[en] The presentation is on the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, U N Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism

No abstract available

No abstract available

No abstract available

[en] The Safeguards Summary Event List (SSEL) provides brief summaries of several hundred safeguards-related events involving nuclear material or facilities regulated by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Events are described under the categories of bomb-related, intrusion, missing and/or allegedly stolen, transportation, vandalism, arson, firearms, sabotage and miscellaneous. The information contained in the event descriptions is derived primarily from official NRC reporting channels

[en] Industrial terrorists are committing acts of sabotage against Canadian companies involved in petroleum and natural gas drilling, mining, logging, industrial-style farming and animal testing. The petroleum industry in Alberta has recently been the target of such industrial sabotage. The acts of vandalism have included shot-up signs, smashed car windows, ripped truck tires on isolated well roads, broken machinery, holes drilled in pipes and even entire wells cemented over and embedded with shotgun shells. Recently, the scale of the vandalism surpassed anything previously experienced in North America when bullets were fired at a gas plant in Grande Prairie County, narrowly missing the operators, and a home-made bomb blew a hole in a gas pipeline. Such assaults against the resource industry (oil, gas, forestry and fisheries) are increasing nationwide. Much of the vandalism goes unreported because companies do not like to admit that they have been targeted. Other incidents of eco-terrorism have included the sabotage and bombing of forestry equipment across the country. These acts of sabotage have shown just how vulnerable the resource industry is. Most attacks share a common profile. They are aimed at machinery, not at people and they are usually the work of urban protesters rather than angry locals. The Grande Prairie incidents do not fit the pattern because the saboteurs endangered lives by using explosives. One of the problems that may be contributing to the terror campaign in the Grande Prairie region is the flaring of unwanted gas from wells, which exposes hundreds of families in the area to as many as 250 chemicals, some of them toxic. For the moment, oil and gas companies are putting their faith in increased vigilance and security, but industry insiders hope that the province will step in before someone dies from a terrorist act

[en] Security Culture (SC) and the awareness of the insider threat are best learned through experience and active discussion. Culture is molded by ordinary life experiences and inherently difficult to teach. This form of training allows the participant to work through inadvertent or unplanned events and learn skills and gain expertise to mitigate those events. Experts from Y-12 have created an interactive Insider Threat Analysis Tool (ITAT) which puts participants in the position of identifying insider threats and mitigation measures through roleplaying and interactive discussion. Each participant is given the opportunity to play a role that leads to theft, diversion or sabotage of critical material and/or infrastructure at a hypothetical facility. ITAT stimulates complex-thought and discussion that leads to formulation of effective policies and procedures. The table-top focuses on the human element of security at a critical facility.

[en] An effective global nuclear materials security system will cover all materials, employ international standards and best practices, and reduce risks by reducing weapons-usable nuclear material stocks and the number of locations where they are found. Such a system must also encourage states to accept peer reviews by outside experts in order to demonstrate that effective security is in place. It is thus critically important to create an integrative framework of state-level evaluation of nuclear security as a basis for measuring the level and progress of international effort to secure and control all nuclear materials. There have been studies to represent state-level nuclear security with a quantitative metric. A prime example is the Nuclear Materials Security Index (NMSI) by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Another comprehensive study is the State Level Risk Metric by Texas A and M University (TAMU). This paper examines the current methods with respect to their strengths and weaknesses and identifies the directions for future research to improve upon the existing approaches

[en] The second Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was held in Seoul, March 26∼27, 2012. It was a very big political event for nuclear security. National and International organization leaders had a time to discuss in depth issues about nuclear security; nuclear terrorism, illicit trafficking of nuclear /radiological materials, sabotages for nuclear facilities, etc. Why did many national leaders still take part in the second nuclear security summit compared to Washington summit and what is the importance of nuclear security? This paper will be the answer from those questions and handle the background, outcomes and future tasks of nuclear security summit. And suggestions for the next summits were considered in the conclusion part

[en] Evaluation of security systems effectiveness requires a definition of adversary capabilities, but an objective basis for such a definition has been lacking. A system of adversary attributes is proposed in which any desired adversary may be synthesized by selection of the appropriate level of capability from each attribute or category. In use, the synthesized adversaries will be pitted against a security system in an evaluation model, thus allowing comparison of other adversary or security system configurations