be substantially varied, depending on what field of activity it is used in. For instance, the meaning of the transparency measures adopted in joint program of RFNC and SNL for future control of disassembling of nuclear weapon is represented as ''...measures which can be taken for building of the confidence of both sides, assuring that these sides reach mutual understanding, and one side can inspect activity of another side as well as its outcomes which are a part of lifetime cycle of nuclear weapon. We consider this meaning to be acceptable for objectives and principles indicated in joint Russian-Kazakhstani activity on decommisioning of the test site. Hereafter in this paper we will use terminology on the transparency measures which is adopted for future control of the nuclear weapon disassembling. The transparency measures application distates a necessity of development of documentation drawing system of individual procedures and operations, which has 'sensitive' information and to which some transporancy measures, and be in accord with the existent legislation of Russia and Kazakhstan. There is an example of nuclear device (ND) destruction in a tunnel 108 located on the former Semipalatinsk test site, that represents experience gained by specialists of RFNC-RITP in the field of the development and realization of the trasparency measures

[en] In his address to the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reviewed the world's non-proliferation regime and the role of IAEA safeguards in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the first and fundamental barrier to proliferation is the political will and determination of individual States not to acquire nuclear weapons, other barriers being legal obligations under treaties or agreements and the acceptance of safeguards inspections to verify peaceful uses of nuclear facilities

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[en] In given article authors considered problems of international control for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapon. The greater attention paid to the position of Republic of Kazakhstan. The detail analysis of existing international legal documents on the given problem is presented. (author)