[en] This report describes the results of a functional and operational assessment of the Corral Monitoring Systems (CMS), which was designed to detect and document accountable items entering or leaving a monitored site. Its development was motivated by the possibility that multiple sites in the nuclear weapons states of the former Soviet Union might be opened to such monitoring under the provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The assessment was performed at three levels. One level evaluated how well the planned approach addressed the target application, and which involved tracking sensitive items moving into and around a site being monitored as part of an international treaty or other agreement. The second level examined the overall design and development approach, while the third focused on individual subsystems within the total package. Unfortunately, the system was delivered as disassembled parts and pieces, with very poor documentation. Thus, the assessment was based on fragmentary operating data coupled with an analysis of what documents were provided with the system. The system design seemed to be a reasonable match to the requirements of the target application; however, important questions about site manning and top level administrative control were left unanswered. Four weaknesses in the overall design and development approach were detected: (1) poor configuration control and management, (2) inadequate adherence to a well defined architectural standard, (3) no apparent provision for improving top level error tolerance, and (4) weaknesses in the object oriented programming approach. The individual subsystems were found to offer few features or capabilities that were new or unique, even at the conceptual level. The CMS might possibly have offered a unique combination of features, but this level of integration was never realized, and it had no unique capabilities that could be readily extracted for use in another system