[en] India and Pakistan, some of the world's most recent nuclear powers, periodic ally suffer intense political conflicts that often threaten to escalate into armed conflicts. We know from the experiences of other nuclear powers that the risks of an accidental nuclear detonation are greatly increased under these circumstances. If such an accident occurred in the subcontinent, would the unfortunate country jump to the conclusion that it had been attacked or would it wait until it could be sure it was an accident? Unfortunately, we believe that it would lead to catastrophic consequences. We propose a globally shared constellation of satellites that would monitor the launches of ballistic missiles and increase nuclear stability by reassuring all nations that tragedy would not escalate to a nuclear catastrophy

[en] The document reproduces a letter dated 27 December 1995 from the Resident Representative of Kuwait to the IAEA in connection with the letter of 27 December 1993 from the Alternate to the Resident Representative of Iraq to the IAEA concerning the news report on the nuclear radiation detection in Iraqi military equipment left behind by the Iraqi army in Kuwait. In the attachment it is reproduced the statement of the Director of the Department for Protection Against Radiation from the Kuwait Ministry of Public Health

[en] Growing concerns within the international intelligence, surveillance and security communities regarding the potential for a radiological or nuclear terrorist attack, and the corresponding concerns within the medical and emergency response communities if such an event occurred, have given rise to the search for effective radiological and nuclear detection and measurement technologies. Such technologies require a variety of capabilities and would be used in different ways, depending upon the details of the situation. Optically Stimulated Luminescence (OSL) is an already established technique in personal dosimetry using materials designed specifically for this application. However, in recent years there has been a growing number of studies and proposals to use the method on materials found in nature in order to provide information useful to security forces and emergency responders. Such materials include commonly found items in households and building structures, as well as those that may be found in a person's possession or on their clothing. Some recent suggestions also include the potential of biological material for such uses. Applications of these materials in radiation detection and measurement include forensics and emergency mass triage following an event. This talk will describe the OSL technique and its application in this important arena.

[en] There is general agreement that realistic quantities of radiological material released from a radiological dispersal device (RDD) will not travel more than hundred meters at toxic levels. Of greater concern in the case of such an incident is the size of the area contaminated with radiological particles. Remediation of contaminated areas will require either removal of the deposited articles or disposal of the contaminated materials. Contours of expected contaminated areas have been presented which extend more than 10 miles downwind of the release location. It would be impossible to remediate such a large area, so the likely response will be to permanently seal most of it off from further use. Not only are these radiation contours below levels of concern, the particle size assumed is unreasonably low, especially when the density of radioactive materials is considered. Using of appropriate RDD characterization and range of particle size, this presentation will show that expected contamination areas should be small enough to make remediation feasible.(author)

[en] Environics Oy has developed a novel monitoring system for detection of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear compounds. The system is portable and rapidly installed into a monitoring location. It will allow real time monitoring and alarming of: Chemical Warfare agents (Nerve, Blister, Blood), Toxic industrial chemicals (General toxic-alarm), Biological warfare agents (Bacteria, viruses, toxins), Radiological agents such as alpha and gamma radiation. Monitoring Station makes continuously measurements. Sensor data is processed and stored to local database by the Master Module (MM) that is located within the station. The MM sends the data to the Control Centers by using communication network. The Control Center receives and logs the data and shows it in real time on a map interface. The status of each sensor and detector can be seen in real time. (author)

[en] During the last war in the Balkan area, spring-summer 1999, NATO forces admitted the use in Kosovo of 30 mm bullets fired by A-10 anti-tank aircraft and, in July 2000, provided the United Nations with a detailed map indicating sites where DU bullets had been used. CISAM, Joint Centre of Military Studies and Application, performed eight environmental check campaigns (October '99, April, August, November '00, January, May, October '01 and June '02). The CISAM scientific expert Team, assisted by a Company of the 7. NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Regiment Cremona, during the first and the second mission discovered some places within the area assigned to the Multi National Brigade West (MNBW) where the DU bullets had been used. Up to day the Team performed approximately 600 field measurements; the 7. Rgt. NBC surveyed 700 locations and the CISAM Laboratory analysed more than 350 samples. The poster presents the summarized results of the campaigns focused to measure the depleted uranium and other radionuclides concentrations in environmental matrix and, in particular, gives the data concerning the site NATO 28, Djakovica Army Garrison and the air sample campaigns

[en] The advent of nuclear weapons introduced a complex new factor into world politics, drawing a line through history and ensuring that international relations would never be the same. By both accident and design, Canada was a central player in the new nuclear era, as countries grappled with the implications of this revolutionary new development. Canada's decision, unique among pioneer atomic powers, not to acquire a nuclear arsenal has been used to buttress widely differing political agendas, while the factors that shaped the policy-making process have been largely ignored. In Canada's Early Nuclear Policy Brian Buckley weaves information from a number of disciplines to shed new light on Canada's early policies. Filling a longstanding gap in the national story, he explores the country's role in the early post-war period, cautioning against simplistic explanations and pointing to the continuing roles of contingency and personality in decision making. While the threat of nuclear war has receded in recent years, the number of states with nuclear weapons, the number of weapons, and their killing power are all far greater than they were five decades ago. Virtually all the issues that emerged fifty years ago remain on the international agenda and are as relevant today as ever

[en] The document reproduces a letter dated 27 December 1993 from the Alternate Resident Representative of Iraq to the IAEA including in an annex the news reported on 30 November 1993 by the Middle East News Agency concerning the detection of nuclear radiations in Iraqi military equipment left behind by the Iraqi army during the war for Kuwait liberation

[en] The bilateral U.S.-Russian strategic arms control di alog was at its peak at the end of the Cold War, when the very successful Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaties were succeeded. Unfortunately, it is almost non-existent these days. With the end of START in 2009, an important verification mechanism, that currently provides transparency of U.S. and Russian strategic forces and their activities, might be lost, if the sides fail to work out a replacement for it. At the same time the role of transparent nuclear arms reductions by nuclear states is growing for the future of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, and this factor should stimulate U.S. and Russia to renew the strategic arms control dialog. The talk focuses on modern trends in the evolution of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and doctrines of their implementation as well as on the impact of these tendencies on attitudes toward arms control. A framework of a new bilateral strategic arms reduction agreement that might replace START and enforce Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) is proposed

[en] Using a questionnaire we investigated whether radiation exposure in correctly understood by medical doctors (n=140), nurses (n=496) and the general public (n=236). Thirty-three percent of medical doctors, 53% of nurses and the general public did not know who is legally allowed to irradiate the human body. Forty-five percent of doctors, 63% of nurses and 48% of the general public complained of anxiety about radiation injury. Fifty-six percent of patients did not ask medical doctors or nurses for an explanation of the risk of exposure. Moreover, 64% of doctors did not explain the risk to patients. In addition, 21% of doctors, 46% of nurses and the general public incorrectly understood that x-rays remain in the examination room. Twenty-seven percent of doctors, 49% of nurses and 80% of the general public did not know the ^ten-day rule^. In conclusion, the results of this questionnaire indicated that basic knowledge about radiation exposure was not adequate. To protect against medical radiation exposure, personnel who are licensed to irradiate to the human body should be well recognized by medical staff and the general public. It is also important that informed consent for radiological examinations be based on fundamental knowledge about radiation exposure. Therefore, to reach a general consensus on radiological examinations and to reduce individual exposure, general public education regarding radiation protection is required. Postgraduate education on radiation protection for medical doctors and nurses is also strongly recommended. (author)