No abstract available

[en] The Finnish power companies, TVO and IVO, chose the wet storage method when building the interim spent fuel stores at Olkiluoto and Loviisa NPP sites. These choices were based on extensive comparative studies of different storage methods and designs. TVO's and IVO's stores started operation in the financial years 1987 and 1984 respectively. TVO's was built as an away-from-reactor (AFR) store on the NPP site, IVO's as an at-reactor-store, wall-to-wall to the NPP process building. The operating experience with both stores is good. 4 figs

[en] The invention relates to apparatus and process designed to transfer toxic or radioactive material in either direction through an opening in the wall of an enclosure. Said opening is fitted with a mobile closure which may latch temporarily with the removable closure of a vessel, when the latter contains, or is intended to contain the material to be transferred. A stream of gas, at a pressure in excess of the pressure in the enclosure, is introduced by an injector into the space between the two latched closures, thus preventing hazardous material from entering and settling on the opposite surfaces of said closures, which are exposed to the environment after the vessel has been removed from the opening

[en] Radioactive wastes are formed on territory of Kazakstan as result of activity of former Semipalatinsk test nuclear site; nuclear explosion, made for decision of economic problems; activity of the enterprises of nuclear-industrial complex, as well as using in activity radioactive materials. At present radioactive pollution in regions, close to test site is studied. On a preliminary data a level of pollution cesium-137 and strontium-90 of site within the limits of background significance except for separate points, making up in a sum of order 2160 sq.km from total 18000 sq.km. However, situation with the level of pollution-239 and other transuranium elements remain poor investigated. On a territory of the Republic of Kazakstan 32 underground nuclear explosions out site of militaries sites for the decision of various economic problems, excluding seismic sounding, as well as for creation of underground capacities mainly in salt domes of Prikaspiyskay depression were conducted. The capacity of charges was from 10 up to 85 k t. As a result of realization of nuclear explosions at Semipalatinsk test site an other platforms, low activity wastes on a surface - 5.9 million tones by activity 11600 Ku were formed, and 6.5 millions tones of middle active wastes in a glaze fort with general active about 12.8 millions Ku are concentrated in underground tanks. It is noted, that for Kazakstan a necessity of construction of regional item storage a low and middle active wastes is obvious. By 2005 in Kazakstan, in connection with removal from operation BN-350 nuclear reactor in Aktau, there is necessity in long-term underground storehouse of high active wastes. According to the program about creation of state system of the collection, processing, the transportation and burial ground from 1993 to 1996 surveys platforms in Mangistau industrial region were executed, the project of re-equipment of storehouse a complex 'Baikal-1' under temporary storehouse of sources ionizing radiation was made. In 1995 the first turn of a reception on storage is accepted in operation

[en] The flask for highly radioactive substances described in this invention comprises a thick steel cylinder with leak proof closures at both ends and made up of several coaxial rings in rolled sheet steel, fitted into each other and welded to each other along their edges. The inner ring is preferably in sheet steel with a lining on its internal side, for instance a stainless steel lining. Likewise the outer ring is preferably in sheet steel with a covering on its outer side. The cylindrical body of the flask is welded by its lower end to a forged steel bottom and by its upper end to a forged steel ring. The bottom can also be made with several partitions. This forged steel ring has an inside peripheral shoulder and the upper end of the flask is closed in a leak proof manner by an initial forged steel plus resting on this shoulder and bolted to it and by a second plug bolted to the free end of this ring

[en] CEM is oriented towards identifying, quantifying and curtailing probable impediments to a program originating from both the internal and external program environments. Critical elements are defined as events, trends or conditions that could generate potential uncertainties in the program. The critical elements are broken down into components against which management action is initiated

[en] The casks are located at a distance from each other in the cuboid final storage concrete container, and the container is then closed. After the transfer to the final storage deposit, the intermediate spaces are filled with sand, salt, concrete or bitumen through one or more lock-up adjustable openings in the cover of the final storage container. (DG)

[en] This document is the final laboratory report for Tank 241-T-201. Push mode core segments were removed from Riser 3 between April 24, 1997, and April 25, 1997. Segments were received and extruded at 222-S Laboratory. Analyses were performed in accordance with Tank 241-T-201 Push Mode Core Sampling and Analysis Plan (TSAP) (Hu, 1997), Letter of Instruction for Core Sample Analysis of Tanks 241-T-201, 241-T-202, 241-T-203, and 241-T-204 (LOI) (Bell, 1997), Additional Core Composite Sample from Drainable Liquid Samples for Tank 241-T-2 01 (ACC) (Hall, 1997), and Safety Screening Data Quality Objective (DQO) (Dukelow, et al., 1995). None of the subsamples submitted for total alpha activity (AT) or differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) analyses exceeded the notification limits stated in DQO. The statistical results of the 95% confidence interval on the mean calculations are provided by the Tank Waste Remediation Systems Technical Basis Group, and are not considered in this report

[en] The Sort on Radioactive Waste Type (SORWT) Model is a method to categorize Hanford Site single-shell tanks (SSTS) into groups of tanks expected to exhibit similar chemical and physical characteristics based on their major waste types and processing histories. The model has identified 24 different waste-type groups encompassing 133 of the 149 SSTs and 93% of the total waste volume in SSTS. The remaining 16 SSTs and associated wastes could not be grouped. according to the established criteria and were placed in an ungrouped category. A detailed statistical verification study has been conducted that employs analysis of variance (ANOVA) and the core sample analysis data collected since 1989. These data cover eight tanks and five SORWT groups. The verification study showed that these five SORWT groups are highly statistically significant; they represent approximately 10% of the total waste volume and 26% of the total sludge volume in SSTS. Future sampling recommendations based on the SORWT Model results include 32 core samples from 16 tanks and 18 auger samples from six tanks. Combining these data with the existing body of information will form the basis for characterizing 98 SSTs (66%). These 98 SSTs represent 78% of the total waste volume, 61% of the total sludge volume, and 88 % of the salt cake volume

[en] This document is a preliminary Tank Characterization Report (TCR). It only contains the current best-basis inventory (Appendix D) for single-shell tank 241-TX-113. No TCRs have been previously issued for this tank, and current core sample analyses are not available. The best-basis inventory, therefore, is based on an engineering assessment of waste type, process flowsheet data, early sample data, and/or other available information. The Standard Inventories of Chemicals and Radionuclides in Hanford Site Tank Wastes describes standard methodology used to derive the tank-by-tank best-basis inventories. This preliminary TCR will be updated using this same methodology when additional data on tank contents become available