[en] This report presents an analysis of the movement of noble gas, iodine, and cesium fission products within the Mark-I containment BWR reactor system represented by Browns Ferry Unit 1 during a postulated accident sequence initiated by a loss of decay heat removal capability following a scram. The event analysis showed that this accident could be brought under control by various means, but the sequence with no operator action ultimately leads to containment (drywell) failure followed by loss of water from the reactor vessel, core degradation due to overheating, and reactor vessel failure with attendant movement of core debris onto the drywell floor. The analysis of fission product transport presented in this report is based on the no-operator-action sequence and provides an estimate of fission product inventories, as a function of time, within 14 control volumes outside the core, with the atmosphere considered as the final control volume in the transport sequence. As in the case of accident sequences previously studied, we find small barrier for noble gas ejection to air, these gases being effectively purged from the drywell and reactor building by steam and concrete degradation gases. However, significant decay of krypton isotopes occurs during the long delay times involved in this sequence. In contrast, large degrees of holdup for iodine and cesium are projected due to the chemical reactivity of these elements. Only about 2 x 10^-4% of the initial iodine and cesium activity are predicted to be released to the atmosphere. Principal barriers for release are deposition on reactor vessel and containment walls. A significant amount of iodine is captured in the water pool formed in the reactor building basement after actuation of the fire protection system