[en] This paper describes a mobile robot system designed to function as part of an overall security system at a high security facility. The features of this robot system include specialized software and sensors for navigation without the need for external locator beacons or signposts, sensors for remote imaging and intruder detection, and the ability to communicate information either directly to the electronic portion of the security system or to a manned central control center. Other desirable features of the robot system include low weight, compact size, and low power consumption. The robot system can be operated either by remote manual control, or it can operate autonomously where direct human control can be limited to the global command level. The robot can act as a mobile remote sensing platform for alarm assessment or roving patrol, as a point sensor (sentry) in routine security applications, or as an exploratory device in situations potentially hazardous to humans. This robot system may also be used to ''walk-test'' intrusion detection sensors as part of a routine test and maintenance program for an interior intrusion detection system. The hardware, software, and operation of this robot system will be briefly described herein

[en] Full text: The plans of physical protection of nuclear facilities must be reviewed and updated every two years. A general study of the physical protection system was carried out in order to review and to update the plan of physical protection of IPEN-CNEN/SP. Important alterations accomplished at the institute were considered in the study, as the installation of a cyclotron 30 MeV and the new operation conditions for the nuclear research reactor IEA-RI, that include the increase of its operation power from two to five megawatts and the establishment of the continuous operation by 72 hours weekly. The area of IPEN-CNEN/SP is 478,000 m² (101,850 m² built area of 107 constructions). The group responsible for the study investigated the performance of the physical protection system and detected some points that could be reinforced at inner and protected areas. The initial step was the evaluation, in loco, of the constructions and physical barriers of inner and protected areas. The performance of the security force personnel on the conventional procedures, as access control to the facilities, control of material flow, area monitoring and patrol, as well as its response for special situation procedures in the case of a physical protection emergency, were evaluated too. The study also focused the communication means used by the security force, as the extension phone lines that are located in each entrance area and in the huts, and the portable VHP radios that are used by the guards. In order to elaborate a programme of modernization of the physical protection system, using the results of the study as basis, an internal committee composed of specialists in physical protection, nuclear safety, operation of reactors and engineering areas was created. The programme elaborated by the committee strengthens the physical protection system by applying the defense in depth concept. At the same time, it attempts to propitiate a balanced protection to minimize the consequences for the failure of one component of the physical protection system. Periodic maintenance of physical barriers, as fences, has been performed in order to keep the level of opponent retard. Portable VHP radios have been purchased to improve the security force communication, creating redundancy in the communication channels. The performance of the physical protection system depends largely on the security force personnel. For this reason, the modernization programme dedicates special attention to the training of those professionals. Emphasis is being given to the emergency procedures, because the personnel action in those cases was considered an important point. The specific training on radio communication is also being reinforced. Nowadays the committee is evaluating the creation of an integrated center of physical protection (ICPP), where the central alarm station will be installed. The ICPP will monitor continuously the intrusion sensors to be installed at the institute. In order to assess the alarms, TV cameras will be installed all around the fences of inner and protected areas. The ICPP will be equipped with redundant communication means with the security and response forces and with the high administration of the institution. (author)

[en] Most of the existing Quantum Private Queries (QPQ) protocols provide only single-bit queries service, thus have to be repeated several times when more bits are retrieved. Wei et al.'s scheme for block queries requires a high-dimension quantum key distribution system to sustain, which is still restricted in the laboratory. Here, based on Markus Jakobi et al.'s single-bit QPQ protocol, we propose a multi-bit quantum private query protocol, in which the user can get access to several bits within one single query. We also extend the proposed protocol to block queries, using a binary matrix to guard database security. Analysis in this paper shows that our protocol has better communication complexity, implementability and can achieve a considerable level of security. (paper)

[en] Manpower requirements for physical security systems place a heavy burden on operating security budgets. Technology innovations which free personnel or which make security personnel more efficient in carrying out their tasks is an important means of dealing with budget and manpower constraints. It is believed that AI/Robotics will be important technologies to alleviate these problems in the future. There are three types of applications for AI and Robotics technology that may: (1) help security personnel perform their tasks more effectively or efficiently, (2) perform tasks that security personnel would otherwise perform (free up people), and (3) perform tasks that cannot be performed by security personnel at this time. This paper will discuss the various types of security applications that are presently being considered for the above areas and will briefly describe a few examples of the application of this technology. Examples will include ground mobile platforms carrying alarm assessment and/or surveillance sensors and operating either autonomously or with telepresence by a remote operator. An airborne platform performing similar functions will also be discussed. An application of a type of robot sentry that would be fixed and incorporate very simple portable displays will also be described. A third type of robot, an interior robot, that could be used in sensitive or hazardous areas to do detection and assessment functions will be reviewed

