No abstract available

[en] An alphabetical directory of publications dealing with nuclear fuels and reactors trade lists over 100 references written from the mid-1970s to the present

[en] Designing an emissions trading scheme requires in-depth knowledge regarding several aspects. This paper attempts to clarify some important design points of the forthcoming emissions trading scheme for aviation under the EU ETS. Five general key points of system design are acknowledged and comparisons are made to previous and current emission trading schemes. While it is not meant to be exhaustive it helps to create an understanding of what design elements should be handled with caution. Discussion is provided in regard to the recent implementation of aviation in the EU ETS. Above all, it is argued that initial allocations of emission permits and the trade barrier between the aviation sector and EU ETS need to be carefully examined.

[en] Recent trends in Australia's energy trade are examined. The Committee concluded that 1980-81 energy export projections, which foreshadowed massive increases in exports of coal, gas and uranium, must now be considered excessively optimistic. Export opportunities are identified and company, union and government policies are discussed

[en] Greenhouse gas emission trading in the United States (US) is becoming an increasingly important topic in national politics and trade and industry. There are many developments in legislation and regulation, varying from proposals for a carbon tax in California to discussions in the White House concerning the Lieberman-Warner Bill. Moreover, increasingly more voluntary initiatives and carbon markets are started up. According to a recent study of Point Carbon, the market amounted to 60 billion USD for 2.7 billion tons CO2 in 2007, which is an 80% increase compared to 2006. This article provides an overview of the main developments in the US in this area. [mk]

[en] Highlights: • Adams and Parmenter's (2013) stylised model is modified to explain simulation results • ETS-linking, even with permit trading, may reduce aggregated welfare. • Pareto-improvement could be attainable in ETS-linking. • More generous caps shall be given to China's less developed regions. - Abstract: China is moving from regional Emissions Trading Schemes (ETSs) to a nation-wide ETS. Although a larger ETS will be more efficient, the literature warns that it could make net permit selling regions worse off. We use a CGE model to simulate the linking of two provincial ETSs, namely those of Hubei and Guangdong. Our simulations suggest a trade-off between efficiency and equity as the richer regions (typified by Guangdong) will benefit from linking but the poorer regions (typified by Hubei) may lose. This is because poorer provinces in China tend to be more emissions intensive and therefore likely to face a carbon price rise upon linking, the costs of which may be only partially offset by trading, if indeed trading is permitted. We show this, and explain why it is the case by improving on the stylized model suggested by Adams and Parmenter (2013). Following Atkinson (1970), we find that worsened equity from linking may dominate improved efficiency, thus reducing aggregated welfare. We advise more generous caps to be given to more emissions intensive and less developed regions. If so, as suggest our simulation results, a Pareto-improvement could be attainable.

[en] Many studies have shown that the activities of multinational corporations are quite sensitive to differences in income tax rates across countries. In this paper I explore the interaction between multinational taxation and abatement activities under an international emissions permit trading scheme. Four types of plans are considered: (1) a single domestic permit system with international offsets; (2) separate national permit systems without trade; (3) separate national permit systems with limited offsets; and (4) an international permit trading system. For each plan, I model the incentives for the multinational firm to choose abatement activities at home and abroad and to transfer emissions credits between parent and subsidiary. Limits on trading across countries restrict efficiency gains from abatement, as is well known. But if available offset opportunities are limited to actual abatement activities, those activities are also more susceptible to distortions from incentives to shift taxable income. Transfer-pricing rules can limit but not always eliminate these distortions. In a system of unlimited international trading, abatement is efficiently allocated across countries, but tax shifting can still be achieved through intra-firm transfer pricing. From the basis of efficiency for both environmental and tax policies, the best design is an international permit trading system with transparent, enforceable transfer-pricing rules. (author)

No abstract available

[en] The Dutch government embraces the idea that trading of emission allowances is a useful way of reducing the emission of harmful gasses. In the current plans to amend the Environmental Management Act, however, the legislator has chosen for a system where allowances may only be transferred in accordance with strict conditions. These conditions do not provide a legal framework for an efficient emission allowances trading market. As a result, Dutch industry will potentially be placed in an unfavourable position. The legislator, it is suggested, should opt for fully transferable allowances. It is crucial that an efficient international market for trading in allowances is established. This means that it should be possible to trade these allowances easily, without excessive legal restrictions. The aim of the legislator is to prevent extreme situations in this market. While its concerns are valid, however, the legislator has missed the mark by choosing a system whereby transfer of allowances is subject to excessive conditions. The legal consequence of not fulfilling one or more of the conditions during the sale is that the allowance will not be legally transferred, and the seller will remain the proprietor of the allowance, without either the seller or the buyer being aware of the situation. It is clear that this would be an unworkable situation as it would not be possible from a practical angle to simply and quickly check previous transactions. Overall, this would result in high transactions costs, which in turn would be a barrier to an efficient market. In summary, an efficient market in emission allowances seems to be an illusion if the transfer of allowances are subject to such conditions as are presently envisaged by the law. It is suggested that the legislator can reach its goals by dropping the conditions for transfers and by supervising the transactions through administrative and criminal procedures instead. This will not affect the owners-hip of emission allowances, which as a result will be easily tradable for low transaction costs

No abstract available