[en] During normal operation of the Savannah River site (SRS) K reactor, heat is transferred from the reactor to the cooling water system (CWS). The river water system (RWS) normally maintains the cooling water inventory in the cooling water (CW) basin. Water is pumped from the CW basin through process water system heat exchangers. The heated water flows into headers that direct water to the effluent sump. Normally, this effluent flows over a weir in the sump, then to the K-area out-fall, and eventually to the Savannah River. An interruption in the RWS supply to tile CW basin is an abnormal condition that has the potential to adversely affect reactor safety. Following this loss of river water to the CW basin, the reactor must be shut down and water conservation established to ensure a 72-h supply of cooling water. This paper briefly describes a methodology developed by the accident management group at the Savannah River site (SRS) for review of the safety analysis and operating/emergency procedures for selected design-basis accidents. The major focus of the review methodology is to identify any discrepancies between the safety analysis and the guidance given to reactor operators that could challenge the safety envelope described in the safety analysis report (SAR). A secondary focus of the methodology is to determine the likelihood that the operator is capable of performing the critical tasks as described in the SAR. The methodology addresses the assumptions made in performing the safety analysis and the results of the analysis of plant response to those conditions. This approach will be used in the review of the existing event-based procedures for selected design-basis accidents at SRS. The review will address the major components, support systems, and essential instruments