[en] The paper shows ROSATOM Central Institute for Continuing Education and Training experience in HTO approach application in in safety culture issues and the institute activity starting from methodological aspect of safety culture concept to special training course development and application. (author)

[en] The paper presents the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority’s (PNRA) experience of using the IAEA methodology for safety culture self-assessment (SCSA) in regulatory bodies. It highlights the strategy utilized for disseminating the outcomes of SCSA in the organization at different levels along with associated safety culture improvement activities. Moreover, improvements in regulatory processes, where safety culture is expected to be included, are also addressed in this paper. (author)

[en] The formation of safety culture requires an attempt to exert constructive influence on the sociopsychological atmosphere of the team and the behaviour of individual employees. By creating a value system for the organization’s staff, as part of its general organizational culture, it may be possible to forecast, plan and promote the desired behaviour. However, it is also necessary to take into account the corporate culture of the organization. Leaders often try to establish a safety culture, where progressive values and behavioural norms are declared, but the results obtained are not those expected. This may be because those values and norms come into conflict with the reality and, therefore, are actively rejected by many members of the organization. The theory of generations developed by the US scientists Howe and Strauss helps in the analysis and consideration of the staff values formed under the influence of many different factors. The development of safety culture may depend, among other things, on the age of the employees involved. (author)

[en] Significant scholarship has been devoted to research into safety culture assessment methodologies. These focus on the development, delivery and interpretations of safety culture surveys and other assessment techniques to assure reliable outcomes that provide insights into the safety culture of an organization across multiple dimensions. The lessons from this scholarship can be applied to the emerging area of security culture assessments as the nuclear industry broadens its focus on this topic. The aim of this paper is to discuss the value of establishing mechanisms, immediately after an assessment and regularly between assessments, to facilitate a structured dialogue among leaders around insights derived from an assessment, to enable ongoing improvements in safety and security culture. The leader’s role includes both understanding the current state of culture, the “what is”, and creating regular, open and informed dialogue around their role in shaping the culture to achieve “what should be”.

[en] In 2008 and 2009, CNSC staff observed a high-level of non-compliance amongst licensees with portable gauges. CNSC staff formed a working group in 2010 to develop a unified strategy for outreach to licensees with portable gauges to promote a positive safety culture, to improve communication between the CNSC and the licensees, to improve licensee’s compliance with regulatory requirements, and to encourage the safe use of portable gauges in the field.

[en] This paper briefly describes the formation of nuclear safety awareness, from the top decision makers about nuclear safety awareness, discusses how to improve the level of full awareness of nuclear safety, thus forming a good nuclear safety culture atmosphere, to achieve the ultimate goal of nuclear safety management. (authors)

[en] The paper presents a general model that provides a framework for the safety culture assessment, creating the possibility to identify factors that can significantly influence the safety culture. The main safety culture influence factors (SCIF) used by model are the following: regulatory environment, organizational environment, worker characteristics, socio-political environment, national culture, organization history, business and technological characteristics. After the analysis of the deficiencies and weaknesses of SCIFc in evolution of the Fukushima accident, some issues that may become necessities and requirements to change and improve both the safety culture and safety of the nuclear installations were highlighted. For each influence factor were identified some requirements to amend. The results will emphasize the necesity of the human - technology - organization system assessment. Hence it was demonstrated that the safety culture results from the interaction of individuals with technology and with the organization. (authors)

[en] Based on the information provided in IAEA SCART guideline this paper introduces the background basis and approach of Safety Culture Assessment. The further actions for Safety Culture Assessment in China have been suggested. (author)

[en] It is obvious that we all have to learn from experience — this is essential in all sectors, especially in those dealing with risks, and for with nuclear risks, it is even more important. this conference has been a relevant instrument, providing a good opportunity for all of you to evaluate and assess the practices and the progress around the human and organizational aspects of assuring nuclear safety, as this is one of the sectors in which we really need to learn from experience. In the same context, it is obvious that it is absolutely important that lessons learned are linked to the realities, including the human realities that were associated to accidents, to the serious, but also to the minor ones. And it is also very important to link these lessons learned to the daily realities that happen continuously — as a way to ensure nuclear safety.

No abstract available