[en] Full text: The NPA in its present status is at the end of its physiological life, the AP and the provisions of the Integrated Safeguards requires a revisit of the present arrangements with EURATOM. In this regard the following elements could be considered: a) Some of the Euratom functions could be transferred to the State/Operator making Easier the use of short notice or unannounced inspections; b) The use of authenticated surveillance with remote transmission capabilities; c) Electronic seals and unattended monitoring/measuring systems with simultaneous remote transmission to the IAEA HQ and to Euratom. For the Additional Protocol the IAEA has the infrastructure to deal with all requirements of the AP and this can be taken into account to avoid duplications in Euratom. Some of the functions of the Euratom could be also taken over by the IAEA in order to avoid duplications and increase the efficiency provided that the necessary. Financial resources are made available by the EU. (author)

[en] The Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency were approved by the Board of Governors on 21 February 1979. The test is reproduced herein for the information of all Members. The provisions established by the Board of Governors on 24 September 1977 for the application of safeguards in relation to the granting of technical assistance are also reproduced in the Annex to the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules.

[en] In Korea, 17 nuclear facilities are currently under IAEA's safeguards and it is expected that more than 25 nuclear facilities will be under IAEA's safeguards in the year 2000 according to nuclear R and D and industry expansion. In connection with unlimited extension of NPT in 1995 and IAEA's measures to strengthen the safeguards like 'Programme 93+2', the international non-proliferation regime will be strengthened more and nuclear advanced countries will require the transparency and credibility of nuclear activities in recipient countries instead of transferring advanced nuclear technologies and nuclear material. In 1995, the Korean Government had revised the Atomic Energy Law to control increasing nuclear facilities and nuclear material effectively and to establish international transparency and credibility. In the revised Atomic Energy Law, it is provided that the national inspection, other than IAEA inspection, will be started from 1996. Currently, necessary arrangements for national inspection are being prepared by MOST and TCNC at KAERI. However, the safeguards system in Korea is still beginning stage, Korea's safeguards activity was passive and fragmentary that leads non-attainment of safeguards goal in many facilities. The reasons were; absence of systematic safeguards system(SSAC); lack of understanding safeguards concepts; lack of manpower, designated organization for safeguards, etc. As Korea ranked world top 10 nuclear power generation country and has a plan to be a nuclear advanced country, Korea should have appropriate safeguards system and should not spare necessary assistance to that system. (author). 19 tabs., 2 figs

[en] From the inception of the implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement (INFCIRC/435), in 1991, ABACC has had an important role at the non-proliferation agenda and has also been an active player in the international safeguards. It was necessary for ABACC to develop a technical capacity to face the challenges to be a safeguards agency and to gain credibility in the nuclear safeguards world. This capacity means to develop and implement safeguards systems in the technical area, in the inspection framework, in the conceptual analysis of processes and approaches and in the political scenario. These tasks conducted the strategic plan of ABACC on the last 20 years. Among the accomplishments, ABACC has been involved in the application of safeguards to sensitive and complex installations, in developing safeguards instrumentation, in establishing a technical and trained inspectorate, in constructing a cooperative and coordinate environment with IAEA for safeguards application. Other challenges as R and D of equipment and quality assurance systems were also managed during all these years. ESARDA is one forum that ABACC is involved and always shares experience and ideas. On July 18th, 2011 ABACC will formally complete 20 years. This paper summarizes the accomplishments, lessons learnt and future actions for strengthen the ABACC safeguards role. It also addresses the collaboration of ABACC with other organizations in the non-proliferation and international safeguards arena.

[en] This handbook is about cautions that everybody works with radioactive materials must have during their performance. (C.M.)

No abstract available

[en] This paper is the guide to a workshop designed to enable the participants to gain a better understanding of National Safeguards Systems and their functions. The workshop provides an opportunity to address the requirements for the organization that has to carry out the system functions at the State level in a country having a research reactor and ancillary laboratories

[en] Norway was among the first countries to have a nuclear research reactor in operation. JEEP 1, a joint project between the Netherlands and Norway, went into operation in 1951. In the early years of nuclear power there were no safeguards bureau. However, Norway had in the late 1950's signed an agreement with USA concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The agreement secured USA that the nuclear facilities in Norway were not used for military purposes, and provided Norway with uranium and other vital equipment for the reactors. IAEA safeguards was implemented in Norway 1 March 1972. Norway is not part of EURATOM, thus only the bilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA is enforced. For Norway the Additional Protocol came into force in 2000, while Integrated Safeguards was implemented in 2002. As one of the first countries to have Integrated Safeguards implemented, Norway has a broad experience in this field. This paper will present the nuclear facilities in Norway and discuss the experiences with Integrated Safeguards and compare it to traditional safeguards

[en] The Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency were approved by the Board of Governors on 21 February 1979. The test is reproduced herein for the information of all Members. The provisions established by the Board of Governors on 24 September 1977 for the application of safeguards in relation to the granting of technical assistance are also reproduced in the Annex to the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules.

[en] The Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency were approved by the Board of Governors on 21 February 1979. The test is reproduced herein for the information of all Members. The provisions established by the Board of Governors on 24 September 1977 for the application of safeguards in relation to the granting of technical assistance are also reproduced in the Annex to the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules.