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[en] The aim of this paper is to provide a comparative assessment of the innovation effects of instruments which support the diffusion of renewable electricity technologies with a functions-oriented technological innovation system perspective. The paper provides a link between two major streams of the literature: the functions of innovation systems and the literature on renewable electricity support schemes. We show that, when a functional perspective is adopted, feed-in tariffs are likely to be superior to other policy instruments (quotas with tradable green certificates and tendering), although they still need to be complemented with other instruments, most importantly, direct R and D support. Furthermore, those innovation effects are affected by the specific design elements of the instruments chosen. - Highlights: ► A comparison of the innovation effects of instruments for the diffusion of renewable technologies. ► A functions-oriented technological innovation system perspective. ► A link between the functions of innovation systems and the literature on renewable electricity support schemes. ► Feed-in tariffs are likely to be superior to other instruments. ► Innovation effects are affected by the specific design elements of instruments.
[en] This publication contains statistics of transport tariffs for electricity distribution 1996 in Norway. Transport tariff applies to tapping or feeding at a customer's connection point in the network. It covers all costs of the power transport from the feeding to the market or from market to tapping. Typically, transport tariffs have several components such as a fixed charge, which is the same for all customers, power charge, which depends on the maximum power demanded, and energy charge, which depends on total energy use. The publication gives a good picture of the prices and costs the typical customer will face upon connection to a variety of grids. 4 figs., 5 tabs
[en] By request of the Dutch Lower House the Dutch Court of Audit examined the regulation of tariffs of the energy grid operators. This report does not only answer questions from the Dutch Lower House, but the Court of Audit also provides recommendations for increasing supervision on regional and national energy grid operators.
[nl]De Algemene Rekenkamer heeft op verzoek van de Tweede Kamer onderzoek gedaan naar de tariefregulering van het energienetbeheer. In dit rapport beantwoorden we niet alleen de vragen die de Tweede Kamer ons heeft gesteld, maar doen wij tevens aanbevelingen om het toezicht op het regionale en landelijke energienetbeheer te versterken.
[en] Feed-in tariff program is an incentive plan that provides investors with a set payment for electricity generated from renewable energy sources that is fed into the power grid. As of today, FIT is being used by over 75 jurisdictions around the world and offers a number of design options to achieve policy goals. The objective of this paper is to propose a quantitative model, by which a specific FIT program can be evaluated and hence optimized. We focus on payoff structure, which has a direct impact on the net present value of the investment, and other parameters relevant to investor reaction and electricity prices. We combine cost modeling, option valuation, and consumer choice so as to simulate the performance of a FIT program of interest in various scenarios. The model is used to define an optimization problem from a policy maker's perspective, who wants to increase the contribution of renewable energy to the overall energy supply, while keeping the total burden on ratepayers under control. Numerical studies shed light on the interactions among design options, program parameters, and the performance of a FIT program. - Highlights: ► A quantitative model to evaluate and optimize feed-in tariff policies. ► Net present value of investment on renewable energy under a given feed-in tariff policy. ► Analysis of the interactions of policy options and relevant parameters. ► Recommendations for how to set policy options for feed-in tariff program.
[en] The United Kingdom (UK) started implementing a national Feed-In Tariff (FiT) mechanism on the 1 April 2010, which included specific payment tariffs for solar photovoltaic (PV) installations. However, a revised FiT rate has been put in place starting from 1 April 2012, applicable to any installations with an eligibility date of on or after 3 March 2012. This paper presents, first, an overview of solar PV installation in the UK. This followed by a general concept of the FiT in the UK before analyzing the financial impact of the new FiT rate on the consumers. Similar financial analysis is conducted with selected countries in Europe. The financial analysis investigates the total profit, the average rate of return and the payback period. It is found that the new FiT rate generates very low profit, minimum rate of return and a longer payback period, suggesting a downward trend of solar PV uptake in the future. - Highlight: ► Overview of solar PV installation in the UK until present time is discussed. ► Financial analysis is presented using previous, new and degression FiT tariff. ► Comparative analysis with other European countries is evaluated. ► The new FiT rate in the UK generates very low return than other countries. ► This could suggest a downward trend of UK's solar PV uptake in the future
[en] In a liberalized electricity market both the consumers and the producers of electricity must pay for the use of the power transmission network. Thus, the net manager has unlimited options to realize efficiency improvements. A neutral and transparent management of the power grid is necessary to avoid disturbance of the market. KEMA Consulting translated abstract ideas and strategic advices to operational concepts in its report 'A framework for the determination of tariffs of the transport in the Dutch electricity sector'
[en] This document explains the main principles and control means of natural gas tariffing in France for non-eligible consumers: marginal cost tariffing and equal terms between consumers, prices control regime and public utility contract between the Government and Gaz de France company for the smoothing of the strong volatility of petroleum products price, successive increase of prices due to import tariffs. The evolution of prices between 1998 and today are summarized in tables and graphs. (J.S.)
[en] Some possible tariff structures for electricity transport are discussed. First, the costs associated with the transport of electricity are explained. The fixed and variable costs of a transport are illustrated with some examples. Furthermore, the most common tariff structures (contract path, megawatt mile, postage stamp) and negotiated Third Party Access are discussed. Finally, the way the tariff structures reflect the costs of electricity transport are reviewed. 3 figs., 1 tab., 7 refs
[en] With the increasing interest in yardstick regulation, there is a need to understand the most appropriate method for realigning tariffs at the outset. Benchmarking is the tool used for such realignment and is therefore a necessary first-step in the implementation of yardstick competition. A number of concerns have been raised about the application of benchmarking, making some practitioners reluctant to move towards yardstick based regimes. We assess five of the key concerns often discussed and find that, in general, these are not as great as perceived. The assessment is based on economic principles and experiences with applying benchmarking to regulated sectors, e.g. in the electricity and water industries in the UK, The Netherlands, Austria and Germany in recent years. The aim is to demonstrate that clarity on the role of benchmarking reduces the concern about its application in different regulatory regimes. We find that benchmarking can be used in regulatory settlements, although the range of possible benchmarking approaches that are appropriate will be small for any individual regulatory question. Benchmarking is feasible as total cost measures and environmental factors are better defined in practice than is commonly appreciated and collusion is unlikely to occur in environments with more than 2 or 3 firms (where shareholders have a role in monitoring and rewarding performance). Furthermore, any concern about companies under-recovering costs is a matter to be determined through the regulatory settlement and does not affect the case for using benchmarking as part of that settlement. (author)