[en] The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co (SKB) has a programme for the siting of a repository for spent nuclear fuel in Swedish bedrock. In 1996, the Swedish Government decided that SKB must perform an assessment of the repository's long-term safety before undertaking the next step of the programme which entails drilling in a minimum of two municipalities (site investigations). SKB has presented such a safety assessment in SR 97 Post-closure Safety (henceforth referred to as SR 97). SR 97 is one of the documents in the comprehensive reporting that SKB must provide when it proposes sites for investigation. The Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) and the Swedish Radiation Protection Institute (SSI) have evaluated SR 97 in terms of its purposes which are to demonstrate a methodology for safety assessment, to show that Swedish bedrock can provide a safe repository using SKB's method, to provide a basis for specifying the factors that are important for site selection and to derive preliminary requirements on the function of the engineered barriers. The authorities have reached the following conclusions: SR 97 does not indicate any conditions that would mean that geological final disposal in accordance with SKB's method would have significant deficiencies in relation to the safety and radiation protection requirements of the authorities. SR 97 contains the elements required for a comprehensive assessment of safety and radiation protection. SKB's safety assessment methodology has improved within several important areas, such as the documentation of processes and properties that can affect repository performance and the development of models for safety assessment calculations. The methodology used in SR 97 has some deficiencies, for example, the specification of future events to be described in the safety assessment. SR 97 has not, to an adequate extent, dealt with unfavourable conditions that can affect the future safety of a repository. SKB states that the results of SR 97 have been applied to formulate requirements and preferences regarding the host rock for a repository. In the authorities' opinion, SR 97 does not include a description of how this has been done. The coupling between safety assessment and site investigation, should be improved. A safety assessment of a repository for spent nuclear fuel will always contain uncertainties and deficiencies in the underlying data. Access to experts who can provide expert judgement is therefore vital. SKB should improve its procedures for obtaining expert judgement. To summarize, the authorities find that parts of the methodology in SR 97 must be further developed and detailed prior to the forthcoming stages of the site selection process. SKB's development of methods for safety assessment is a continuous process that should be conducted throughout all of the stages of the final disposal process. On the basis of the review of SR 97 and previous reviews of SKB's Research, Development and Demonstration programmes the authorities find that the KBS-3 method is an adequate basis for SKB's forthcoming site investigations and for the further development of the engineered barriers. In connection with future reviews of SKB's R, D and D programmes, the authorities intend to present additional views on the reporting that is necessary prior to the different stages of SKB's final disposal programme