[en] This report documents geosphere processes identified as relevant to the long-term safety of a KBS- repository, and forms an important part of the reporting of the safety assessment SR-Can. The detailed assessment methodology, including the role of the process report in the assessment, is described in the SR-Can Main report. The following excerpts describe the methodology, and clarify the role of this process report in the assessment. The repository system, broadly defined as the deposited spent nuclear fuel, the engineered barriers surrounding it, the host rock and the biosphere in the proximity of the repository, will evolve over time. Future states of the system will depend on the initial state of the system, a number of radiation related, thermal, hydraulic, mechanical, chemical and biological processes acting within the repository system over time, and external influences acting on the system. A methodology in ten steps has been developed for SR-Can described below. Identification of factors to consider (FEP processing): This step consists of identifying all the factors that need to be included in the analysis. Experience from earlier safety assessments and KBS-specific and international databases of relevant features, events and processes influencing long-term safety are utilised. Based on the results of the FEP processing, an SR-Can FEP catalogue, containing FEPs to be handled in SR-Can, has been established. The initial state of the system is described based on the design specifications of the KBS repository, a descriptive model of the repository site and a site-specific layout of the repository. The initial state of the fuel and the engineered components is that immediately after deposition, as described in the SR-Can Initial state report. The initial state of the geosphere and the biosphere is that of the natural system prior to excavation, as described in the site descriptive models. The repository layouts adapted to the sites are provided in underground design reports for each site. Factors related to external conditions are handled in the categories 'climate related issues', 'large-scale geological processes and effects' and 'future human actions'. The handling of climate related issues is described in the SR-Can Climate report, whereas the few external, large-scale geosphere processes are addressed here in the Geosphere process report. The treatment of future human actions in SR-Can is described in the SR-Can FHA report. The identification of relevant processes is based on earlier assessments and FEP screening. All identified processes within the system boundary relevant to the long-term evolution of the system are described in dedicated Process reports, i.e. this report and process reports for the fuel and canister and for the buffer and backfill. For each process, its general characteristics, the time frame in which it is important, the other processes to which it is coupled and how the process is handled in the safety assessment are documented, Definition of safety functions, function indicators and function indicator criteria. This step consists of an account of the safety functions of the system and of how they can be evaluated by means of a set of function indicators that are, in principle, measurable or calculable properties of the system. Criteria for the safety function indicators are provided. The Process reports are important references for this step. A FEP chart is developed, showing how FEPs are related to the function indicators. Data to be used in the quantification of repository evolution and in dose calculations are selected using a structured procedure. Also, a template for discussion of input data uncertainties has been developed and applied. A reference evolution, providing a description of a plausible evolution of the repository system, is defined and analysed. The isolating potential of the system over time is analysed in a first step, yielding a description of the general system evolution and an evaluation of the safety function indicators. If the evolution indicates breaching of isolation, the retarding potential of the repository and its environs is analysed and dose consequences are calculated for the long-term conditions identified in the first step. Also, some canister failure modes not resulting from the reference evolution are analysed in order to further elucidate the retarding properties of the system. Each process is handled in accordance with the plans outlined in the process reports. A set of scenarios for the assessment is selected. A comprehensive main scenario is defined in accordance with SKI's regulations SKIFS 2002:1. For each safety function, an assessment is made as to whether any reasonable situation where it is not maintained can be identified. If this is the case, the corresponding scenario is included in the risk evaluation for the repository, with the overall risk determined by a summation over such scenarios. The set of selected scenarios also includes e.g. scenarios explicitly mentioned in applicable regulations, such as human intrusion scenarios, and scenarios and variants to explore design issues and the roles of various components in the repository. The main scenario is analysed essentially by referring to the reference evolution in step 7. An important result is a calculated risk contribution from the main scenario. The additional scenarios are analysed by focussing on the factors potentially leading to situations in which the safety function in question is not maintained. In most cases, these analyses are carried out by comparison with the evolution for the main scenario, meaning that they only encompass aspects of repository evolution for which the scenario in question differs from the main scenario. For these scenarios, as for the main scenario, a risk contribution is estimated