[en] Security officer tactical training issues are discussed in relation to the possible implementation of the Tactical Improvement Package (TIP), utilizing the Engagement Simulation System (ESS) equipment, by nuclear power plant licensees for security officer tactical training. The ESS equipment provides the capability to simulate engagement conditions between adversaries armed with weapons which have harmless laser transmitters. A brief discussion of the TIP is presented, along with some concerns and considerations in the use of the TIP

[en] One is the International Convention for Suppressing Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and the other is amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). ICSANT and CPPNM were proposed by the UN and IAEA, respectively to strengthen the international framework of nuclear security. The ICSANT was entered into force in 2007, but CPPNM amendment is pending in force because the shortage of countries who ratify it. For going into effect this convention, it needs the two-thirds of the States Parties to the CPPNM. It is not completed, yet. So, various initiatives such as nuclear security summit, GICNT, UN ministerial conference, etc. treated that those two conventions were the primary basis to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture. The Republic of Korea (ROK) continuously has made an effort to consolidate the nuclear security legislative framework since the 2010. The purpose of this paper is to provide what we did to strengthen the nuclear security legal framework and what should we do next

[en] Ensuring the security of nuclear facilities is a critical element in preventing theft of nuclear materials and sabotage that could result in a radiological release. While the international community has traditionally focused on improving physical security to prevent these outcomes by investing in the “guns, guards, and gates” trifecta, a newer threat has gained attention: the cyber threat. A cyber-attack perpetrated by a terrorist group on a nuclear facility could have physical consequences leading to either an act of theft or sabotage. This threat presents new challenges to facility operators as well as national authorities. Given the increasing reliance upon digital controls, it is expected that these challenges will only continue to grow. A security lapse at a nuclear facility leading to theft of nuclear material or a catastrophic radiological release would have global implications—an incident anywhere would have consequences everywhere, and would cast doubt on industry-wide security practices. Therefore, all countries must have effective cybersecurity measures in place. Currently, government authorities and facility operators are struggling to keep pace with this new threat, battling issues such as high costs, bureaucratic inertia, highly complex systems, cultures of compliance, and a shortage of demonstrably qualified personnel. National and international guidance has evolved over the past year, but not quickly enough to address the growing gap between attacker and defender capabilities in cyberspace. Recognizing that the growing sophistication of cyber threats increasingly taxes the capabilities of governments, national regulators, and facility operators around the world, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has concluded that a fresh look at the overarching framework that guides cybersecurity implementation at nuclear facilities is an urgent, necessary precursor to achieving essential progress in this area. Despite valuable ongoing efforts at the national and international level, more must be done. A more effective and perhaps disruptive approach, based on a set of high-level priorities, is critical to getting ahead of this threat. Over the past year, NTI has engaged in conversation with experts and undertaken research to identify and further develop high-level priorities to guide the implementation of cybersecurity at nuclear facilities. Such a framework would be a crucial first step in shaping an international, ambitious, forward-looking global strategy in this area. This paper defines the fundamental priorities that make up this framework while situating them in a broader context of the cyber threat to nuclear facilities and the challenges faced by national authorities and facility operators. (author)

[en] The ASSESS Neutralization module (Neutralization) is part of the Analytic System and Software for Evaluation of Safeguards and Security (ASSESS), a vulnerability assessment tool. Neutralization models a fire fight between security inspectors (SIs) and adversaries. This paper reports that a comparison has been made between actual outcomes of police and small military engagements and the results predicted by the Neutralization module for similar scenarios. The results of this comparison show a surprising correlation between predicted outcomes (based on numbers of combatants, weapon types, and exposures, etc.) and the actual outcomes of the engagements analyzed. The importance of this analysis is that given the defenders have intelligence on actual adversary characteristics or are protecting against a design basis threat, defense capabilities can be evaluated before an engagement. Results could then be used to develop a favorable probability of a desired outcome. For example, law enforcement agencies are frequently able to compile the number of criminals, types of weaponry, willingness to use force, etc., from analysis of crime scenes

[en] A reusable, tamper-indicating seal is comprised of a drum confined within a fixed body and rotatable in one direction therewithin, the top of the drum constituting a tray carrying a large number of small balls of several different colors. The fixed body contains parallel holes for looping a seal wire therethrough. The base of the drums carries cams adapted to coact with cam followers to lock the wire within the seal at one angular position of the drum. A channel in the fixed body, visible from outside the seal, adjacent the tray constitutes a segregated location for a small plurality of the colored balls. A spring in the tray forces colored balls into the segregated location at one angular position of the drum, further rotation securing the balls in position and the wires in the seal. A wedge-shaped plough removes the balls from the segregated location, at a different angular position of the drum, the wire being unlocked at the same postion. A new pattern of colored balls will appear in the segregated location when the seal is relocked

No abstract available