[en] The Ignalina Safety Assessment, which was completed in December 1996, recommended the installation of a diverse shutdown system on the 2nd unit at Ignalina. During the PPR-2004 in the DSS project are created two independent shutdown systems by separating the absorber rods into two independent groups as follows: 1. One system (designated AZ) consists of the existing 24 BAZ rods and 49 AZ/BSM rods that together are used for reliable reactor shutdown (including Control and Protection System (CPS) circuit voiding accident). This system performs the emergency protection function. 2. The other system (designated BSM) comprises the remaining absorber rods and the 49 AZ/BSM rods. Thus 49 AZ/BSM rods are actuated from AZ initiating equipment as well as from BSM initiating equipment. The BSM system performs the normal reactor shutdown function and is able to ensure long-term maintenance of the reactor in the sub-critical state. Along with implementation of DSS was modernized existing Emergency Process Protection System, which was divided into two independent Sets of initiating equipment. The DSS is independent and diverse initiating equipment from the existing 1st Set equipment; with each set having its own independent in-core and ex-core sensors for measurement of neutron flux and process parameters. The 2nd Set of initiating equipment for measuring ex-core neutron flux, was modernized with new design of 4 Ex-Core detectors each have a single low level neutron flux detector and two high range neutron detectors. They are comprising: 1. A fission chamber which operates in pulse mode to cover the low flux levels. 2. A compensated ionisation chamber in current mode to operate at high flux level. This detector is doubled to give a measurement of the axial deviation. Two detectors are enough to produce the axial power deviation. The results of testing and analysis of pilot operation of ex-core neutron sensors of DSS will be shown on the Report. (author)

[en] The Lithuanian situation of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in context of European states is discussed in the paper. The main components as safety and preliminary emergency readiness are analyzed also. The works in Ignalina NPP concerning the personal and the plan of final operation shutdown are foreseen. (author)

[en] This paper describes assumptions and main results of the least cost power sector development analysis for Lithuania, carried out in 1999. It mostly focuses on impact of earlier closure of the Ignalina NPP to total costs of power sector operation and development, investments required in one or another scenario, supply/demand balances, environmental consequences. The general conclusion is that earlier closure of the Ignalina NPP will lead to over 4.6 bin. Lt present valued losses in the power sector, will create significant. (author)

[en] The scheduling limits for a typical long year taking into account technical stops, machine development, special physics runs are presented. An attempt is then made to outline a ten year post LS1 schedule taking into account the disparate requirements outlined in the previous talks in this session. The demands on the planned long shutdowns and the impact of these demands on their proposed length will be discussed. The option of using ion running as a pre-shutdown cool-down period will be addressed

[en] The minimal duration for LS1 is 20 months, meaning the time from physics to physics will be about 2 years. The actual start of LS1 is set for the 17. November 2012, which will allow the Liquid Helium emptying from the machine before Christmas. However, delivery dates for certain components are on the critical path of the experiments, which will allow the first beams for beam commissioning not before September 2014. Depending on the results of mid-2012 physics, the start date of LS1 will be reviewed. The actual plan for injectors is in line with the LHC plan, but the risk of running injectors for two years has to be assessed. The analysis of resources is progressing well throughout the complex (collaborations and internal mobility) and is being done according to priorities. Certain activities have already been postponed to LS2, and new requests will be carefully analyzed, as well as open issues

[en] The Nuclear Power Plant Krsko Probabilistic Shutdown Safety Assessment (PSSA) was recently enhanced to refine the modeling and quantification of human errors during shutdown operations. The use of EPRI's ORAM software allows for human error probabilistic to be calculated based on the time available to perform an action, which varies considerably during shutdown operations and typically has a significant impact on human error probabilities. The enhanced human action modeling uses a cause-based methodology for most response times. For short times, such as early in an outage with reduced inventory, the human error probabilities calculation is based on an empirical, time-based analysis. Operator interviews provided a basis for calculations in both methodologies. An analysis was performed to determine the impact of human actions on the quantified core damage risk and the factors contributing to important human actions.(author)

No abstract available

[en] This paper summarizes the sessions devoted to Long Shutdown 1 (LS1) in the LHC, injectors and experiments. The time frame and start date were discussed, with the main activities from powering tests prior to warm-up up to physics were presented. The session finished with a discussion on the maximum reasonable energy. (author)

[en] Characteristics of disruptive plasma termination, its amelioration and avoidance, and fast plasma shutdown are described in relation to designing tokamak fusion reactors. (author)

[en] A simulation of the loss of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system during midloop operation was performed using the ATHLET Mod 1.1 C system code. The analysis is a posttest calculation of the 6.9 c test performed on the BETHSY facility on April 14, 1992. Test 6.9 c has been analysed within an OECD/NEA/CSNI project as an open exercise named International Standard Problem (ISP)38. BETHSY is an integral test facility which simulates a three loop 900 Mwe (2775 MWt) Framatome PWR. The test consisted in a loss of RHR system at a cold shutdown and midloop condition (i.e. the liquid level was at the axis of the cold legs) and at atmospheric pressure. Along with loss of RHR system, the pressurizer and Steam Generator (SG) 1 outlet plenum manways were open. In the paper the results of the ATHLET calculations were assessed against the measured data. The initial conditions were determined during the first 200 s of the simulation. The transient was simulated for 8800 s. (author)