[en] This paper is an extension to earlier studies that examined the attractiveness of materials mixtures containing special nuclear materials (SNM) and alternate nuclear materials (ANM) associated with the PUREX, UREX, COEX, THOREX, and PYROX reprocessing schemes. This study extends the figure of merit (FOM) for evaluating attractiveness to cover a broad range of proliferant state and sub-national group capabilities. The primary conclusion of this study is that all fissile material needs to be rigorously safeguarded to detect diversion by a state and provided the highest levels of physical protection to prevent theft by sub-national groups; no 'silver bullet' has been found that will permit the relaxation of current international safeguards or national physical security protection levels. This series of studies has been performed at the request of the United States Department of Energy (DOE) and is based on the calculation of 'attractiveness levels' that are expressed in terms consistent with, but normally reserved for nuclear materials in DOE nuclear facilities. The expanded methodology and updated findings are presented. Additionally, how these attractiveness levels relate to proliferation resistance and physical security are discussed.