[en] This report addresses the development of a nuclear infrastructure in Iran, and assessments are made on the near-term potential this infrastructure might yield of either nuclear power or nuclear arms production. The most significant facilities are treated in a more elaborate fashion, as these are assumed to have key roles in either a true civilian programme, or in the prospect of weapons-grade fissile material production. The future potential capacity for the latter is calculated under certain presumptions, both in the case that Iran focuses its efforts on uranium-based nuclear weapons, and in the case that it should choose the plutonium path to nuclear weapons. All the conclusions and findings in this report are based on technological considerations. This means that social or political assessments have not prevailed, rather the picture of Iran's nuclear programme is drawn through descriptions and assessments of facilities and systems, and their role in the bigger context. Definite conclusions have not been made as to whether Iran's nuclear programme currently is aimed towards nuclear arms or nuclear power. The secrecy surrounding some of the most prominent nuclear sites together with more or less credible allegations of purely weapons-related activities in the past, make it hard not to conclude that Iran until the disclosures in 2002 made as great an effort as it could on its way on developing nuclear weapons covertly. The scope of today's nuclear programme seems, on the other hand, most likely to be in part to help relieve the ever-increasing need for energy, although considerable deficits to this strategy are identified, at the same time as the Iranian people are united in a giant, high-prestige project in defiance of massive international pressure. Adding to this is a much-feared ability to rapidly being able to redirect their nuclear efforts, and develop nuclear arms in perhaps as little as one year. This so-called break-out scenario, where Iran presumably would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), has generated enough concern among several of the dominant nations in the world, that they have gone to great lengths to try to dissuade Tehran from the continued pursuit of its in principle legal nuclear activities. As this report is issued, Iran still has some way ahead before its infrastructure can readily provide it with nuclear weapons on demand. But Iran seems almost to have overcome the presumably highest technological threshold, namely full-scale uranium enrichment. Today's infrastructure is far from sufficiently developed to be able to fully support Iran's planned nuclear power developments, but on the other hand the need for indigenously produced nuclear fuel is also several years ahead, as long as Iran's first self-constructed nuclear power plant is far from completion. The known and assumed uranium deposits, however, are of minute proportions compared to the stated ambitions of their nuclear power programme (20 GWe within 2030). Iran's future reactors will hardly be able to go online before they become dependent on fuel from abroad. The uranium deposits are, on the other hand, abundant for the future production of several thousands of nuclear weapons. And if the infrastructure that is arising today is actually directed towards that purpose, Iran will in theory some day be able to produce more than a hundred nuclear weapons a year. (Author)