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[en] As the US and Russia move to lower numbers of deployed nuclear weapons, transparency regarding the quantity of weapons usable fissile material available in each country may become more important. In some cases detailed historical information regarding material production at individual facilities may be incomplete or not readily available, e.g., at decommissioned facilities. In such cases tools may be needed to produce estimates of aggregate material production as part of a bilateral agreement. Such measurement techniques could also provide increased confidence in declared production quantities.
[en] Fissionable materials are common to all nuclear weapons and controls on the production, storage, processing and use of fissionable materials provides one means to address non-proliferation and disarmament. In this article, the relevance of such controls is examined and the current situation and future prospects are assessed. (authors)
[en] In recent years, there is growing interest in formal negotiations on non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. With the negotiations of New START, there has been much speculation that a tactical nuclear weapons treaty should be included in the follow on to New START. This paper examines the current policy environment related to tactical weapons and some of the issues surrounding the definition of tactical nuclear weapons. We then map out the steps that would need to be taken in order to begin discussions on a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. These steps will review the potential role of the IAEA in verification of a tactical nuclear weapons treaty. Specifically, does IAEA involvement in various arms control treaties serve as a useful roadmap on how to overcome some of the issues pertaining to a tactical nuclear weapons treaty?
[en] War history as a modern historic discipline is by far no longer a mere history of arms technique or a chronicle of battles. It deals with the change of warfare, shows how the wars of the various ages had determined society, and vice versay investigates the influence of social, economic, and -concerning mentality-historical changes on war. With this survey, which covers the period between the Middle Ages and the recent past, the author has presented a small masterpiece of the history of war. A book like this is particularly important and instructive in a time when all depends on the preventing of wars. (orig.)
[de]Kriegsgeschichte als moderne historische Disziplin ist heute laengst nicht mehr nur eine Geschichte der Waffentechnik oder eine Chronik von Schlachten. Sie beschaeftigt sich mit dem Wandel der Kriegfuehrung, zeigt, wie die Kriege der verschiedenen Zeitalter die Gesellschaft bestimmt haben, und erforscht umgekehrt den Einfluss gesellschaftlicher, wirtschaftlicher, mentalitaetsgeschichtlicher Veraenderungen auf den Krieg. Der Autor hat mit diesem Ueberblick, der vom Mittelalter bis zur juengsten Gegenwart reicht, ein kleines Meisterwerk der Geschichte des Krieges vorgelegt. Gerade in einer Zeit, in der alles darauf ankommt, Kriege zu verhueten, ist ein Buch wie dieses besonders wichtig und lehrreich. (orig.)
[en] Several nuclear weapons programs have or are pursuing the implementation of multi-unit operations for tasks such as disassembly and inspection, and rebuild. A multi-unit operation is interpreted to mean the execution of nuclear explosive operating procedures in a single facility by two separate teams of technicians. The institution of a multi-unit operations program requires careful consideration of the tools, resources, and environment provided to the technicians carrying out the work. Therefore, a systematic approach is necessary to produce safe, secure, and reliable processes. In order to facilitate development of a more comprehensive multi-unit operations program, the current work details categorized issues that should be addressed prior to the implementation of multi-unit operations in a given weapons program. The issues have been organized into the following categories: local organizational conditions, work process flow/material handling/workplace configuration, ambient environmental conditions, documented safety analysis, and training
[en] The author tries to find out the real cost of French nuclear weaponry. According to this study the total cost of the French military nuclear programs for 1960-1998 period is about 1499 milliard francs (MdF). This cost can be distributed as follows: i) fabrication of the bomb: 690 MdF; ii) display of the bomb: 727 MdF; iii) control of the bomb: 50 Mdf; iv) protection against nuclear attacks: 9 MdF; and v) dismantling of the bomb: 23 MdF. It goes without saying that these figures exceed by far those given by French authorities. (A.C.)
[en] The document reproduces the Statement of the President of Ukraine made on 1 June 1996, received by the Director General of the IAEA on 11 June 1996 from the Resident Representative of Ukraine. The Statement refers to the completion on 1 June 1996 of removal of strategic nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, with a view to subsequent destruction in the presence of observers from Ukraine
[en] Program on Degelen mountain massif adits characterization was prepared within framework of an Agreements between the United States of America and the Republic of Kazakstan on inter-continent missiles's mine start destruction. This program is one of base documents of contract DNA-0179. According this contract has been worked out comprehensive surveillance of all the adits. The status of its portals was defined also. The geology, hydrogeology and radiation situation into adits were studied
[en] This paper argues that the continuities in international politics and strategy, pre- and post-1945, are far more important than are the discontinuities, and that therefore the disciplined study of pre-nuclear ideas and events could and should improve our understanding of the structure of current and anticipated security problems. Training of today's strategists and arms controllers in pre-nuclear history can be justified on a number of grounds
[en] A comprehensive settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue may involve military, economic, political, and diplomatic components, many of which will require verification to ensure reciprocal implementation. This paper sets out potential verification methodologies that might address a wide range of objectives. The inspection requirements set by the International Atomic Energy Agency form the foundation, first as defined at the time of the Agreed Framework in 1994, and now as modified by the events since revelation of the North Korean uranium enrichment program in October 2002. In addition, refreezing the reprocessing facility and 5 MWe reactor, taking possession of possible weapons components and destroying weaponization capabilities add many new verification tasks. The paper also considers several measures for the short-term freezing of the North's nuclear weapon program during the process of negotiations, should that process be protracted. New inspection technologies and monitoring tools are applicable to North Korean facilities and may offer improved approaches over those envisioned just a few years ago. These are noted, and potential bilateral and regional verification regimes are examined