[en] General remarks In furtherance of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety (the Action Plan) unanimously endorsed by the Member States as a result of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, the IAEA held an International Experts’ Meeting (“IEM”) from 19-22 March 2012. The primary objectives of this IEM were to analyze relevant technical aspects of reactor and spent nuclear fuel management safety and performance; to review what is known to date about the accident in order to understand more fully its root causes; and to share the lessons learned from the accident. These objectives served to pursue several purposes of the Action Plan: · to discuss the results of Member States national assessments of the safety vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants in light of lessons learned to date (Action Plan, Safety Assessments in the Light of the Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power station bullet no. 11); · to analyze all relevant technical aspects and learn the lessons from the Fukushima accident. (Action Plan, Communication and Information Dissemination bullet no. 41); and · to help facilitate and to continue to share with member states a fully transparent assessment of the accident in cooperation with Japan (Action Plan, Communication and Information Dissemination bullet no. 5). The IEM was attended by approximately 230 experts from 44 Member States and 4 international organizations. There were wide-ranging and open discussions and a full exchange of information. This summary is intended to reflect observations that were made at the IEM, but does not necessarily reflect the consensus of the participants. The IEM revealed that the Member States (including regulators, industry, and technical support organizations), the IAEA Secretariat, and other relevant organizations had undertaken very significant efforts to analyze the Fukushima accident and to take appropriate actions to respond to it. The overall efforts have been comprehensive, thoughtful, and impressive. It is anticipated that nuclear safety will be greatly strengthened as a result. The presentations and discussions revealed that the Member States had taken a variety of largely independent efforts to examine the accident. It was reassuring to note that, despite somewhat different terminology and emphases, the analyses had largely converged on the same conclusions. The similarities in actions provide confidence that significant issues have not been overlooked. There were expected common elements in the efforts of the various Member States directed at assurance of protection from extreme events (e.g. earthquakes, tsunamis, flooding, tornadoes, or other site-specific external hazards), at a capacity to respond to station blackout and to assure a heat sink, to improve communications and emergency response, to control hydrogen deflagration and detonation, and to respond to threats to spent fuel pools. But the discussions also revealed a widespread undertaking to strengthen the overall safety framework. Just as the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents brought about an overall strengthening of the safety system, it is already apparent that the Fukushima accident will have a similar effect. One important element of a broadened safety agenda is the concerted effort to establish a robust capacity to protect against a beyond-design-basis accident. In effect, the presentations revealed an intention to establish an additional layer of protection to prevent a severe accident regardless of the initiating event. This is to be accomplished by additional installed and/or mobile equipment that provides increased assurance of a capacity to meet essential functions, such as a need for electrical power or cooling water. There was emphasis as well on efforts to place a priority not only on preventing accidents, but also mitigating them and placing a priority on preserving containment. Moreover, there are efforts to strengthen severe accident management guidelines and to improve emergency response capacity. The result should be greatly strengthened defense in depth. In short, good progress has been made on improving safety and a large number of activities are in process. Member States, both regulatory bodies and operators, are taking aggressive actions to increase safety. And the Action Plan is providing an appropriate framework for the development and sharing of essential lessons learned. These efforts should continue